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ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes a probabilistic method for evaluating transmission grid 
security after line shunt faults. The most efficient contributions to system 
reliability enhancement can be found in probabilistic methods applicable to real 
transmission grids. One aim of the research was also to get an estimate of the 
Finnish 400 kV transmission grid reliability.  
The method developed in this thesis takes into account the effect of the 
following issues: frequency of line faults, fault location on the line, protection 
system, different substation structures, failure rates of substation components 
and the dynamic behaviour of the power system after different contingencies. 
Mathematical modelling and computational methods were used in this 
research. Statistical analyses for the estimation of initiating events such as line 
faults were made. A failure mode and effect analysis was made for substation 
components using both the Finnish 400 kV device-failure database and expert 
judgments. Reliability analyses for substation post-fault operations were made 
with event and fault trees. Different event tree end states (fault duration and 
circuit breaker trips) were then simulated with a power system dynamic 
analysis program using a particular load flow and grid topology. The dynamic 
analysis results were classified as secure, alert, emergency and system 
breakdown. A special alert case 'partial system breakdown' was also classified. 
The event trees were then reanalysed, now focusing on the power system states 
rather than the substation consequences.  
The method was applied to the Finnish transmission system and some 
quantitative estimates for grid reliability were obtained. Several grid-level 
importance measures (Fussell-Vesely, risk decrease factor, risk increase factor 
and sensitivity of parameters) for substation components and model 
parameters, as well as estimates of the total and partial system breakdown 
frequencies, were calculated. In this way, the relative importance of the 
substation components regarding the total and partial system breakdown was 
reached. Contributing factors to partial and total system breakdown after line 
faults were also found and ranked. On the basis of the results, some 
recommendations for improving the transmission grid reliability, in terms of 
maintenance planning and investments, were made. 
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PREFACE 
After I had attended the last examination for my licentiate degree in February 
2002, I dropped in to Antero Arkkio’s office in the Electromechanics 
laboratory and chatted with him for a while. Perhaps I was slightly frustrated 
with my life at that time or maybe I just felt like a new challenge. Antero 
suggested that I make a doctoral thesis. Well, I thought, this is a nice 
proposition. I then mentioned the idea to my boss at Fingrid, Jussi Jyrinsalo. He 
thought it sounded good and we started to search for a suitable topic. The 
subject was found later that year when I met Ritva Hirvonen, who was then 
working as a research manager at VTT (Technical research centre of Finland). 
VTT had some years earlier made a preliminary transmission grid reliability 
study for Fingrid plc. Ritva said that this topic warranted further research and 
would be suitable for a thesis.  
After this things went ahead very quickly. Fingrid promised to finance the 
project and to give me all the technical information I needed. I started my 
student leave in September 2002 when I went to VTT. I performed the first part 
of this research there and stayed until the end of 2003. By the end of 2003 the 
situation at VTT had changed; Ritva Hirvonen had left to take up a position at 
the Energy Market authority. Matti Lehtonen had also left VTT to work as a 
full-time professor at TKK (Helsinki University of Technology). I then 
completed the research and finalized the thesis manuscript at TKK in 2004. 
To conclude: this thesis is the result of a suggestion by a professor, 
financial and technical support from Fingrid, financial support from TEKES 
and research co-operation between Fingrid, VTT and TKK. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS 
AC Alternating current 
AR Autoreclosing 
BFR Breaker failure relay 
CB Circuit breaker 
CIGRE International Council on Large Electric Systems 
CT Current transformer 
D Line differential relay 
DC Direct current 
ET Event tree 
f Frequency  
IEfˆ  Estimate of the annual frequency of initiating events per line 
kilometre 
FMEA Failure mode and effect analysis 
FV Fussell-Vesely importance measure. This is also known as the 
fractional contribution of basic event to risk. 
HVDC High Voltage Direct Current 
IE Initiating event 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IEV International Electrotechnical Vocabulary 
l The length of the line in kilometres 
  12
MCB Miniature circuit breaker 
MCS Minimal cut set 
MTTR Mean time to repair. In this thesis MTTR is used to denote the 
mean active repair time instead of the mean down time of the 
component. 
NERC North American Electric Reliability Council  
Nordel Nordel is an organisation for co-operation between the 
transmission system operators the Nordic countries, i.e. 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. 
n-1 criterion The n-1 criterion is a method of providing reliability to systems. 
According to this criterion, the system is sufficiently reliable if it 
is able to operate under any unplanned outage of a component 
due to a single cause. In a power system, the criterion means that 
the loss of any line, busbar, generator or transformer after a 
single power system fault will not cause overloading of the 
remaining components or other problems. 
P Probability 
PLC Power line carrier 
POTT Permissive overreach transfer tripping. Protection using 
telecommunication, with overreach protection at each section end 
and in which a signal is transmitted when a fault is detected by 
the overreach protection. Receipt of the signal at the other end 
permits the initiation of tripping by the local overreach protection 
(IEC 1995). 
PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
PSB Partial system breakdown. A special alert or emergency state of a 
power system, when the extended fault duration has caused extra 
generator trips or permanent blocking of HVDC links.  
pu Per unit 
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PUTT Permissive underreach transfer tripping. Protection using 
telecommunication, with underreach protection at each section 
end and in which a signal is transmitted when a fault is detected 
by the underreach protection. Receipt of the signal at the other 
end initiates tripping if other local permissive protection at the 
other end has detected the fault (IEC 1995). 
q Constant unavailability 
RAR Rapid automatic reclosing operation 
RDF Risk decrease factor 
RIF Risk increase factor 
SB System breakdown 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System 
SF6 Sulphur hexafluoride. This is a gas that has been used in high 
voltage circuit breakers and other switchgear. 
Ti Test interval 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
UCTE Union for the Coordination of Electricity Transmission. This is 
the association of transmission system operators in continental 
Europe. 
VT Voltage transformer 
VTS Voltage transformer supervision 
Z-relay Distance relay 
λ  Failure rate 
λˆ  Failure rate estimate 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The traditional way to plan and operate a power transmission system involves 
the deterministic n-1 criterion. In this method, the power system is operated in 
such a way that, after any single contingency, the system remains stable and a 
new operating point without overloading and voltage violations can be reached. 
Probabilities of different faults are traditionally not taken into account; instead 
all faults that may limit the transmission capacity are treated equally. This 
method can lead to conservative utilization of the grid. The liberalization of the 
electricity markets has called for using the transmission grid more efficiently 
than before. Also, it has become more difficult to get rights-of-way for building 
new transmission lines, which increases the pressure to transfer more power via 
the existing lines.  
In the Finnish Electricity Market Act it is stated that “the electricity 
market authority orders one grid operator to be responsible for the technical 
operability and reliability of Finland's electricity system…” This is called 
"system responsibility". Thus the transmission system operator derives a 
motivation for the grid reliability analysis directly from the legislation.  
The transmission system operators try to keep the security of the grid at as 
high a level as possible. The resources for that are always limited. Most benefit 
from the existing resources can be received if the decisions in investments, 
maintenance and operation prove to be correct. The most efficient contributions 
to the system reliability can be found by using the probabilistic methods.  
The power systems are usually large, complex and, in many ways, non-
linear systems. The post-fault phenomena in a power system are dynamic in 
nature and dependent on the grid connection and load flows in different parts of 
the grid. Thus the security analysis of a power system is a difficult task. The 
effects of an unreliable power system transmission can be widespread and 
affect millions of people, as was the case in the USA, Italy and Sweden in 
August and September 2003 (NERC 2004, UCTE 2004, and Svenska Kraftnät 
2003).  
The reliability and risk assessment tools have been widely used for many 
applications, for nuclear and conventional power plants, for example. There are 
several software tools for these purposes. So far no power system reliability 
analysis software package that would allow the user to simulate different 
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substation structures in detail in a comprehensive power system reliability 
analysis has been introduced.  
The organisation of the Nordic power system companies, Nordel, revised 
in 1992 its grid planning rules. The Nordic Grid Code 2004 includes the 
planning rules dated 1992 (Nordel, 2004). The probabilistic approach applied 
in the Grid Code accepts major system breakdowns after extreme faults. These 
planning rules have aroused the need to analyze grid security with probabilistic 
methods.  
In 2000, the Finnish transmission system operator Fingrid plc, together 
with VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland), searched for commercial 
reliability analysis computer programs that would both take into account the 
substation post-fault events and the impact of different substation structures on 
reliability and that would also be suitable for local solutions. There were some 
programs that had a substation model, but it was not suitable for the meshed 
transmission grid. After that, in 2002, Fingrid plc started a research project 
together with the Technical Research Centre of Finland. The aim of the project 
was to develop a probabilistic reliability analysis method for the grid security 
analysis. The probabilities of different faults, the post-fault events at the 
substations and the consequences of these faults for the power system at 
different load flows were inside the scope of this research. Helsinki University 
of Technology joined the project at 2004. This thesis is a part of this research 
project. 
1.2 The research problem 
Central to the research problem of this thesis is the estimation of transmission 
grid reliability in such a way that both post-fault substation events, i.e., the 
protection system and circuit breaker operations, and the power system 
dynamics are included.  
The purpose is also to evaluate the applicability of the traditional 
reliability methods, such as failure mode and effect analysis, probabilistic 
safety assessment, event and fault trees, to power system reliability analysis. 
1.3 Objectives of the study  
The main objective of this research is to develop a probabilistic method for 
estimating the transmission grid reliability. The method should take into 
account the substation also. The protection systems and circuit breakers are 
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situated at substations. Failure of these components can lead to a series of 
events that are usually not taken into account in transmission grid planning. 
The probabilistic and systematic analysis of these post-fault operations can give 
rise to indicators of reliability and thus help grid planning and operation. The 
aim was also to compare the effect of different busbar schemes and different 
substation components on reliability.  
In order to use the research resources more efficiently by avoiding the 
development of new software, it was thought that the method developed should 
preferably use existing computer programs rather than require one that was 
purpose-made. In the market there are several computer programs for reliability 
analysis and for power system simulation. 
One objective was to obtain an estimate of the Finnish 400 kV 
transmission grid reliability, too.  
1.4 Scope of the research 
Line faults are studied as they are the most common faults of the transmission 
grid. Busbar faults can be more severe, but they are rare compared to line 
faults. Security, not adequacy, is the power system issue of interest. The 
substation model includes only those components that isolate the faulted line 
after a fault, i.e., the protection system and circuit breakers.  
The method is applied to the Finnish 400 kV grid; only one load flow is 
studied. In the load flow case used in the study, Sweden imports power to 
Finland via AC lines in the north. In this case, the voltage stability sets the limit 
for power transfer, so the case is not sensitive to the situation in Sweden and 
Norway. The dynamic behaviour during the export case is a more complicated 
issue. The limiting factor is the damping of interarea oscillations, which is a 
function of the Finnish load flow and also the generator connection and grid 
loading of southern Sweden and Norway. 
The analysis finds out the frequency of different power system states 
(secure, alert, emergency and system breakdown) after line faults. Also, partial 
system breakdown (trip of extra generators or HVDC links due to extended 
fault duration), which is one alert case, is calculated. The importance measures 
are calculated only for total and partial system breakdowns. The complete 
reliability analysis of emergency and alert states would require a human 
reliability analysis, since the control centre personnel needs to act during these 
states. This is outside the scope of this thesis. The alert state in this research 
includes several different network configurations and consists of several event 
tree end branches. Some alert states are more critical than others. The complete, 
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or even sufficient, analysis of the alert states in different load flow cases is a 
major task and would require a different study.  
Only technical aspects, not economic are taken into account in this study. 
However, the results of this analysis can be used in decision making where 
economic issues are considered also. The system protection schemes are not 
studied. 
The simulations already completed are sufficient for evaluating the 
suitability of this method for the power system post-fault reliability analysis. In 
order to get a full view of the power system security, the method should be 
applied to busbar faults also and the simulations should be made with different 
load flows. 
1.5 Research methods  
Mathematical modelling and computational methods are the tools used in this 
research. Reliability analysis for substation components and dynamic 
simulations for the power system are made. These two issues are then 
combined in order to meet the objectives of the study. A reliability model is 
created during this study. The model applies event and fault trees. The power 
system simulation model used in this study is the existing model of the Finnish 
grid and is made at Fingrid plc.  
The basic idea was to get an overview of the grid reliability. In order to 
get the best benefit from the resources available, the use of existing computer 
programs was preferred instead of creating new software. The development of 
a method of grid reliability analysis using commercial computer programs was 
thought to be a good solution. Any substation structure can be analysed by 
using fault and event trees to the degree of accuracy found best by the user. 
This approach is laborious and requires a deep understanding of the grid, but it 
gives more flexibility, since any substation schemes and meshed and radial 
grids can be analysed. The substation reliability model was made with software 
Risk Spectrum (Relcon 2003). Power system dynamic simulations were made 
with PSS/E (Shaw PTI 2001).  
Statistical analysis for the estimation of the reliability characteristics of 
grid components and initiating events such as line faults were made. 
Additionally, some other reliability engineering methods, such as failure mode 
and effect analysis, were used. The source data for these analyses was received 
from the database of the Finnish transmission system operator Fingrid plc; thus 
this is a case study of a transmission grid. 
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1.6 Scientific contribution  
The main contribution of the study is a probabilistic method for transmission 
grid security analysis after line shunt faults. This method combines the failure 
analysis of the post-disturbance operations at the substations and the response 
of the power system to these failures. With this method, it is possible to 
estimate the probability of the system breakdown and other power system 
states.  
This study differs from other studies in that it is applicable to transmission 
grids of real size, takes into account the power system dynamics after grid 
shunt faults and, additionally, develops a detailed substation model that 
includes all the components necessary for line fault isolation. 
The method developed for substation post-fault operations uses event and 
fault trees and therefore inherently introduces the possibility of calculating 
different grid-level importance measures for substation components and for 
model parameters. With these component and parameter importance measures, 
the more and less effective ways of improving grid security can be found. They 
also help to find the contributing factors to system breakdown.  
The method developed here takes into account the effect of the following 
issues on reliability:  
 
• Frequency of line faults 
• Fault location on the line 
• Different substation structures 
• Failure rates of substation components  
• Dynamic behaviour of the power system after different contingencies 
• Reach of the remote back-up distance protection  
 
In the literature, the power system reliability analyses often concentrate on 
the grid dynamics and are made without a substation model or with a limited 
model. Even if the substation post-fault events are taken into account, the 
approach does not take into account all the relevant substation components. On 
the other hand, there are reliability analysis methods for substations only, even 
quite detailed ones, but they do not pay attention to the fact that a similar 
failure at different substations, or at the same substation but with a different 
load flow, can lead to completely different power system consequences.  
The method developed here was applied to the Finnish transmission grid and 
some quantitative estimates for the grid reliability were received. The estimates 
of the partial and total system breakdown frequencies after line shunt faults 
were calculated. The estimates were calculated for a lightly loaded grid only, 
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which means that the results received are, to some extent, too optimistic. Also, 
different substation component importance measures in relation to system 
breakdown were calculated as well.  
1.7 Outline of the thesis 
After the introduction, Chapter 2 describes the reliability concepts used in this 
study. Both the special concepts used in power system reliability analysis and 
general reliability concepts are mentioned. Chapter 3 deals with the previous 
work with transmission system security and the reliability modelling of 
substations. 
Chapter 4 presents the Finnish transmission system in general and those 
details that are needed in reliability modelling. The statistics of the Finnish 400 
kV grid faults, which are used for identifying the initiating events for the 
reliability model, are described in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 presents some aspects of the transmission system reliability 
modelling. It first describes the framework of the reliability modelling in 
general, after which it describes the model of this study. Finally, comments on 
a comprehensive reliability analysis of a power system are presented.  
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 report the transmission system reliability model of this 
study. The substation model with event and fault trees is described in Chapter 
7. After that, the failure model and effect analysis made in this study is 
described and, finally, some remarks on the common cause failures are made. 
Chapter 8 describes the dynamic simulations that are made according to the 
results of the substation model. It also presents the classification of the power 
system states. The way to combine the substation model and dynamic 
simulations is described in Chapter 9. This chapter describes the calculation of 
the frequency of post-fault power system states and different grid-level 
importance measures. It also gives some ways of creating indicators of system 
breakdown.  
The model was used for analysing the security of the Finnish 400 kV 
transmission grid after line faults. The results received with the model are 
presented in Chapter 10.  
Chapter 11 discusses the methodology, practical aspects, and 
miscellaneous issues of the model and proposes future work. Concluding 
remarks are presented in Chapter 12.  
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2 RELIABILITY CONCEPTS  
Concepts like reliability, alert state of a power system or adequacy of a power 
system have been used with different meanings in the literature. There are also 
concepts like security, which have a different and specific meaning in the 
power system and in the protection of the power system. The aim of this 
chapter is to define the main concepts used in this research in an unambiguous 
way.  
2.1 Reliability concepts in power system analysis  
2.1.1 Power system reliability 
In power systems, it is the term reliability that is widely used in the literature. 
The book written by Anderson (1999) about the power system protection and 
that by Anders (1990) about the probabilistic concepts in power systems use 
this term. The APM Task Force Report (1994), Beshir et al. (1999), Huang and 
Yishan (2002), Leite da Silva et al. (1993), Khan (1998), Miki et al. (1999), Rei 
et al. (2000), Xu et al. (2002) have used this term, too. In this thesis, the 
concept reliability is used as a general concept. There are two reasons for this. 
One is the fact that the literature uses this concept instead of the concept 
dependability. The other reason is the fact that, in this thesis, the protection has 
an important role. For power system protection, the general concept is 
reliability rather than dependability, both in the literature and in the standard 
(IEC 60050-448, 1995).  
Maybe it is worth mentioning that some people prefer dependability as a 
general term describing reliability. IEC vocabulary standard IEV 191 for 
“Dependability and quality of service” uses dependability as a term of 
collective availability performance but points out that it is used only for general 
description in non-quantitative terms (IEC 1990).  
Reliability 
Reliability of a power system is a general term that refers to the probability of 
its satisfactory operation in the long term. According NERC, as quoted by 
IEEE/CIGRE (2004), the reliability of a bulk power electric system, “is the 
degree to which the performance of the elements of that system results in 
  21
power being delivered to consumers within accepted standards and in the 
amount desired. The degree of reliability may be measured by the frequency, 
duration and magnitude of adverse effects on consumer service.” Reliability of 
power systems is divided into two different aspects: security and adequacy.  
Security 
Power system security is the ability of the power system to withstand sudden 
disturbances such as short circuits or non-anticipated loss of system 
components. Security refers to the degree of risk in its ability to survive 
imminent disturbances (contingencies) without interruption of customer 
service. Thus it relates to robustness of the system in a context of imminent 
disturbances and depends on the power system operating condition before the 
disturbance and the contingent probability of disturbances. Security is a 
dynamic issue and it implies both the transition to the new operating point and 
the state of this new operating point. (IEEE/CIGRE 2004) 
Adequacy 
Power system adequacy is defined by the IEEE/CIGRE Joint Task Force (2003 
p. 1393) as “the ability of the system to supply the aggregate electric power and 
energy requirements of the customers at all times, taking into account 
scheduled and unscheduled outages of the system components.” Adequacy is 
therefore a steady state issue and deals both with generation and transmission 
capacity.  
Reliability and security 
The distinction between reliability and security is worth noticing. Reliability is 
a function of the time-average performance of a power system, in different 
loading situations, after different faults, during different outages. It can only be 
judged by consideration of the system’s behaviour over an appreciable period 
of time. Security, on the other hand, is a time-varying attribute, which can be 
judged by studying the performance of the power system under a particular set 
of conditions. To be reliable, the power system must be secure most of the time 
(IEEE/CIGRE 2003). 
2.2 Faults and disturbances in a power system 
Power system fault is power system abnormality which involves, or is the 
result of, the failure of a primary system circuit or item of primary system 
plant, equipment or apparatus and which normally requires the immediate 
disconnection of the faulty circuit, plant, equipment or apparatus from the 
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power system by the tripping of the appropriate circuit breakers. Power system 
faults can be shunt, series, and combination faults (IEC 1995, 48-13-02). 
A shunt fault (short-circuit) is a fault that is characterized by the flow of 
current between two or more phases or between phase(s) and earth at the 
frequency of the associated power system (IEC 1995, 448-13-05). 
In this study, the concept ‘line fault’ means such a shunt fault at the power 
line that it can be tripped by the distance relays. Therefore line fault is used as a 
synonym for line shunt fault. A shunt fault can be either a short circuit or an 
earth fault. In this study, the concept ‘short circuit’ means a multiphase shunt 
fault with or without connection to the earth. ‘Earth fault’ in this study means a 
shunt fault between one phase and the earth, which can be tripped by the 
distance relays. The line faults, where the fault impedance is less than about 50 
Ω, can be detected and tripped by the distance relays. The concept ‘high 
resistance earth fault’ is an earth fault that cannot be tripped by the distance 
relays. 
Line shunt faults, i.e., short circuits and earth faults on the line always 
create a disturbance in an effectively earthed grid. The power system state after 
the disturbance is dependent on the fault location and the power system state 
before the fault. Because the 400 kV grid in Finland is effectively earthed, the 
fault currents of earth faults can be high and the faults need to be tripped 
quickly. 
2.2.1 Power system stability 
Stability is an important part of the power system security analysis, and can be 
divided into three different parts: generator rotor angle stability, voltage 
stability and frequency stability. Power system stability is the ability of an 
electric power system, under a given initial operating condition, to regain a 
state of operating equilibrium after being subjected to a physical disturbance 
with most system variables bounded so that practically the entire system 
remains intact (IEEE/CIGRE 2003). Machowski, Bialek and Bumby (1997), 
Prabha Kundur (1994) and Carson W. Taylor (1994), for example, have written 
books about power system stability. 
The rotor angle stability is the ability of synchronous generators in a 
power system to remain in synchronism. It can be divided into transient 
stability, which refers to stability after severe disturbances, and small signal 
stability, which refers to synchronism after small disturbances. If, after a fault, 
the generator angle increases suddenly because the active power cannot be 
transmitted to the grid or if the oscillations start to increase in amplitude, the 
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generator has lost angle stability and is tripped. The angle stability after a fault 
means that the possible electromechanical oscillations after a fault are damped 
and a new load flow is reached.  
Voltage instability after a disturbance occurs if the post-disturbance grid 
voltages are below or outside the accepted limits. The term voltage collapse is 
often used to refer to a system breakdown due to low voltages; more 
accurately, the term refers to the series of events that leads to a system 
breakdown or abnormally low voltages in a significant part of a power system. 
This may occur after a major transmission line or a big generator near the load 
area has tripped; this can lead to increased power transmission through 
remaining lines, which, in turn, increases the reactive power consumption. If 
the reactive power reserves are not sufficient for the new situation, the voltage 
values decrease, the remaining lines cannot transmit the power and a voltage 
collapse may occur. An example of a disturbance that almost caused a voltage 
collapse is presented in Hirvonen and Pottonen (1994). 
The frequency stability is the ability of a power system to maintain steady 
frequency following a severe system upset resulting in a significant imbalance 
between generation and load (IEEE/GICRE 2003). 
2.2.2 Power system states in a security analysis  
A power system security analysis requires the analysis of the power system 
during and after the disturbance. The stability (rotor angle, voltage and 
frequency) needs to be studied. If the case is unstable, the result is a system 
breakdown. If, and only if, the stability is maintained after the disturbance, a 
steady-state analysis of the post-fault system conditions against the thermal and 
voltage violations is meaningful.  
Stability and instability do not cover all the possible states of the power 
system. The power system states between the secure (normal) state and system 
breakdown are alert and emergency. These concepts are widely used in the 
literature and they are defined in the IEC dictionary, too (IEC 1990). The 
system state model with the states used in this study is presented in Figure 1. 
Normal  
The normal state here refers to the secure state of an electric power system, i.e., 
to a stable state that has the ability to withstand disturbances. 
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Figure 1  Power system states for the security analysis (Nordel 2002 p. 7) 
Alert 
An alert state of an electric power system is a state in which a credible event 
will result in loss of load, stresses of system components beyond their ratings, 
bus voltages and system frequency outside tolerances, cascading, voltage 
instability, or some other instability (IEC 1990, IEV-191-22-06). The system 
will remain stable and without any stresses beyond ratings as long as no fault 
occurs. The alert state would seem to be a normal state, but with no reserves 
available for disturbances.  
But because a disturbance during an alert state would lead to problems, 
this state is not secure and it would require operator actions in order to become 
a secure state. The maximum allowed time for operator actions in the Nordel 
system is 15 minutes. This 15-minute rule is an agreement between the Nordel 
transmission system operators. According to the agreement, the system shall 
within 15 minutes resume operation within normal limits of transmission 
capacity and frequency deviation (Nordel, 2002). The operator actions may 
include gas-turbine starting, for example, and load shedding and the power 
control of a high voltage direct current (HVDC) link.  
Emergency 
An emergency state of an electric power system is a state in which some 
system components are stressed beyond their ratings, or some bus voltages or 
system frequencies are outside tolerances (IEC 1990, IEV-191-22-05). In this 
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power system state, the grid operators shall act in such a way that the grid shall 
again reach a secure state. In this case, the maximum time for operator actions 
is also 15 minutes, according to Nordel requirements. But it may be possible 
that, in some situations, the control centre actions need to be made even faster 
in order to avoid a system breakdown. 
System breakdown  
System breakdown (SB) is a power system state in which the power system has 
collapsed. Often this is called a black out. This is a state in which the system 
has collapsed and operators start the system restoration. The breakdown can be 
caused due to rotor angle, voltage or frequency instability after the fault. It also 
can be caused by insufficient operator actions during an emergency state or 
after a fault that occurred during an alert state.  
2.2.3 Reliability concepts in power system protection 
Reliability of protection is defined as the probability that a protection can 
perform a required function under given conditions for a given time interval. In 
this context, the required function for protection is to operate when required to 
do so and not to operate when not required to do so (IEC 60050-448, 1995).  
The reliability of protection is divided into two categories: security of 
protection, defined as the probability of protection from not having an 
unwanted operation under given conditions for a given time interval, and 
dependability of protection, defined as the probability of protection from not 
having a failure to operate under given conditions for a given time interval 
(IEC 1995). Thus security deals with unwanted erroneous trips, while 
dependability focuses on the problem of missing trips after grid faults. 
2.3 General reliability concepts  
A comprehensive presentation about system reliability issues can be found in, 
for example, Rausand and Høyland (2004), Høyland and Rausand (1994) and 
Henley and Kumamoto (1992). The most important definitions are listed in this 
chapter.  
Availability 
Availability is the ability of an item to perform its required function at a stated 
instant of time or over a stated period. There is a difference between 
availability at time instant t and long-term constant availability. The former is 
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the probability that the item is functioning at time t, while the latter is the mean 
proportion of time the item is functioning.  
Unavailability 
The unavailability at time t is the probability that the item is not functioning at 
time t. The long-term constant unavailability is the mean proportion of time the 
item is not functioning.  
Failure mode and effect analysis  
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a systematic technique for failure 
analysis. It involves reviewing the components of the system to identify failure 
modes and their effects. This method is used to identify the potential failure 
modes of each of the functional blocks of the system and to study the effects 
these failures might have on the system. FMEA can be used for designing and 
as a basis for more detailed reliability analyses and for maintenance planning. 
It can be simply qualitative, or can include the quantitative evaluation of 
different failures as well. The concept FMECA is also used. This encapsulates 
failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis.  
Fault tree  
A fault tree is a logical model that explains the failures of higher-level failure 
event as a logical function of those of a lower level. Higher-level in this context 
refers to the system, while lower-level refers to the subsystems and 
components. In a fault tree construction, the starting point is the specified 
system failure (top event). The system components are regarded as the basic 
events in a fault tree.  
Event tree 
The starting point in building an event tree is the initiating event, which is an 
accident or a disturbance. The event tree is a logic tree diagram that 
systematically describes the sequence of events, which most often are safety 
functions planned for preventing a catastrophe after an accident. The diagram 
starts with the initiating event and provides a systematic analysis of the 
different possible outcomes of the sequences. Event tree analysis can be 
quantitative, qualitative or both. 
Minimal cut set 
A cut set is a set of basic events whose simultaneous occurrence ensures that 
the top event occurs. A cut set is minimal if it cannot be reduced. Both a fault 
tree and event tree analysis produce a group of minimal cut sets. 
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Probabilistic safety assessment, PSA 
Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) is a method for evaluating the safety 
level in different processes. It was originally developed for the evaluation of 
the core damage of nuclear power stations.  
Failure rate 
Failure rate is denoted as failures per unit of time. Some authors prefer the 
concept hazard rate instead of failure rate.  
Mean time to repair  
Mean time to repair is the average amount of time required to repair a 
component. This time starts after the fault is detected. 
A coherent system  
A coherent system is such that 
• if all the components are in a failed state, the system is in a failed state 
• if all the components are functioning, the system is functioning 
• when the system is in a failed state, no additional component failures 
will cause the system to function 
• when the system is functioning, no component repair will cause the 
system to fail. 
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3 PREVIOUS WORK  
The literature dealing with power system reliability can be divided according to 
the following issues: power system static and dynamic reliability, i.e., adequacy 
and security, and power system modelled with or without the substation. Figure 
2 presents different research approaches for transmission system reliability 
studies classified according these differences. It is also possible to model the 
substation operations without the power system, as can be seen in Section 3.5.  
 
 
Figure 2  Different approaches for the power system reliability analysis 
Some authors deal with power system reliability without a substation model. 
Substation events after a fault are assumed to be 100 % reliable and supposed 
only to change the grid topology. Some authors have a substation model 
included in the power system analysis, but different authors include different 
substation components in the model. Some authors deal merely with the 
substation reliability. 
This thesis belongs to the category in which the substation model is 
included; both the missing trips by the protection failures and by the circuit 
breaker failures are included in this thesis. 
Many papers. 
Outside the scope
of this research.
Substation model 
included No substation model
Se
cu
rit
y 
stu
di
es
 
Ad
eq
ua
cy
stu
di
es
Chapter 3.4: 
Missing trips of the 
the protection
Chapter 3.3
Chapter 3.1:
Circuit breakers or 
protection 
Chapter 3.2: 
Unwanted trips by the
protection
  29
3.1 Adequacy analyses of power system with a 
substation model 
Jourda (1993) and Jourda and Allan (1996) present a dynamic methodology for 
substation availability evaluations, because “the substations are the most 
important features of the electrical networks, because they are nodes and 
because the protection systems are mainly located in the substations”. They use 
Markov models for substation components and study substation operations 
after disturbances, taking into account the protection and possible protection 
failures. The authors have created new indicators in order to compare different 
substation designs.  
Many substation models do not allow the possibility of protection failures 
at all, but this approach is adequate for many purposes. The goal of the work by 
Xu et al. (2002) is to compare the effect of unplanned substation-originated 
outages to grid reliability. They use the average unavailability values of the 
substation components and study the effects of the failure of different 
substation components on the grid. The goal of the work of Medicherla et al. 
(1994), Karlsson et al. (1997) and Atanackovic et al. (1999) is to compare the 
effect of different substation configurations on substation reliability. 
Atanackovics et al. and Medicherla et al. use Markov models for substation 
components, Karlsson et al. calculate fault trees after having made an FMEA 
analysis. Power system adequacy analysis in which the circuit breaker trip at 
the substation is the main event is presented by Meeuwsen and Kling (1997). 
They have developed a computer program for analysing switching events at the 
substation, since the “faults at the substation can lead to line and generator 
tripping”. Software for substation reliability analysis presented by Goel and 
Shrestha (2002) includes the model for circuit breakers that trip after faults and 
change the grid topology. They calculate cut sets with a computer program 
after having made an FMEA for substation components.  
3.2 Power system security and unwanted protection 
operations  
A separate group consists of the power system security analyses with unwanted 
protection tripping. Many authors deal with the concept ‘hidden failures in 
power system protection’. Tamronglak et al. (1996), Koeunyi-Bae and Thorp 
(1999), Wang and Thorp (2001), Chen and Thorp (2002), Elizondo et al. 
(2001) and Yu and Singh (2002) present reliability studies that take into 
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account the hidden failures in protection and power system cascaded outages 
due to these hidden failures.  
Hidden failures are defined as “the incorrect operations that usually 
remain undetected until abnormal operating conditions are reached” (Wang and 
Thorp 2001) or “insecure or failed protection system that remains undetected 
until abnormal operating conditions are reached” (Bae and Thorp, 1999). 
Elizondo et al. (2001) define the hidden failure as “a permanent defect that will 
cause a relay or a relay system to incorrectly and inappropriately remove a 
circuit element(s) as a direct consequence of another switching event.” It is 
worth noticing that a hidden failure is hidden under normal operating 
conditions, but activates with increasing line loading and causes an unwanted 
and unselective trip.  
The probability of a hidden failure in these studies is a function of line 
loading. The authors analyse the cases where, in addition to a correct trip after 
a line fault, there exist also one or more unselective and unwanted trips. They 
analyse the power system adequacy after cascaded trips. Their focus is to find 
those areas of the power system that are most affected by hidden failures.  
Some authors present methods to find power system vulnerability indices. 
Yu and Singh (2003) study the power system behaviour after hidden failures, 
taking into account also the power system security. They use swing equations 
for that. Yu and Singh mention that “it is necessary to incorporate dynamic 
reliability analysis in a vulnerability study as well”, which is true, if we want a 
comprehensive hidden failure reliability analysis. Their method is applied to a 
test system with three generators, six lines and three load buses. 
Another study of unwanted line trips by the protection is a power system 
security assessment by presented by Singh and Hiskens (2001). Their method 
uses the Lyapunov energy function method for dynamic analysis and it takes 
into account the possible protection operations that can contribute the voltage 
collapse, rotor swings and voltage dips. The dynamic simulation method 
proposed by the authors is fast and efficient. They present a protection model 
for a distance relay with circular characteristics. The protection operations are 
modelled with equations that are called viability surfaces, which are for 
unwanted unselective trips during the disturbance.  
Anderson et al. (1997) propose a reliability model for redundant 
protection systems. They concentrate on protection dependability. If the relay 
fails to trip after a fault, the consequence may be the isolation of large sections 
of the power system by back-up protection. They use a Markov model and take 
into account common cause failures. Their model is very detailed and requires 
a considerable amount of outage data. The authors used the model and 
calculated their performance measures as a function of the relay test interval for 
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a typical transmission system. As a result, they concluded that they had found a 
reasonable testing interval for the protection devices.  
3.3 Power system security analyses without a substation 
model 
If the security is studied with adequacy or alone, the grid model presented in 
the literature often is simple and may consist of only some nodes and some 
lines. In the simplest cases, the grid model includes only a very small number 
of nodes and lines. I got the impression that most sophisticated models 
developed are applied to the most simple grid model. Wu et al. (1988) present a 
study for power system steady-state and dynamic security. Their example 
consists of a double line with generators on one end and load on the other. 
Loparo and Abdel-Malek (1990) present a power system security study with a 
very simple grid model, but with a very detailed reliability model.  
There have been many security analysis studies made without a substation 
model. Aboreshaid and Billinton (1999), Khan (1998), Rei et al. (2000), Leita 
da Silva et al. (1993), Huang et al. (2002), Beshir et al. (1999) and 
Shahidehpour et al. (1989) present a power system reliability analysis without a 
substation model. Correct trips after disturbances occur, but the interest is the 
power system state after those trips. This method inherently includes the 
simplification that both the protection and circuit breakers act 100 % reliably. 
This assumption, used by the authors mentioned above, is good for operation 
planning simulations, but has limited use as part of an overall approach to the 
reliability analysis of transmission grids. 
Makarov and Hardiman (2003) present risk-based probability indices for 
transmission systems. They present a concept of a normalized risk index, which 
expresses the duration of system problems and is not dependent on the system 
size. Using this assumption, they calculate the normalized risk index for lines 
and buses. They want to find out areas that are affected more than the others by 
violations and are thus the most vulnerable parts of the system. This method 
gives information about the structure of the power system if the different 
substations and lines really are equal.  
Berizzi et al. (2003) present a review of recent studies about power system 
security assessment. Authors describe several studies, most of which calculate 
different risk indices.  
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3.4 Power system security analysis with a substation 
model 
Miki et al. (1999) have developed a hybrid model that includes power system 
dynamic simulations and event trees for protection system operation. The 
protection is included in the model because “the protection systems play an 
important role for preventing fault cascading”. The protection system is 
modelled with a Markov model and the method is applied to a small model grid 
(19 nodes, 11 lines and 5 generators). The authors have made the extension 
from merely dynamic simulation to substation events. Since only the protection 
is modelled, the authors do not take into account the failures of the circuit 
breakers. Since the protection usually is duplicated, the protection is 
structurally more reliable than the circuit breakers.  
3.5 Protection reliability analyses 
Many authors deal with the reliability of protection as their main object and 
pay no or little attention to the consequences of protection failures to the power 
system. The APM Task Force (Allan et al., 1994) presents different methods 
(Markov models, event trees and Monte Carlo simulation) for power system 
protection analysis. They also point out that progress in modelling the effects 
of failures of the protection systems has been slower than developments in 
other areas or power system reliability studies. They conclude that estimating 
the likelihood of the instability due to protection system failures is not yet a 
mature technique, because the protection systems are complex and it is difficult 
to model the effects of protection malfunctions on power systems. 
Transmission line protection system unreliability statistics are presented 
by Johannesson et al. (2004). This is an updated research of that by Svensson et 
al. (1992). Johannesson et al. present the fact that, in their case study, the 
percentage of power system disturbances with incorrect protection operations is 
about 7 % and that amount did not increase with the implementation of digital 
relays. In their statistics, the percentage of unwanted relay operation is 59.3 % 
and the percentage of missing operation is 19.3 %. The authors also present an 
extensive list of the causes of unwanted relay operations.  
According to a NERC (North American Electric Reliability Council) 
study conducted from 1984 to 1988 as quoted by Tamronglak et al. (1996), the 
relative amount of those significant disturbances, where the protective relays 
are somehow involved, varied between 60 and 92 %. The authors do not report 
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how often the protection problems were failure to trip and how often it was an 
unwanted unselective trip. 
Pugh et al. (1997) present a reliability model that uses event trees for 
analysing modern protection systems, where the main protection, back-up 
protection, control, disturbance recorder and event register are integrated in one 
device. Event trees for differential and distance protection with the succeeding 
and failure probabilities are presented. This is a comparison of the effects that 
the telecommunication and the doubling of the main protection have on the 
overall protection reliability. The authors wanted to display that it is possible to 
develop the reliability models to evaluate the dependability of the protection 
systems. 
The event tree method for protection reliability studies is presented by 
Ferreira et al. (1996). The authors present the planning of integrated protection 
in a National Grid Company in UK. The focus of the research is on protection 
security and dependability and the authors study a differential relay operation 
after a line fault. Current transformers, unit protection, trip relays, intertripping 
system and circuit breaker trip coils are included in the protection model. This 
approach is detailed and can be used for comparing some specific protection 
systems. Ferreira et al. (2001) have further compared the traditional protection 
and the modern protection system with functional integration by using event 
trees. The result of their study is that a judicious integration of functions leads 
to reliability gains. 
Aabo et al. (2001) compare two different protection systems in a case 
study of the Norwegian grid, where unwanted trips are a problem. They use 
event trees and compare the traditional relays that are tested once in two years 
and modern relays with self-supervision functions. Their conclusion is that, 
since the modern relays have self-supervision, the maintenance procedures are 
reduced and this leads to reduction in works at the substation and reduces the 
possibility of human errors.  
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4 THE FINNISH TRANSMISSION SYSTEM 
In this chapter, the Finnish 400 kV transmission grid is presented. The 
reliability practices and the substation schemes and protection system 
characteristics are briefly described.  
4.1 The grid with connections to abroad  
The Finnish transmission grid is presented in Figure 3. The total 400 kV line 
length is about 4300 km. The number of transmission lines is 39 and there are 
26 substations with busbars at 400 kV level. In addition, there are five 400 kV 
substations without a busbar. This is a 400/110/20 kV transformer connected to 
the third branch of a 3-branch line.  
The transmission grids of Finland, Sweden, Norway and the eastern part 
of Denmark are synchronously connected together and form the Nordel 
interconnected grid. The Finnish grid is connected to the Russian grid via a 
back-to-back HVDC link at Vyborg. This is only for the import of Russian 
power to Finland. Additionally, some Russian power stations are connected to 
the Finnish system instead of that of Russia.  
Two 400 kV alternating current (AC) lines and one HVDC link connects 
the Finnish and Swedish grids together. The HVDC link Fenno-Skan is both 
for the import and the export of power and connects the southern parts of 
Finland and Sweden together.  
4.2 Reliability practices  
Nordel is the organisation of Nordic transmission system operators (TSOs). 
The members of Nordel are the TSOs of all Nordic countries, i.e., Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. The three main activity areas in 
Nordel are system planning, market development and system operation. Today 
there is an agreement between the Nordic TSOs about the operating code 
(Nordel, 2004). Nordel published in 2002 the report “Reliability Standards and 
System Operating Practices” (Nordel, 2002). In this, it is stated that the Nordic 
TSOs shall jointly maintain the coherent operation of the Nordic power system 
with a satisfactory level of security and quality (Nordel, 2002, p.6). The 
reliability criterion of Nordel is based on the n-1 criterion. The criterion implies 
that  
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Figure 3  The Finnish transmission grid. 400 kV lines are blue, 220 kV lines 
green and 110 kV lines red. 
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•  “Single faults shall not result in serious operational disturbances. 
• There shall be an adequate disturbance reserve and transmission 
capacity to enable the Nordic power system to cope with clear design 
contingencies. 
• The loss of a busbar must not lead to serious operational disturbances. 
Following a disturbance on the n-1 level, the system shall within 15 
minutes resume operation within normal limits of transmission 
capacity and frequency deviation. 
• System protection schemes are accepted as part of n-1 criterion, and 
are used to a variable degree in the various countries. 
• Temporary n-0 principle is to a variable degree accepted regionally by 
each TSO under special operating conditions and when important 
lines are out for maintenance.” (Nordel, 2002, pp. 6-7) 
 
Nordel grid planning rules for the Nordic transmission system were revised in 
1992. The basic idea of these rules is that more severe consequences are 
acceptable after less frequent combinations of faults and operation conditions. 
The allowed consequences after a fault that occurs when the grid is 
spontaneously weakened are to some extent more severe than consequences 
after a fault that occurs when the grid is intact or during planned maintenance. 
An example of this is that, after a single fault that affects a series component 
(e.g., a line), the acceptable consequence is stable operation if the grid is intact 
or if there is a planned maintenance outage. If the same fault were to occur 
when the grid is spontaneously weakened, the acceptable consequence would 
be “controlled operation, regional consequences”. This means that a region in 
Nordel could have a system breakdown. The detailed list showing the 
classification of different faults and respective acceptable consequences 
following these can be found in the Nordel Grid Code (Nordel, 2004). 
4.3 Busbar schemes  
The Finnish 400 kV substations have two basic busbar schemes; these are 
described in this chapter. Both schemes have two main busbars. The main 
difference between these schemes is the number of circuit breakers per line 
end.  
The busbar scheme with a single circuit breaker for a line end is presented 
in Figure 4. This scheme has two main busbars and one auxiliary. Usually each 
line or transformer bay is connected to one main busbar only, the bus coupler 
circuit breaker is closed and connects the main busbars together and the 
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auxiliary busbar is dead. The bus coupler circuit breaker can be used for 
replacing the line or transformer circuit breaker with the bus coupler circuit 
breaker by utilizing the auxiliary busbar.  
This busbar scheme is called a single circuit breaker busbar scheme in 
this study. Only one circuit breaker needs to be tripped after a line fault when 
the line end has this busbar scheme. A busbar fault leads to disconnection of all 
the lines connected to the faulted busbar. 
 
 
Figure 4  The substation scheme with two main busbars, one auxiliary 
busbar and one circuit breaker for each line end 
The other common busbar scheme is presented in Figure 5. In this scheme, all 
line ends have two parallel bays, each equipped with a circuit breaker, a current 
transformer and disconnectors. All circuit breakers are normally closed. This 
busbar scheme is called a double circuit breaker busbar scheme in this study. 
After a line fault, two circuit breakers need to be tripped. 
There are two 400 kV substations that have only one busbar. Since these 
substations have one circuit breaker for a line end, they are modelled basically 
in the same way as the substations with two busbars and one circuit breaker per 
line end. After a busbar fault, the faulted busbar and all lines are tripped.  
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Figure 5  The substation scheme with two main busbars and two circuit 
breakers for each line end 
The third branch of a 3-branch line has only one 400/110/20 kV transformer. 
The substation scheme of this kind of branch is presented in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6  The substation scheme of the transformer branch of a 3-branch 
line 
4.4 The line protection system  
The Finnish 400 kV transmission line protection system always consists of two 
separate main protection relays. The two main relays are most often two 
different distance (Z) relays, which are equipped with the permissive overreach 
transfer trip scheme (POTT) or the permissive underreach transfer trip scheme 
(PUTT) in order to trip instantaneously faults, including those near the line 
ends. Both POTT and PUTT schemes need a telecommunication channel and 
thus are identical regarding the reliability of the protection. The line protection 
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specification requires that the two distance relays of the same line end shall not 
be of similar type.  
A simplified schematic representation of the zones of the distance 
protection is shown in Figure 7. Zone 1 covers about 80 % of the protected 
line, which in this case is the line between substations A and B. POTT and 
PUTT zones cover the whole protected line. Zones 2 and 3 of the distance 
relays located at substation A are the back-up protection systems for adjacent 
lines. Zone 2 covers the protected line completely and a section of the adjacent 
lines. Zone 3 covers the adjacent lines partly or completely. The trip signal of 
zones 2 and 3 is sent only after a delay, but zone 1 and POTT (PUTT) send a 
trip signal instantaneously. The reach of zones 2 and 3 is not constant. It 
depends on the characteristics of the relay and on the length of the protected 
line and adjacent lines and also on the amount of fault currents. In many cases, 
zone 3 cannot cover the whole length of the adjacent lines, since the fault 
current infeed from the other adjacent lines reduces the reach.  
 
 
Figure 7  The protection zones of the distance protection for two different 
cases 
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The main protection relays are completely redundant, apart from the voltage 
transformer and the primary winding of the current transformer. The relays are 
situated in different relay cubicles, fed by different 220 V DC batteries and 
they receive the current measurement from different cores of the current 
transformer. The voltage transformer is common to both distance relays. In 
new installations with static or microprocessor relays, the miniature circuit 
breakers of the voltage measurement are separate, but the old installations with 
electromechanical distance relays have common miniature circuit breakers. If 
the miniature circuit breaker trips, the distance relays are incapable of sending a 
trip signal. This common component of electromechanical distance relays is 
included in the corresponding fault trees.  
The static and microprocessor distance relays have a voltage transformer 
supervision, which detects the faults at the secondary circuit of the voltage 
measurement. This supervision prevents the distance relay trips, if it activates. 
The failure of the voltage transformer could lead to the activation of the voltage 
transformer supervision systems of both relays or it could trip both miniature 
circuit breakers. These occurrences would prevent the relay operation. 
However, the voltage transformer supervision operation and the trip of 
miniature circuit breaker send an alarm and are therefore immediately detected. 
After this alarm, both line protection systems are failed and the line is 
disconnected until the protection is repaired. These kinds of failures are not 
modelled. The probability of such occasions is small because it requires the 
simultaneous occurrence of two events. The duration of them is short because 
they send an alarm. No such failure has occurred. It is worth noticing that if the 
voltage transformer is failed in such a way that the voltage measurement is 
zero, but the voltage transformer supervision or the miniature circuit breakers 
are not operated, the correct operation of the protection during faults is not 
prevented. In this case, the problem might be the security of the protection, 
since the protection may trip if the load current exceeds the threshold limit of 
the relay.  
Very short lines and some other special lines, such as series-compensated 
lines, are provided with one distance relay and one differential relay.  
The relays send the trip signals to the relevant circuit breakers after a 
fault. The relays send a trip signal in less than 60 ms, the circuit breakers trip in 
about 40 ms. The instantaneous trip of a distance relay takes 50 ms at most. 
The permissive over- and underreach transfer trip scheme trips can take 60 ms 
due to the time required for the telecommunication signal. The delay of zone 2 
of the distance relays is 400 ms and the delay for zone 3 is 1000 ms.  
The breaker failure relay measures the current of the circuit breaker that 
has received a trip signal. If the current does not stop in a given time (200 ms in 
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the Finnish 400 kV grid), the breaker failure relay trips all the circuit breakers 
connected to the same busbar as the faulted one and sends a trip signal to the 
distance relays at the remote end substation of the faulted line bay.  
After instantaneous line trips there is one rapid autoreclosure and, if that 
fails, one delayed autoreclosure. The dead time of autoreclosing is different at 
different line ends. At one line end, called master in this study, the 
autoreclosing relay effects the autoreclosing first if the line is dead, i.e., if the 
measured line voltage is zero. At the other line end, called follower, the 
autoreclosing relay effects the autoreclosing after the master if the line voltage 
and busbar voltage are equal and in phase. After the delayed line trips, only 
delayed automatic reclosure is performed. The delayed trips are the trips by the 
zones 2 and 3 of the distance relays and the trips of the sensitive earth fault 
relays. 
For high resistance earth faults there are sensitive earth fault current 
relays. They are definite time relays that can trip faults with zero sequence 
current. The sensitivity of the relays is sufficient for earth faults with 500 Ω or 
less fault resistance. The time delay of the relays is typically about 3 seconds. 
4.4.1 Telecommunication systems for line protection  
The protection system for 400 kV lines is always equipped with at least one 
telecommunication channel. The channel is realised with an analogue power 
line carrier (PLC), with radio link, with optic fibres or with a combination of 
these. When there is only one telecommunication channel, both distance relays 
at both substations use the same telecommunication channel. This means that, 
even though the two main relays are redundant, the protection system for faults 
near the line ends is not completely redundant as regards the instantaneous trip. 
Two separate telecommunication channels are necessary when one main 
protection relay is a distance relay and the other is a differential relay. Also 3-
branch lines and series-compensated lines are equipped with duplicated 
telecommunication channels. The two channels always have different routes 
and are redundant, apart from the 48 V DC supply for the telecommunication 
devices.  
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5 400 KV GRID FAULTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the grid fault statistics of the Finnish 
400 kV grid. Both the number of different grid faults and the causes of them 
are reported. As grid faults are the initiating events of the series of events in the 
substation reliability model, this chapter contains a fundamental part of the 
research. Only after we know which faults occur more probably than others, 
can we decide what kind of substation reliability model would be suitable.  
5.1 Grid disturbance database 
The statistics presented in this chapter is from the grid disturbance database of 
Fingrid plc. The data used in this research covers the period 1983-2002. The 
database has the following data for each disturbance: number, date and time, 
fault location, operator responsible for the fault location, grid owner, faulted 
component, shunt fault type (earth fault, short circuit, other), causes of fault, 
faulted phases, the relays that tripped, possible reconnections, fault class (line 
fault, busbar fault, other fault), nature of the fault (primary fault, secondary 
fault) and a field for all kinds of comments and discussions. The energy not 
supplied at a delivery point and the price of that energy is also recorded. The 
latter is the validation of financial costs of the disturbance to society, not the 
energy not invoiced.  
The database is made for operation reliability analysis. The user can get 
predefined reports from the database and it is also possible to get different 
reports directly from the database. Some interpretation of the data was made in 
order to classify the faults correctly for this analysis. If the sensitive earth fault 
relay had tripped instead of the distance relay, the fault was interpreted as a 
high resistance earth fault.  
5.2 400 kV line faults  
5.2.1 Short circuits and earth faults on lines  
There have been 48 line short circuits and 166 line earth faults in the 400 kV 
grid during the period 1983-2002. Only five short circuits were permanent; 21 
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faults were cleared by rapid automatic reclosing relays and 22 were cleared by 
delayed automatic reclosing relays. The causes of the permanent line short 
circuits were high wind, a fallen tower and a small aeroplane that cut the earth 
wires. The reason for the short circuits that were successfully cleared was most 
often lightning stroke, but a tree near the conductors and a forest fire were also 
responsible.  
Table 1 Line-originated line trips in the Finnish 400 kV grid during the period 
1983-2002 
Cause Number of 
earth fault 
Number of 
short circuit 
Total 
number 
Lightning 127 38 165 
Snow or ice 3 1 4 
Spontaneous 
landslide 
1  1 
Forest fire  1 1 
Storm or high wind 5 4 9 
A tree or felling a 
tree 
9 2 11 
A failure of a tower 
or a part of a tower 
6 1 7 
Unknown 14  14 
Vehicle 1 1 2 
Total 166 48 214 
 
Most earth faults (133) were successfully cleared by rapid or delayed 
autoreclosure relays. Twenty earth faults were permanent, 11 faults were 
manually reconnected after a time delay, which was more than 15 minutes, and 
2 earth faults were reconnected manually after a time delay that was less than 
15 minutes. The causes of permanent earth faults were a tower or tower-part 
failure, a tree, a vehicle that cut the guy wire of a tower, ice on phase wires or 
dew on earthing wires and earth slide due to a nearby dumping place causing 
one tower to move. Some faults remain unknown. Sometimes the automatic 
reclosure did not function after a lightning stroke, which caused the fault to be 
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classified as permanent. The causes of non-permanent earth faults and short 
circuits with successful autoreclosure were lightning strokes, tree, ice on lines, 
high wind. Some fault causes remain unknown. 
Even when there is only one cause of several line faults, all faults are 
calculated. Once a storm created three successive short circuits before the line 
was manually disconnected. All these three faults are included in Table 1, 
because they are line faults that needed to be tripped. 
If we assume that the line fault frequency is constant per line unit length, 
and that the line shunt faults may be regarded as initiating events in the 
reliability analysis, we can calculate the estimate of the annual initiating event 
frequency IEfˆ  When the line fault statistics and line lengths during different 
years are known, the estimate can be calculated with the following equation: 
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in which FM is the number of line shunt faults during the year M and lM the line 
length during the year M. Thus IEfˆ  is equal to the total number of line faults 
divided by the total line kilometre years. During the period 1983-2002, the 
number of line shunt faults were 214; there were 72800 line kilometres 
altogether. Therefore the estimate for annual line fault frequency per kilometre 
is 2.9E-03. With the existing 4300 km of 400 kV lines, this estimate points to 
12.5 line faults per annum. 
5.2.2 High resistance earth faults 
There have been ten high resistance earth faults during the years studied. The 
faults are presented in Table 2. Most of them were caused by single trees, one 
was caused by a forest fire and one by a tower insulator chain breaking; in one 
case, the cause remains unknown. Only on three occasions was the faulted line 
correctly tripped without any unwanted unselective trips. 
The sensitive earth fault relays in the Finnish 400 kV grid measure only 
the current, not the voltage. The 400 kV grid is effectively earthed. Therefore, 
the zero-sequence voltage is small and the directional earth fault relays cannot 
be used, because the setting also needs to detect the earth faults, which have a 
fault resistance of 500 Ω. This limit is due to the electrical safety regulation. 
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For this reason, the selectivity is not always achieved by using sensitive earth 
fault relays.  
Table 2  High resistance earth faults in the Finnish 400 kV grid during the 
period 1983-2002 and the corresponding correct and unselective line trips  
Cause of 
the fault 
Correct 
trips 
Number of 
unselective 
trips  
Comment 
Unknown Yes 0  
A fallen tree Yes 0  
An insulator 
chain 
Yes 0  
A forest fire Yes 1 There was a fire under the line. The 
adjacent non-faulted line tripped at 
one line end. 
Tree 1  Yes 2 
Tree 1 Yes 4 
After the first fault, two healthy 
lines were tripped at one line end. 
The lines were reconnected. After 
three hours, the same tree caused a 
new earth fault. During this time 
four healthy lines tripped at one line 
end. 
Tree 2 Only one 
line end 
1 
Tree 2 Only one 
line end 
2 
Tree 2 Only one 
line end 
1 
Tree 2 Only one 
line end 
5 
The tree caused four successive 
earth faults. The terminal strip of the 
trip coil of the circuit breaker was 
not connected at one line end of the 
faulted line. Thus the faulted line 
tripped at one line end only (1/2). 
There were also unselective line 
trips and trips of near-by generators. 
5.3 Faults at the substations  
During the period 1983-2002, there were six busbar trips. There is no automatic 
reclosing operation after a busbar protection trip. Three busbar trips were 
caused by the explosion of a current transformer in a line bay or in a main 
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transformer bay. They were earth faults, which occurred in a substation with a 
single circuit breaker busbar scheme. One busbar trip was due to a human error 
during the substation connections after the explosion of a current transformer. 
The reason for this trip was the fact that the operation personnel had forgotten 
to set off the busbar protection before they started to connect the tripped lines 
to the healthy busbar.  
Only two busbar faults had causes other than those relating to the current 
transformer explosion. They both occurred at the double circuit breaker 
substation and were correctly tripped. In one case, the earthing switch at the 
SF6-switchgear was closed, even though the position display showed the open 
position. In the other case, the cause of the busbar short circuit was probably 
ice. A busbar was tripped during foul weather when there were snowy icicles 
and a flash was seen. No marks were found afterwards, so the reason for this 2-
phase short circuit remains unknown. 
According to these statistics, busbar short circuits are rare. If we ignore 
the current transformer explosions, the frequency of busbar short circuits is 
such that there would be one short circuit and one earth fault in 17 years, if the 
number of busbars remained the same. 
The number would be different if the current transformer explosions were 
taken into account. The analysis of current transformer explosions also requires 
a different approach because the initiating event can be a line fault, a busbar 
fault or a fault at the bay that combines two busbars. Also the possible 
protection operations are unforeseeable, as can be seen in Section 5.3.2, which 
analyses the possible consequences of the current transformer explosion.  
5.3.1 Special busbar shunt faults  
There is a substation fault, which is a special case. If the fault is situated at the 
bus coupler circuit breaker bay in a substation with a single circuit breaker 
busbar scheme, the result can be the trip of the whole substation, since the 
isolation of the fault requires the tripping of both busbars. This fault belongs to 
the group “other combinations of two faults with a common cause” in the 
Nordel grid planning rules. After this fault, the allowed consequence is 
“controlled operation, regional consequences” (Nordel, 2004). 
There have been three earth faults at the bus coupler circuit breaker bay. 
They were caused by the explosion of a current transformer.  
Usually the current transformer is situated on the line side of the circuit 
breaker as can be seen in Figure 4 and in Figure 5. Faults in the current 
transformer and also other faults between the current transformer and circuit 
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breaker are special busbar faults, since tripping the busbar is not enough to 
disconnect the fault from the grid. The busbar protection trips the busbar, but 
this does not stop the fault current flowing via the line. Also the line has to be 
tripped. In order to do that, the busbar protection and/or breaker fail relays send 
the telecommunication signal to the line distance protection of the remote end 
substation. If the distance protection at the remote end substation has started, it 
trips the line circuit breaker after it has received the signal at the remote end 
substation, after which the fault is isolated. If such a fault occurs at the double 
circuit breaker substation, both the busbar and one line are tripped, i.e., the 
transmission capacity loss is more than that following a normal busbar fault. If 
this fault occurs at the substation with a single circuit breaker busbar scheme, 
the result is similar to a normal busbar fault. 
5.3.2 An explosion of a current transformer  
Nine times a current transformer has exploded during the 20-year period of the 
study. The reason was a flaw in design. All the transformers were 
manufactured by the same company and they were of a similar type. After the 
explosions, all current transformers of that type were removed from the grid. 
The explosions happened in the summer.  
The consequences of the explosion of a line bay current transformer need 
not be the same. Possible consequences are line trip, busbar trip, an 
instantaneous substation trip by the busbar protection or the delayed substation 
trip by the remote end back-up protection. The explosion of a current 
transformer is a special kind of substation fault, since the consequences of the 
explosion can be anything between a line trip and the substation trip. The 
explosion a current transformer is not a controlled event and thus consequences 
other than the trip of the faulted bay are possible, even probable. The worst 
case would be if the secondary fault current were large enough to damage the 
busbar protection in such a way that it could not send a trip signal while, 
simultaneously, the line protection fails to measure a fault current. In this case, 
the fault would not be tripped at the faulted substation, but would be tripped by 
the distance relays at the remote end substations. The fault duration would be 
about 500 ms, which makes it a severe fault. 
The trips and fault locations of the explosions of the current transformers are 
presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3  Explosions of the current transformers (CT) at the 400 kV substations 
during the period 1983-2002 
CT 
location  
Num-
ber 
Tripped components and other comments 
Line 
bay 
1 The trip of the faulted line. The current of the secondary 
winding of the CT was induced from the primary winding 
in the proportion of the CT ratio and the current direction 
was normal. 
Line 
bay or 
400/110 
kV 
transfor
mer bay 
3 Busbar trip. Possible reasons: (1) if the secondary and 
primary coils of the CT have galvanic contact and thus the 
busbar protection measures a fault current towards the 
busbar. (2) The CT explodes in such a way that there is no 
current at the secondary side. The busbar protection 
measures differential current, since all the other current 
transformers measure the fault current. 
Line 
bay 
1 The busbar protection relay tripped all the circuit breakers 
connected to the same busbar as the faulted line.  
Line 
bay 
1 Both busbars tripped. The busbar protection measures a 
fault current towards both busbars due to an electric arc 
between the primary and secondary windings. The busbar 
protection relays of the both busbars at the single circuit 
breaker busbar scheme have a closely interconnected 
structure, which in certain cases enables the secondary fault 
current to access both relays. On this occasion, the current 
transformer was also on fire. Both busbars would not trip in 
double circuit breaker substations, where independent 
busbar protection systems exist for both busbars and there 
also exist separate current transformers for both circuit 
breakers. 
Bus 
coupler 
CB bay  
2 Both busbars tripped. The busbar protection acted 
correctly. 
Bus 
coupler 
CB bay 
1 The busbar protection tripped only the bus coupler circuit 
breaker. The primary fault current reached also the CT 
secondary windings, after which the miniature circuit 
breakers of the busbar protection DC circuit tripped and the 
busbar protection did not act after that. After the trip of the 
bus coupler CB the fault remained on one busbar only. The 
only line connected to the faulted busbar was tripped by the 
2nd zone of the distance relay at the remote end substation. 
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The fault duration was about 0.5 s. 
All 9  
5.3.3 Line trip due to a short circuit or earth fault at the 
substation  
There have been five substation-originated shunt faults that have led to a line 
trip. At a line bay, the reason for a 2-phase short circuit was the explosion of a 
capacitor voltage transformer of the line bay. In this case, the explosion of the 
voltage transformer disconnected the wire of the power line carrier transformer 
and this connected two phases together. Another time, a line voltage 
transformer exploded, causing an earth fault and the line to trip. A line was 
tripped once due to an electric arc in the bushing of a transformer. These faults 
belong to the protection zone of the line protection. However, the average 
frequency of these faults is not dependent on line length, but on the amount of 
components at the substation. 
Once there was a substation earth fault and once a short circuit due to a 
human error. When the personnel closed a wrong disconnector, it caused an 
earth fault. Another time, a line circuit breaker was closed but the temporary 
earth remained on the line.  
5.3.4 Miscellaneous line trips  
As soon as somebody announced to the control centre that the conductor of a 
line has fallen, the line was disconnected. However, after the line was 
inspected, nothing exceptional was found. A transformer inrush current caused 
a line to trip once. At this time, the earth fault relays were not equipped with a 
filter for a 100 Hz component. One circuit breaker failure was such that one 
pole was open.  
5.3.5 Line trips without a power system fault 
Unwanted trips are not power system faults, but they cause a disturbance. For 
example, the protection system malfunctions, erroneous trip signals from the 
control centre, relay tests or spontaneous circuit breaker trips can be reasons for 
unwanted trips. Trips unwanted by the protection are classified as unwanted 
spontaneous trips and unwanted unselective trips.  
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Unwanted spontaneous line trips 
Unwanted spontaneous trips are those that are independent of power system 
faults. This is why they are called spontaneous instead of unselective. A reason 
for an erroneous trip can, for example, be a human error during relay testing or 
a failure in the relay. The consequences of the spontaneous unwanted tripping 
depend on the number of components tripped, the operation principle of the 
power system (n-1, n-0), the loading of the grid and the possible occurrence of 
simultaneous faults. During the 20 years of the study, there were 29 unwanted 
spontaneous line trips. Almost half of them were unwanted trips during relay 
testing. 
Table 4  Substation originated spontaneous unwanted line trips 1983-2002 
Cause Number of spontaneous 
unwanted trips 
Substation secondary system planning 5 
Circuit breaker 2 
Relay failure 3 
Human error in operation 3 
Relay or disturbance recorder testing 14 
Other 2 
Total 29 
Unwanted unselective line trips 
Unwanted unselective trips are those that occur together with a power system 
fault. The consequences of the unselective unwanted trip depend on the same 
issues as those of the unwanted spontaneous trips and on the operation of the 
protection, which should trip the fault. If both the correct and the unselective 
trip or trips occur, there is a loss of several components, but the fault duration 
is not extended. If the correct tripping is missing, the consequence is a longer 
fault time and the loss of several components. 
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Table 5  Substation originated unselective line trips 1983-2002 
Cause Number of unselective trips 
A hardware failure in a relay system 3 
A high resistive earth fault with 
unselective trips, see Section 5.2.2. 
6 
Relay setting or configuration  1 
Telecommunication  1 
Error in the temporary relay system 
during a short circuit test 
1 
The terminal strip of the circuit breaker 
trip coil was not connected when a tree 
caused four successive high resistance 
earth faults  
10 
Total 22 
5.4 Concluding remarks on grid faults  
During the 20 years studied there were 214 line shunt faults and two busbar 
shunt faults. In this comparison, the explosions of current transformers are 
excluded. If the current transformer explosions are included, the number of 
substation faults is eleven. A current transformer explosion is a special fault 
case that cannot be treated as a normal busbar earth fault, since the 
consequences of the explosion are unforeseeable and the busbar and protection 
operations after the explosion depend on the details of the explosion.  
The majority of the faults occur along the transmission lines. To get an 
overview of the reliability after power system faults, it is reasonable to first 
concentrate on line faults. The line faults that can be tripped by the distance 
relays are much more frequent than high resistance faults and they also have a 
greater effect on stability. Therefore, the reliability model was developed for 
those line faults that have enough fault current and can be tripped by distance 
relays.  
The reliability analysis for high resistance earth faults, which may in some 
cases cause random unselective line trips, would require a different approach 
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and cannot be made with the same model. Also, it has already been decided 
that the old sensitive earth fault relays will be replaced with modern relays in 
the near future. With the modern relays, it is possible to have a directional 
setting that uses the zero-sequence voltage and current measurements and can 
selectively detect and trip the earth faults, which have a fault resistance of 
about 150 Ω. This sensitivity is sufficient for most tree faults. Additionally, it is 
possible to have in the same relay another setting, which fulfils the 
requirements of the electrical safety regulation and detects the earth faults, 
which have a fault resistance of 500 Ω. With these changes, the selectivity of 
the high resistance earth fault protection will be improved. It is unnecessary to 
develop a reliability model for a system that will change in the near future. 
The line faults that start with a failure of a current or voltage transformer 
of a line and create a shunt fault are not studied in this study. The analysis of 
the faults that start with a component failure at the line end resembles more the 
analysis of the substation faults, even though they would belong to the line 
protection zone. The frequency of this kind of initiating events is not dependent 
on the line length but on the number of components and the failure rate of 
different component types. Also, the possible consequences might be different 
from the line faults and therefore the same model is not valid for those faults.  
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6 CONSIDERATIONS OF POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter presents some important aspects of a reliability analysis of a 
power system. First, a framework for a security analysis is presented. Then 
some observations about a comprehensive power system reliability analysis are 
made. Finally, the analysis performed in this study is briefly described.  
6.1 A framework for transmission grid security analysis  
Figure 8 gives an overview of the main aspects of the power system that need 
to be considered when performing an availability performance assessment for 
the transmission grid.  
 
 
Figure 8  A block diagram for the power system availability analysis 
(Pulkkinen et al.) 
The block diagram in Figure 8 presents the framework developed during the 
pre-project of the transmission grid reliability that was made at the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (Pulkkinen et al., 2002). The aim of the pre-project 
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was to develop a framework for electricity network availability assessment. A 
new approach was needed, because the existing software was designed for 
systems that have different protection philosophies and substation 
configurations from those in Finland.  
The aim was a modular analysis package for transmission grid availability 
and risk analyses. The model recommended consists of four parts: a reliability 
model, use of a power system simulator to identify the severity of faults and 
their combinations, definition of availability performance indicators and 
probability distribution of operating states.  
The recommended way of making the analyses is to use existing 
reliability methods. Fault tree analysis of the substations and dynamic 
simulation can both be realised with existing software. It is important that good 
analysis practices and proper interpretation of analysis results are made.  
The model proposed includes the FMEA of the substations and 
transmission lines. The topology of the grid and the grid state are needed for 
power system simulation. Different substation configurations should be 
included in the model.  
When the different faults are known and the load flow case is selected, the 
faults can be simulated. Dynamic power system simulations are necessary for 
finding out the consequences of the disturbance to the power system.  
The effects of the faults to the power system are known only after the 
simulations are made. The severity of the faults can be ranked in different 
ways. Then a calculation of reliability indicators can be made. An indicator can 
be a probability of the system breakdown, for example, or a list of the faults 
that, together with certain substation operation failures, most probably lead to 
system breakdown.  
6.2 The reliability model and analyses made  
In this study, the framework presented in Figure 8 was the starting point. The 
focus of this study is on the reliability of the grid after power system faults, i.e., 
on security. Therefore some changes were made to the block diagram of the 
pre-project.  
It is important to know the number of different initiating events and the 
causes of them. Therefore, the statistical analysis of grid faults was made in 
order to identify the different initiating events. As the most frequent initiating 
events were the line shunt faults, the model was developed for them. 
The substation reliability model developed takes into account different 
busbar schemes and those primary and secondary components that are involved 
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in fault clearing. The model developed here is for line faults only. A grid fault 
and the series of events at the substations after the fault are modelled. The 
substation reliability model produces the most probable substation 
consequences after the fault and their probabilities. 
During the model development, some alterations were made to the 
original block diagram. The block diagram that describes the model used in this 
research is presented in Figure 9 and is described in detail in Chapter 7. The 
main structural difference between the block diagram developed in this study 
(Figure 9) and the block diagram that was the starting point (Figure 8) is the 
following: 
The model developed during this research project uses the substation 
reliability model block in the following way. First, this block is used for 
analysing the protection and tripping operations at the substation after the line 
fault. This analysis produces the substation consequences that are used as 
inputs for power system dynamic simulation. After the simulations, the results 
(power system states) are analysed with the same substation reliability model. 
The results of the second analysis are the probability and importance values of 
the selected power system states.  
Other differences between the block diagrams in Figure 8 and in Figure 9 
describe the number of different analyses made and are not primary. During 
this research, only a limited number amount of analyses were made. Since the 
focus was the model development, it was enough to make a limited analysis 
with one load flow and one grid topology only. With these analyses, the 
applicability of the model developed can be evaluated. The dynamic 
simulations of the grid are very time consuming and so is the building of event 
and fault trees for the whole 400 kV grid. The differences between the 
comprehensive reliability analyses after grid faults and the analyses made in 
this study are listed here.  
 
• One load flow and one grid topology was analysed instead of several 
load flows and grid connections 
• Only line faults are analysed 
• The power system states that were analysed in detail were system 
breakdown and partial system breakdown. Alert and emergency states 
were excluded at this stage. Here, the partial system breakdown is a 
special alert state, in which one or more extra generators or HVDC 
links are tripped due to extended fault duration. Importance measures 
were developed only for these two power system states.  
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Figure 9  Block diagram for the power system security analysis of this study 
6.3 A comprehensive reliability analysis 
A complete reliability analysis of a power system should include issues other 
than the security after grid faults. At least, system problems, multiple faults and 
unwanted trips need to be considered. Also human actions during the alert and 
emergency states of a power system are worth attention. 
System problems can lead to the loss of stability. A comprehensive power 
system reliability analysis covers those system problems that might be possible 
in the system under study. Both the causes and the probability of them are of 
interest. A variety of events can create system problems. Power system 
oscillations due to insufficient damping can cause problems, especially in a 
small system that exports power to a big system via a long AC line. A minor 
change in the system can start the oscillations; it is not necessarily a fault that 
starts the oscillations. A subsynchronous resonance of the turbogenerators near 
HVDC links or series-compensated lines can cause generator trips. 
Geomagnetically induced direct currents in closed transmission line loops can 
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saturate the transformer and lead to transformer trips. The differential relay can 
trip the transformer due to the large magnetization current.  
The analysis of special protection schemes is important, especially if the 
protection can create problems to the system if incorrectly activated. The 
special protection schemes are installed to prevent the system breakdowns. The 
unwanted operations of special protection schemes, as well as the failure of 
them to act when required should be analysed. 
The occurrence of simultaneous grid faults, due to a common cause or 
independently should be analysed. A thunder storm or a high wind can cause 
several simultaneous faults. An explosion of a current transformer can lead to a 
line trip, a busbar trip or a trip of the whole substation. The system breakdown 
in southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark was caused by an n-3 fault, where a 
disconnector at a substation fell over double busbars some minutes after a 
generator was tripped due to a valve failure. The busbar fault was such that two 
different phases from the two busbars were short circuited through an electric 
arc (Svenska Kraftnät 2003).  
Since there can be an infinite number of different faults, a selection of the 
cases for further analysis should be made. The substation faults can cause 
faults, where several components trip; therefore, the initiating event frequency 
and different consequences of them should be analysed. 
The system breakdowns of Italy and USA in autumn 2003 were not 
caused merely by a single power system fault. The duration between the first 
fault and the final breakdown was 15 minutes or more (UCTP 2004, NERC 
2003). During this time, the power transmission of some grid parts became 
overloaded, which is an emergency state. During this period, extra lines tripped 
due to overload and finally the system collapsed. Insufficient operator actions 
at the control centres during the alert or emergency state of a power system 
were the final causes of these breakdowns.  
A comprehensive reliability analysis of the grid should include the control 
centre practices. The communication between neighbouring transmission 
system operators, the tools available at control centres for system monitoring 
and control, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the personnel, should be 
analysed. 
Unwanted spontaneous and unselective trips caused by the relays should 
be included in the analysis and the effects of them should be simulated. 
Unwanted spontaneous trip of a single component is seldom a problem if the 
system is operated according to n-1 principle. Unwanted unselective trips can 
be disastrous and should be analysed.  
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7 RELIABILITY MODEL FOR SUBSTATIONS AND LINE 
FAULTS 
This chapter describes the substation reliability analysis method developed for 
grid security analysis. First, the modelling principles and then the details of the 
model are presented.  
7.1 General modelling principles  
Substation risk modelling follows the principles of Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment, PSA (NUREG/CR-2300 1983). PSA is originally used for the 
safety analysis of nuclear power plants. In a so-called ‘level 1 PSA’, the 
accident starts with an initiating event, the continuation of which is then 
modelled with event and fault trees. This approach is suitable also for 
modelling the power system protection, since the method is developed for 
analysing the safety functions after an accident. This analysis of post-fault 
substation operations is therefore analogous to a nuclear power station PSA-
analysis. 
The purpose in this study was to combine reliability modelling and the 
dynamic analysis of the grid. Event and fault tree analysis is illustrative and the 
event trees, when correctly built, can give the necessary data for power system 
dynamic simulation. It also gives the probability of different failures at the 
substation, i.e., the probability of each of the consequences of the event tree.  
Since different distance relay zones are used for faults at different parts of 
the line, one event tree for a line is not enough. According to Figure 10, one 
line can be modelled with three event trees.  
Markov models would give additionally the duration of different 
component states. However, the duration of basic event states is not necessary 
for reliability estimation. Additionally, the definition of the Markov model 
states, and the calculation of them would be extremely laborious for a grid with 
39 lines. A rough estimation of the number of states for each line fault analysis 
can be received by multiplication of 12 fault trees per line (on average) and 
about five different basic events per each fault tree. For one line, this makes 
about 60 basic events; for 39 lines, the number of basic events would be about 
2340. The number of states in a Markov model with 2340 basic events is 22340. 
The system would have 22340 states, the consequences of which would have to 
be analysed. It could be possible to eliminate those states that do not need any 
further analysis, but even that would be a laborious task.  
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The aim was to find a solution that can be used for a real grid and that 
would give results with a reasonable amount of work and pick out the essential 
issues that affect reliability. A PSA analysis instead of Markov models was 
chosen. 
7.2 Identification of initiating events 
Both qualitative and quantitative analyses were made for grid faults during the 
20-year period studied. The causes of the faults and the number of them were 
analysed. The faults that occur most often are the line shunt faults. This is why 
the line faults are analysed in this study. The analysis of grid faults is presented 
in Chapter 5.  
In this study, line faults are the initiating events of the event trees. More 
precisely, the initiating events are only those line faults that can be tripped by 
distance relays. High impedance earth faults that cannot be tripped by distance 
relays are not studied. They are infrequent. It is also useless to create a 
reliability model for such initiating event as the protection of them will 
improve significantly in the near future.  
The distance protection of a line acts in different ways according to fault 
location along the line. The reach of zone 1 is about 80 % of the line length, 
which means that 20 % of the line at the remote end does not belong to the 
zone 1. Since an instantaneous trip is required after all line faults, the fault near 
the line ends needs to be tripped with a permissive over- or underreach transfer 
trip scheme, which needs a telecommunication channel. Therefore the distance 
relays at both line ends can trip at zone 1 the faults located in the middle of the 
line. About 60 % of the line length belongs to this section. The remaining 40 % 
is divided into two sections as shown in Figure 10.  
The operation of a distance relay is about the same for 1-, 2- and 3-phase 
faults, i.e., the reaches of the zones are set to be similar. In this study, it is 
assumed that the zones are exactly the same and the probability of a failure in 
sending a trip signal is the same for 1-, 2- and 3-phase faults.  
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Figure 10  The zones of the distance protection along the line 
7.3 The parts of the substation reliability model 
There are three main components, the reliability of which is important when 
studying the power system functioning after a fault. The three components are  
 
• The protection relay system, which includes the relays and the 
secondary circuits of the protection 
• The circuit breakers that include the circuit breaker and the trip and 
close coils 
• The telecommunication system between the relays. 
 
After a fault in a power system, the protection system detects the fault and 
sends a trip signal to circuit breaker(s). Then the circuit breakers trip in order to 
isolate the fault, after which the power flow can continue in the healthy parts of 
the power system. The breaker fail protection and the remote back-up 
protection enter into action if the main protection does not function properly.  
The event trees are created for substation events, taking into account the 
three main parts listed above.  
7.4 Event trees  
Here the event and fault trees are created and analysed by using a computer 
program called Risk Spectrum (Relcon AB 2003). This software package 
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calculates the probabilities of the different events and it also analyses several 
importance measures. 
In this model, each event tree branch always has one success and one 
failure path. With the success or failure branches of the main components listed 
in Section 7.3, we can create all the substation post-fault events. A location 
where one can create branches in an event tree is called as a function event in 
the program used. The input of the function events is calculated with fault 
trees; therefore the fault tree top gates are the inputs of the function events.  
The aim was to make the event trees as simple as possible and to ensure 
that the analysis of event trees gives the necessary data for power system 
analysis. In order to reach this goal, some principles were established before 
and during the event tree construction.  
The frequency, given the initiating event frequency, is calculated in event 
tree analysis for different substation consequences.  
7.4.1 Principles for event tree construction 
The basic structure of event trees is such that the function events of the main 
protection operations are put before the function events of the circuit breakers, 
which corresponds with the real-time sequence. The final functional events in 
all event trees are the automatic reclosing operations, first the master line end 
and then the follower line end, which also is a true order. The events of both 
line ends are put in the same event tree, while usually the operations of the 
master line end are before the operations of the follower line end. In the real 
world, the order of the trip signals of the main protection at the two line ends is 
arbitrary and the same yields for the circuit breakers trips. This does not matter. 
Since, basically, the event tree is a logical diagram, simultaneous events can be 
put in an arbitrary order. The line ends are the master and the follower. Master, 
in this context, means the line end that makes the autoreclosing first if the line 
is dead. The follower, on the other hand, makes the autoreclosure if the line 
voltage and busbar voltage are equal and in phase. The master has a shorter 
dead time than the follower before the autoreclosure. 
The event tree branches are constructed in such a way that the analysis of 
them gives the different possible consequences that are necessary for power 
system analysis. In a power system dynamic analysis, one needs to know the 
fault duration and the sequence of circuit breaker trips. This principle leads to 
such a structure that the main protection system and the circuit breakers need to 
be in separate function events, since the consequence of the failure of the main 
protection is different from the failure of the stuck circuit breaker. If the main 
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protection systems at one line end fail to send a trip signal, nothing at this 
substation stops the fault current flowing. If the circuit breaker fails to trip, the 
breaker failure relay can trip the other circuit breakers connected to the same 
busbar as the faulted circuit breaker.  
A principle that prevents the event trees from being extremely 
complicated is the assumption that, if the circuit breaker is stuck, all the phases 
are stuck. This is a conservative assumption; it would be more probable that 
one phase of the circuit breaker would be stuck rather then all. But, if all the 
different possible failure modes (1- 2 and 3-phases) of each circuit breaker 
were taken into account, the number of event tree function events and branches 
would increase dramatically. However, the extra information received with this 
method would be secondary.  
The same event tree analysis is valid for 1-, 2- and 3-phase faults, since 
we assume that the substation component operations after the fault are not 
dependent on the fault current phase and magnitude. The faults with zero 
sequence current have different remote back-up protection. The remote back-up 
protection is not modelled in event trees, but is taken into account when 
defining the power system states after the dynamic simulations.  
If the distance relays fails to send a POTT or PUTT trip signal due to a 
failure of the telecommunication channel, the relays can send delayed zone 2 
trip signals during the faults at the remote end of the line. Therefore, the event 
trees have a function event of a delayed zone 2 trip signal after the function 
event of a transfer trip scheme. The probability of the zone 2 and zone 1 trip 
signal failure is assumed to be the same, since all the components for both 
these trips are the same.  
There are some fatal failures after which the failure branch always is the 
end branch. Such fatal failures are those where the fault current continues to 
flow at one line end, i.e., either the main protection relays fail to send a trip 
signal to circuit breakers or a breaker failure relay fails to trip the circuit 
breakers. From the power system point of view, there is no need to know if the 
trip succeeds at the other end if it has failed at one end. The failure is fatal 
enough and it is quite insignificant what would occur at the other line end. 
Additionally, a simultaneous ‘no-trip’ failure at both line ends would have the 
probability that is the product of probabilities of both line ends, a very small 
number.  
The operations after the branch ‘no trip at one line end’ are not modelled 
in event trees, but taken into account later on. In reality, after such an incident, 
the remote end back-up protections of the adjacent lines can isolate the 
substation after a 1-second delay, if the 3rd zones of the back-up distance relays 
reach the fault and if the system has remained stable during the delay. The 
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possible reach of the 3rd zones of the back-up relays and the stability are taken 
into account when defining the power system state after the power system 
analysis of substation consequences is made.  
The substation post-fault operations of the line ends that are located in 
Sweden or in Russia are modelled on the assumption that the substation 
structures and failure rates are the same as in Finland.  
The event trees of 3-branch lines are constructed in such a way that the 
protection operations of the third branch, which consists of the 400/110/20 kV 
transformer, are ignored. This branch has usually two distance relays and one 
circuit breaker. The scheme of this kind of substation is presented in Figure 8. 
If the tripping of this branch were to fail, the fault current infeed from the 110 
kV grid would be small, due to the reactances of the transformer and 110 kV 
grid. This small current does not have any effect on the grid dynamic stability 
and therefore it is not necessary to take it into account when calculating the 
grid dynamics. Therefore, it is enough to model the operations of the other two 
line ends in the event trees. 
7.4.2 Different event trees  
The details of the event tree depend both on the substation schemes at line ends 
and on the fault location. The substation scheme has an effect on the number of 
circuit breakers that need to be tripped in order to isolate the fault. Three 
different fault protection systems are planned for three different fault locations, 
as can be seen in Figure 10. There are four different lines, when classified 
according to the number of circuit breakers. Therefore twelve different event 
tree constructions were made, as can be seen in Table 6. 
Table 6  Different event trees for line fault analyses 
Event tree Line type Fault location 
ET 1 Middle of the line 
ET 2 Near the master line end 
ET 3  
Both line ends have double 
circuit breaker busbars 
Near the follower line end 
ET 4a Middle of the line 
ET 5a 
The master line end has a 
double circuit breaker busbar 
scheme; the follower line end Near the master line end 
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ET 6a 
has a single circuit breaker 
busbar scheme. Near the follower line end 
ET 4b Middle of the line 
ET 5b Near the master line end 
ET 6b 
The follower line end has a 
double circuit breaker busbar 
scheme; the master line end 
has a single circuit breaker 
busbar scheme. Near the follower line end 
ET 7 Middle of the line 
ET 8 Near the master line end 
ET 9 
Both line ends have single 
circuit breaker busbar schemes 
Near the follower line end 
 
Event trees 1, 2 and 3 are for the lines where both line ends have double circuit 
breaker busbars. These event trees have most branches and different possible 
substation consequences.  
Event trees 4, 5 and 6 are for lines, where one line end has double circuit 
breakers and the other line end has single circuit breakers for each line end. 
These fault trees have some mutual symmetry, and they have an equal number 
of consequences. These event trees do not have a failure of two circuit breakers 
at the single circuit breaker line end, thus the number of consequences is 
smaller than in event trees 1, 2 and 3.  
Event trees 7, 8 and 9 are the simplest, since they have the smallest 
number of circuit breakers and breaker failure relays. 
7.4.3 One event tree in detail  
In the following, one event tree is discussed in detail. This event tree is 
developed for a case with single circuit breakers at both line ends. The fault 
location is in the middle of the line and all the distance relays protecting the 
line measure the fault as being on zone 1; therefore the model does not contain 
any telecommunication channels. The number of the event tree presented here 
is ET7; this can be seen in Figure 11. The function events of the event tree are 
the following, starting from the initiating event: 
 
1) The trip signal of the main protection relays of the master line end. 
The protection system at the master line end sends an 
instantaneous trip signal to the circuit breaker. If this fails, no 
other issues are checked. 
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2) The trip signal of the main protection relays of the follower line 
end. The protection system at follower line end sends an 
instantaneous trip signal to the circuit breaker. The failure branch 
of this is the end branch, since this failure is regarded as fatal. 
3) The circuit breaker of the master line end trips. The failure of this 
branch leads to breaker failure protection.  
4) The breaker failure protection of the master line end trips the 
relevant circuit breakers. If this fails, there is no trip at this 
substation and the failure branch is the end branch. 
5) The circuit breaker of the follower line end trips. The failure of 
this branch leads to breaker failure protection.  
6) The breaker failure protection of the follower line end trips the 
relevant circuit breakers. If this fails, there is no trip at this 
substation and the failure branch is the end branch. 
7) The rapid automatic reclosing relays of the master line end make a 
successful automatic reclosing. If this fails, the follower does not 
try an autoreclosure. 
8) The rapid automatic reclosing relays of the follower line end make 
a successful automatic reclosing. This can succeed only if the line 
has voltage and the voltages at the line and at the substation are in 
phase. 
 
A description of each end branch and the consequences connected with the 
branches are presented in Table 7. A consequence of an event tree is a kind of 
label attached to each end branch. The consequences in this stage are substation 
consequences. It is worth noting that the same consequence can be caused due 
to different failure sequences. The substation consequences are independent of 
the load flow case because they depend only on the successes and failures at 
the substation components after the fault. The substation consequences include 
both the fault durations and the tripped components. The consequences are 
numbered. The numbers, descriptions and explanations of consequences are 
presented in Table 7 of event tree 7. The numbers and descriptions of all event 
trees are presented in the tables in Appendix A.  
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Figure 11  The event tree for the faults in the middle of the line for the lines 
with single circuit breaker busbar schemes at both line ends. (Event tree 7 
is shown in Appendix A) 
Table 7  Descriptions of the end braches of the event tree presented in Figure 
11. RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, BFR = breaker failure relay. 
End 
branch 
Substation consequence of the end branch: identification number, 
description of the consequence and explanation. 
1 7-00. Description: Master and follower: line trip 100 ms, autoreclosing. 
Explanation: Both the protection and circuit breakers succeed. The 
fault is isolated in 100 ms. Rapid automatic reclosure succeeds at both 
line ends. This is a planned n-1 fault and the grid will remain stable. 
2 7-01. Description: Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
Rapid autoreclosing fails. 
Explanation: Both the protection and circuit breakers succeed. The 
fault is isolated in 100 ms. Rapid automatic reclosure succeeds at the 
master line end but fails at the follower line end. This is a planned n-1 
fault, even though the line remains unconnected immediately after the 
fault. The grid will remain stable. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1) Master:
main 
protection
trip signal
2) Follower:
main 
protection
trip signal
3)Master:
circuit 
breaker  
trips 
4) Master:
breaker 
failure
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circuit 
breaker  
trips 
6) Follower:
breaker 
failure
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7) Master
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auto-
reclosure
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rapid 
auto-
reclosure
Line fault
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3 7-01. Description: Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
Rapid autoreclosing fails. 
Explanation: Both the protection and circuit breakers succeed. The 
fault is isolated in 100 ms. Rapid automatic reclosure fails at the 
master line end and therefore does not occur at the follower line end. 
This is a planned n-1 fault, even though the line remains unconnected 
immediately after the fault. The grid will remain stable. 
4 7-11. Description: Master: line trip 100 ms (no RAR). Follower: one 
busbar trip (BFR 250 ms). 
Explanation: At the master line end, the protection and circuit breakers 
succeed to trip the fault. At the follower line end, the circuit breaker 
fails to trip, but the breaker fail protection succeeds to trip the busbar. 
There is no automatic reclosure after a busbar trip. 
5 7-24. Description: Follower: no trip signal or no circuit breaker trip at 
the substation. 
Explanation: At the master line end, the protection and circuit breakers 
succeed to trip the fault in 100 ms. At the follower line end, the circuit 
breaker and breaker failure protection fail. Therefore, the fault current 
continues to flow from the follower line end. 
6 7-10. Description: Master: one busbar trip (BFR 250 ms). Follower: 
line trip 100 ms (no RAR). 
Explanation: At the follower line end, the protection and circuit 
breakers succeed to trip the fault in 100 ms. At the master line end, the 
circuit breaker fails to trip but the breaker failure protection succeeds 
to trip the busbar 250 ms after the fault start. There is no automatic 
reclosure after a busbar trip. 
7 7-12. Description: One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 
250 ms. 
Explanation: The relays at both line ends send trip signals, the circuit 
breakers at both line ends fail to trip but both breaker failure protection 
systems succeed to trip the relevant busbars 250 ms after the fault start. 
8 7-24. Description: Follower: no trip signal or no circuit breaker trip at 
the substation. 
Explanation: At both line ends, the circuit breakers fail to trip. The 
breaker failure protection succeeds to trip the busbar at the master line 
end but fails at the follower line end. Therefore the fault current 
continues to flow from the follower line end. 
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9 7-23. Description: Master: no trip signal or no circuit breaker trip at the 
substation. 
Explanation: At the master line end, the circuit breaker and breaker 
failure protection fail. Therefore the fault current continues to flow 
from the master line end. 
10 7-24. Description: Follower: no trip signal or no circuit breaker trip at 
the substation.  
Explanation: The main protection at the master line end sends a trip 
signal, but the main protection at the follower line end fails to send a 
trip signal to the circuit breaker. Therefore the fault current continues 
to flow at the follower line end. 
11 7-23. Description: Master: no trip signal or no circuit breaker trip at the 
substation. 
Explanation: The main protection at the master line fails to send a trip 
signal to the circuit breaker. Therefore the fault current continues to 
flow at the master line end.  
7.4.4 Other event trees  
If the line has extra circuit breakers compared to the line of event tree 7, extra 
function events are added to the event trees. This is the case if the line has 
double circuit breaker busbar schemes at one or both line ends.  
For line faults near the line ends, the protection branches are three instead 
of the two presented in Figure 11. These are:  
 
• The protection system at the line end near the fault sends an 
instantaneous (zone 1) trip signal 
• The protection system at the other line end sends an instantaneous 
(POTT, PUTT) trip signal 
• The protection system at the other line end sends a delayed trip signal. 
 
All event tree structures created for different lines and different fault locations 
are presented in Appendix A, together with a list of all substation consequences 
of the end branches of different event trees. 
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7.5 Fault trees  
The function events of the event trees need an input in order to calculate the 
branch probabilities. Fault tree top gates are used as inputs for event tree 
branches. The number of fault trees built during the study was about 460.  
Fault trees consist of basic events and gates. The top gate of a fault tree 
corresponds to the event tree function event. Different fault trees made for 
different protection and trip functions are listed here: 
 
• Two main protection relays fail to send a permissive overreach 
(underreach) trip signal to circuit breaker trip coils 
• Circuit breaker fails to trip after it has received a trip signal to trip 
coils  
• Breaker failure protection fails. The fault tree includes both the relays 
and the relevant circuit breakers. The failure of this fault tree occurs if 
one or more circuit breakers remains closed. 
• Rapid autoreclosure fails at a line end that gives the voltage to a dead 
line (a master station). This fault tree includes relays and circuit 
breakers. 
• Rapid autoreclosure fails at a line end that closes the circuit breaker 
only if the opposite end has made a successful autoreclosure (a 
follower line end). This fault tree includes relays and circuit breakers.  
 
An example of a fault tree is given in Figure 12. The top gate of this fault tree 
is the failure of two main protection relays to send a trip signal to circuit 
breakers. Different fault trees of this study are presented in Appendix B. Fault 
trees are not presented graphically, but by listing the minimal cut sets and the 
probabilities of them.  
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Figure 12  A fault tree, where the top gate is ‘two main protection distance 
relays fail to send the zone 1 or zone 2 trip signal to circuit breaker trip 
coils.’ Z = distance relay, MCB = miniature circuit breaker, VT = voltage 
transformer, DC = direct current, CCF = common cause failure. 
7.5.1 Principles used in fault tree construction  
Some assumptions were predefined before it was sensible to start to create the 
fault trees. The assumptions used in this model are listed in this chapter. 
Usually the basic events in the fault trees are for a component, such as a 
certain relay or a certain circuit breaker, only. These basic events depend only 
on the component itself. Some basic events are for common components, the 
failure of which affects several fault trees. Such a basic event corresponds to, 
for example, the substation direct current system, which feeds the protection 
relays, circuit breaker trip and close coils. Another example of such a basic 
event is the substation pneumatic air system, which produces compressed air 
for air-blast circuit breakers.  
Some devices send an alarm when there is a failure. It is supposed that 
this alarm is always sent successfully to the control centre, i.e., the alarm acts 
with 100 % reliability. Some devices that send an alarm are not modelled at all. 
An example of such a device is a DC rectifier that fails. After it has sent an 
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alarm and during the repair, the batteries do not loose all their energy. Thus 
rectifier failures are not included in the model. 
The cable ditch at the substation has several cables. There is a risk that 
something might damage all the cables in that ditch and prevent the 
transmission of the signals. The substation area is surrounded by a fence, so no 
one can excavate the cables accidentally. However, there is a common cause 
failure basic event for cables of each line bay.  
A constant unavailability model is used for the telecommunication system 
reliability. This constant unavailability of the FMEA analysis is used for all 
other telecommunication channels except the power line carrier. The power line 
carrier unavailability is dependent also on the initiating event, thus the FMEA 
unavailability cannot be used directly. The power line carrier in the Finnish 400 
kV grid is installed in two phases instead of three. During 1-phase faults, there 
is always a healthy phase available. The case is different for 2- and 3-phase 
faults. During 3-phase faults, all the phases carry the fault current and it is very 
probable that the telecommunication signal cannot pass the faulted line. In this 
case, the constant unavailability of the telecommunication is 1. During 2-phase 
faults, it is possible for the power line carrier to be on the healthy phase or on 
faulted phases. On average, one in three times the fault current is only on the 
faulted phases and the telecommunication fails. The constant unavailability of 
the power line carrier during a 2-phase fault q2-ph can therefore be calculated 
according to the following equation 
3
1
3
2
2 +=− PLCph qq  (2) 
where qPLC is the constant unavailability of the power line carrier.  
It is assumed that, if a relay succeeds to send a trip signal to the circuit 
breaker(s), it also sends a signal to the breaker failure relay. The breaker failure 
fault tree has both the relay and the circuit breakers connected to the same 
busbar as the faulted circuit breaker. However, in the model, the circuit 
breakers of the line and generator bays are included, since these bays feed large 
fault currents. The circuit breakers of the 400/100 kV transformers are 
excluded, since the fault current infeed from 110 kV grid to 400 kV is 
insignificant compared to the fault current at 400 kV grid. The breaker failure 
fault trees of those 400 kV substations that are connected to the 400 kV grid 
with a radial line and have no generators, are assumed to never fail.  
After commissioning, the SF6 circuit breakers are provided with a 
blocking system that prevents the trip if the SF6-gas density in the circuit 
breaker is too low. If the circuit breaker trips with a low SF6-gas pressure, the 
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circuit breaker can be broken. Fingrid plc removes the blocking system when 
the guarantee period is over. Therefore, most SF6 circuit breakers are not 
provided with this blocking system and this is not taken into account in the 
circuit breaker fault trees.  
7.5.2 Basic event types 
The Risk Spectrum reliability analysis code (Relcon 2003) uses different basic 
event types. These basic events of the software are used in this analysis as such.  
Monitored components 
The monitored, repairable basic event type is used for those components, which 
have a self-supervision property. The long-term constant unavailability of this 
basic event is calculated with the following equation (Relcon 2003 Theory 
Manual p.6, Høyland and Rausand 1994 p. 164): 
MTTR
q
1+
=
λ
λ
 (3) 
where λ is the constant failure rate and MTTR the repair time (mean time to 
repair.) 
Tested components 
Periodically tested components have a different basic event model. The long-
term constant unavailability of tested components, when the repair time is 
taken into account is (Relcon 2003, Theory Manual p. 7): 
Ti
MTTRee
Ti
q TiTI ⋅−+−⋅−=
−•− )1()1(11 λλλ  
(4) 
where λ is the constant failure rate and MTTR is the repair time (mean time to 
repair) and Ti is test interval. The first part of the equation presents the average 
unavailability without taking into account the repair time and is presented in 
Høyland and Rausand (1994, p. 174). The second part is the unavailability 
contribution due to the repair. In the cases where the repair time is very short 
compared to the test interval, the second part is negligible.  
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Components with constant unavailability  
The basic event with a constant unavailability has the unavailability value as its 
only parameter. It is the simplest model available. This model is used for 
telecommunication channels and for static and microprocessor relays.  
Monitored and tested failures in one device  
Static and microprocessor relays have two kinds of failures. A failure in the 
power supply unit of a relay is such that the self-supervision of the relay sends 
an alarm. An erroneous setting or configuration can be detected only during a 
test.  
The fault tree program used does not have a model that includes both 
failure types in the same basic event. One possibility is to create two basic 
events for each relay. One basic event would be for monitored failures and the 
other would be for failures detected during testing. With this method, the 
number of minimal cut sets would be increased and the calculation of 
importance measures would give separate importance values for different faults 
of the same device, which would not be sensible.  
The other possibility is to use one basic event with the constant 
unavailability for each relay. The latter choice is selected. The constant 
unavailability value is calculated with two basic events. One basic event has a 
failure rate calculated with those faults that send an alarm and the other uses a 
failure rate calculated according to those faults that can be detected during the 
testing only. The drawback of this method is that the importance of failure rate 
or testing interval cannot be calculated for those devices.  
7.6 Failure mode and effect analysis, FMEA 
The input data for fault tree analysis was received with failure mode and effect 
analysis. FMEA was used to identify different failure modes and their effects, 
causes and identification. This data was necessary for selecting the reliability 
models of components in the fault trees. The FMEA made is presented in 
Appendix C. The fault trees were made according to the failure mode and 
effect analysis and according to the substation structure. 
The qualitative failure data of the substation components was received by 
specifications, substation diagrams and device failure database. Expert 
judgments of the specialists of the maintenance, planning and local operation 
were important sources for the FMEA. The FMEA data, as well as the 
structures modelled, are specific rather than universal. Different transmission 
companies may have different substation structures, different protection 
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systems, different maintenance policies and they may have devices 
manufactured by different companies. 
The quantitative results of the FMEA are received mostly from the device 
failure database of Fingrid plc. Some data are received from the supervisory 
control and data acquisition system (SCADA). The data used in this research 
cover the different periods depending on the respective cases. The quality of 
data was not constant, being better for some components than for others.  
The device failure database of Fingrid plc has the following data: failure 
number, device location and ID, part of the device that has a failure, device 
type by manufacturer, manufacturing year, commissioning year, date and time 
of detection of failure, cause of failure, how the failure was detected, effect of 
failure, whether the device can be used during the failure, repair method, the 
urgency of the repair, repair time, repair duration, whether is the failure 
connected with a disturbance or not and a field for all kinds of comments. The 
database is made mainly for maintenance purposes. Some interpretation of the 
data was made in order to classify the failures correctly for this kind of 
analysis.  
All the relays of the same class (microprocessor, static, mechanical) have 
the same FMEA data irrespective of the manufacturer. The same principle is 
applied for air-blast, minimum oil and SF6 circuit breakers, too.  
The failure rate values for each component are calculated according to the 
Bayes theorem. The failure rate estimate λˆ  is calculated according to the 
following equation:  
TOTT
k+= 5.0λˆ  (5) 
in which k is the number of failures detected during a certain time and TTOT is 
the total number of component-years. This estimate is calculated by using a 
non-informative prior distribution (Høyland and Rausand, 1994; Lee, 1997) 
If there have been many failures, the failure rate estimate approaches the 
classical estimate, which is the number of failures divided by the component-
years. If there have been no failures and the number of component-years is 
small, the Bayes estimate might give too large a value. The estimate becomes 
better with the increasing number of components and years. 
The parameter ‘mean time to repair’ is the mean active repair time for the 
components whose failure does not cause the changes in the grid connection. 
The repair duration of each failure is reported in the device failure database. 
These kinds of components are the ones that are doubled. For some single 
components, the 15 minutes value is used. This is due to the Nordel 
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requirement that the operation be changed back to secure in 15 minutes 
following faults that change the grid state from secure to alert. If a single 
component like a circuit breaker is broken, the faulted circuit breaker is 
disconnected from the grid and possibly some alterations in the grid loading are 
made as well. This means that the faulted case duration is only 15 minutes, 
since the grid topology, and maybe the grid loading, are changed after that 
time. This is an approximation of the reality and a second-order matter in this 
model. 
7.7 Common cause failures 
The model does not contain common cause failures other than the substation 
and the bay. There are no other such issues that would lead to common cause 
failures that would have significance in the reliability model. 
The basic event for the whole substation is in all fault trees of that substation. 
This basic event models a fire, for example, or a mechanical failure of the 
substation or at the building. All the secondary systems of the substation 
(relays, telecommunication devices, part of the cables connecting the bays to 
the secondary system) are in the building. It is worth noting that, if the 
substation is lost, the control centre has 15 minutes to adjust the power system 
connection and grid loading to be secure without the failed substation. If the 
line fault were to occur within 15 minutes, the case would have been correctly 
modelled. The same principle is valid for the basic event ‘bay’. 
A common cause failure due to maintenance or testing is one question that 
needs consideration. If the terminal strips of both circuit breaker trip coils are 
disconnected, the circuit breaker cannot trip, even though it would be 
undamaged. If all terminal strips were disconnected due to an error in 
maintenance or testing, this would be a common cause failure. If the 
maintenance of all similar devices at the substation were carried out 
simultaneously and reconnected simultaneously after the maintenance, a 
common cause failure could occur. However, the maintenance and inspection 
of the circuit breakers, relays and the telecommunication are made for one bay 
at a time. If an error is made at one bay, it is not likely that the same error 
would be made at the other bays, since maintenance and testing of them are 
separate events. The maintenance methods at the substation are such that this 
does not easily lead to common cause failures.  
It is assumed that common cause failure mode can be neglected with 
duplicated main protection systems apart from the miniature circuit breakers of 
the electromechanical distance relays. Still the common cause failure issue of 
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the two microprocessor relays by the same manufacturer is a tricky question. 
The specification allows two different relays from the same manufacturer, if 
they are not the same type. Modern microprocessor relays have software. 
Different relay models by the same manufacturer at the same line bay can fulfil 
the specification, but the relays can have the same software parts to some 
extent. It is possible that, in this case, there is a common cause failure 
possibility. This research is too optimistic in this respect, but because the relays 
are not completely similar, it might be too pessimistic to assume that they are 
similar. A common cause failure for two microprocessor relays by the same 
manufacturer would be the best way to model this, but finding a correct value 
for this would require more information than is available for the relay user.  
The voltage transformer is common for both distance relays, but it is not 
modelled. The distance relays can trip during a fault when even the voltage 
measurement is lacking, therefore the failure of a voltage transformer does not 
necessarily prevent the trip. The voltage transformer supervision systems of 
both relays could operate during a voltage transformer failure and prevent a 
trip. The same could happen if miniature circuit breakers of both distance 
relays trip due to voltage-transformer failure. However, both these occurrences 
send an alarm and are detected, after which the line is disconnected. It is 
thought that both the probability of these occurrences is small and the duration 
of the failures is short; thus they are not modelled.  
The current transformer primary is a common component for the two 
main protection relays. There have been several failures of current 
transformers. They all were explosions and created a substation fault. If there 
were a line fault during the explosion, there would be two simultaneous grid 
shunt faults, which is a completely different situation than is modelled in this 
study.  
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8 POWER SYSTEM SIMULATIONS 
This chapter describes the dynamic simulations that were made in order to find 
the power system consequences of the substation failures after line faults. The 
software, load flow case, grid model, fault locations and the classification of 
simulation results are discussed.  
8.1 Grid model and the load flow case 
The grid simulations were made by using the Power System Simulator (PSS/E) 
program package by Shaw PTI (Shaw PTI, 2001). PSS/E is “a package of 
programs for studies of power system transmission network and generator 
performance both in steady state and dynamic conditions” (Shaw PTI, 2001, 
PSS/E Program Operation Manual, p. P-1). All transmission system operators 
of Nordel use this software; therefore the grid models and different load flow 
cases are available in PSS/E format.  
The model used in this research has a detailed grid model of the Finnish 
grid. The load flow was received from Fingrid plc and has a sample from a day 
in January, 2003. The PSS/E load flow model includes all the generators bigger 
than 10 MW with their block transformers and 400 kV, 220 kV and 110 kV 
lines. The loads, which are connected to 20 kV and lower voltage level, are 
modelled as lumped loads at 110 kV substation nodes in order to create a 
correct load flow case. The grids of Sweden, Norway and Denmark are 
modelled as a reduced grid with big equivalent generators and equivalent lines. 
The HVDC link is modelled as a constant lumped active and reactive load.  
The load flow  
The load flow used in the simulations is a typical January load flow and the 
PSS/E model is created at Fingrid plc. The 400 kV grid is intact. Some 
characteristics of the load flow case are listed below: 
 
• The load in Finland is 12240 MW, 1933 Mvar. 
• The production in Finland is 10378 MW, 1029 Mvar, where hydro 
production is 1450 MW, nuclear production is 2749 MW and other 
thermal production is 6179 MW. 
• Import from Sweden to Finland via northern 400 kV AC lines is 915 
MW, -132 Mvar. 
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• Export to Sweden from Finland via Fenno-Skan HVDC link is 150 
MW 80 Mvar. 
• Import from Russia to Finland via 400 kV AC lines is 1098 MW, 24 
Mvar. This includes both the Russian South Western Power Plant and 
the back to back HVDC link.  
• Import from Norway to Finland via 220 kV AC lines is 66 MW, -26 
Mvar. 
• Transmission from northern Finland to Southern Finland is 834 MW, 
20 Mvar. 
8.2 Dynamic simulations 
All those consequences of event trees were simulated where the power system 
state could not be directly concluded. There is no need to simulate the n-1 
faults, since the grid is planned and operated according to the n-1 principle. 
The number of substation consequences to be analysed with dynamic 
simulations is about 1400. There are 39 lines and 25 - 55 different substation 
consequences for each line.  
The substation consequence with number 23 of the event trees was such 
that no trip occurred at master line end. These cases were simulated in such a 
way that the line circuit breaker tripped after 100 ms in the follower line end. 
After a 1-second fault duration, the substation with the master line end was 
disconnected from the grid. This 1-second delay was chosen, because it is the 
delay of zone 3 of those distance relays that form the remote back-up 
protection of the faulted line. The same principle was used for consequences 
numbered as 24, where the trip does not occur at the follower line end.  
8.2.1 Fault locations and durations 
The line sections that require different event trees are presented in Figure 10. 
The fault location in a dynamic simulation was in the middle of each line 
section. The line sections that require telecommunication are 20 % of the line 
length and situated at the line ends. The fault location for them is 10 % from 
the line end. The fault location for the line section where the distance relays do 
not need a telecommunication channel is in the middle of the line. The fault 
locations for simulations are presented in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13  Fault node locations of a transmission line for dynamic 
simulations 
The start of a dynamic simulation was always similar: first there is pre-fault 
simulation with a duration of one second, after which the fault is applied. 
Following that, the circuit breaker trips in a correct order are simulated. The 
fault durations vary according to the case, but every case is simulated from start 
to 20 seconds in order to see if the post-fault situation will be stable or not. 
In the real world, there are some variations in fault durations, since 
different relays start and succeed in sending the trip signal in different times, 
so, too, do the circuit breakers. There also are variations in relay operations due 
to different fault locations. In this research, the fault duration times of the 
dynamic simulations were fixed and are presented in Figure 14, Figure 15, 
Figure 16 and Figure 17. 
The instantaneous line trip duration is 100 ms, in which the relay 
operations are assumed to take 50 ms and the circuit breaker trip to take 
another 50 ms. This kind of trip can be either a zone 1 trip or permissive over- 
or underreach transfer trip scheme of the distance relays or a trip by the line 
differential relays. The fault duration of this trip is presented in Figure 14.  
 
 
Figure 14  The duration of a line fault with a successful trip operation 
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The delayed zone 2 trip of the distance relays takes 450 ms. The relay sends the 
trip signal after 400 ms from the fault start; the circuit breaker operation takes 
50 ms. The fault duration of this delayed trip is presented in Figure 15. 
 
 
Figure 15  The duration of a line fault with a zone 2 trip of a distance relay 
When the breaker failure protection relays trip the busbar after a circuit breaker 
failure, the fault duration is assumed to be 250 ms if the relay has sent an 
instantaneous trip signal. The duration of this fault is 600 ms if the relay has 
sent a zone 2 trip signal. The fault durations of these trips are presented in 
Figure 16 and in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 16  The duration of a line fault with an instantaneous trip signal, a 
circuit breaker failure and a breaker failure relay operation. BFR = 
breaker failure relay 
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Figure 17  The duration of a line fault with a delayed trip signal, a circuit 
breaker failure and a breaker failure relay operation. BFR = breaker 
failure relay 
It is assumed that when the circuit breaker fails to trip after a trip signal, all the 
phases remain closed. In the simulations, this means that the 3-phase fault 
continues until the breaker failure relay trips the busbar.  
8.3 Analysis of grid simulation 
8.3.1 Classification of simulation results  
The results of the dynamic simulations were classified taking into account the 
stability, the voltage violations, and the thermal limits and also the reach of the 
remote back-up protection. All fault locations and substation consequences 
were simulated with 3-phase faults with zero fault impedance. The power 
system effects of a 2-phase shunt faults are very similar to those of 3-phase 
faults, but 3-phase faults are much quicker to simulate with PSS/E. 
Stability 
Angle stability was classified into the categories: stable and unstable. When the 
angle stability of the power system is lost in 20 seconds the result is a major 
disturbance. There is nothing the control centre operation personnel can do to 
prevent the case. Voltage- or frequency-stability problems did not occur in this 
load-flow situation.  
Voltage violations 
Voltage violations were checked, since it was possible that the voltages were 
beyond the limits without any stability problems. The upper voltage limit 420 
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kV was determined by insulation coordination and the lower voltage limit 370 
kV by voltage instability and voltage quality. The simulations did not produce 
any voltage violations. This is due to the light loading of the grid as well as the 
series compensation at the lines between Finland and Sweden and between 
Northern and Southern Finland. The voltages were checked from the dynamic 
simulation results. The voltage dependency of the load models is included in 
the dynamic simulations. The model also has the reactive power limits of the 
generators and generator excitation controls. 
Thermal limits 
Thermal limits were checked at the winter outdoor temperature of minus 10 
degrees Centigrade, which is a typical January temperature in Finland. No 
overloading of 400 kV branches was detected; there were some 110 kV lines 
that were overloaded after several 400 kV lines were tripped.  
In the Finnish 400 kV system, it is most often the current transformer that 
sets the limits to the branch rating ratings. In those cases where there were are 
two parallel current transformers at double circuit breaker substations, it was 
assumed that the current in one parallel current transformer was not more than 
60 % of the line total current. There are no measurements made on that subject, 
but 50 % -50 % would probably be too optimistic a value, since a very small 
difference between the impedances of the joints may cause different power 
flows for parallel routes.  
The rate MVA values for line conductors, current transformers, 
disconnectors and series capacitors for a +30 degrees ambient temperature can 
be found in the specifications. The rate values for -10 degrees ambient 
temperature can be calculated by multiplying the +30 degrees rating value with 
a coefficient. The coefficients used in this study for converting the specified 
rating values into other ambient temperatures are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8  The coefficients for converting the MVA rating values of certain 
components to different ambient temperatures 
Component 
The coefficient for 
converting the MVA 
rating at +30 degrees 
ambient temperature 
into the rating at +10 
degrees  
The coefficient for 
converting the MVA 
rating at +30 degrees 
ambient temperature 
into the rating at -10 
degrees 
Conductor 1.25 1.5 
Current transformer 1.15 1.3 
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Series capacitor 1.0 1.0 
Disconnector 1.0 1.0 
 
If the +30 degrees rating of a branch is determined by a current transformer, a 
series capacitor or a disconnector, the rates at other temperatures are 
determined by this same component also. However, if it is the conductor that 
sets rating limits at +30 degrees, it happens sometimes that it is the current 
transformer limiting the branch rating at +10 or -10 degrees.  
Remote back-up protection issues 
The remote back-up protection should trip the fault if the trip does not occur at 
the substation. These consequences were numbered as 23 and 24 in the event 
trees. The remote back-up protection operations are ignored in the event tree. 
However, they are taken into account separately when analysing the event tree 
results. There is a remote back-up protection that consists of distance relays 
situated at the next substation on the reverse direction. If the 3rd zones of all the 
remote back-up distance relays reaches the fault and sends the trip signal, the 
fault is isolated after a 1-second delay. This leads to the disconnection of all the 
lines connected to that substation. But zone 3 of the remote back-up protection 
does not always reach the fault location; in this case the trip is not possible. 
This may happen when the remote back-up protection consists of 
electromechanical distance relays with circular zone characteristics or when the 
protected line is a long one. 
8.3.2 Power system consequences  
The power system states that will be used as consequences in the event trees 
are secure, alert, emergency and system breakdown. A special alert case, in 
which extra generators or HVDC links are tripped due to an exceptionally long 
fault duration, is also used.  
The power system state after the line fault is studied and classified 
according to straightforward rules presented in this section. All the cases where 
the grid is not intact after the fault clearance are always classified in this study 
as ‘alert’ if there are no violations of voltage or thermal limits. In reality, this 
case can be either secure or alert. It is possible that, after some line trips at a 
certain grid loading, the grid would withstand another line or busbar trip, which 
would mean that it is secure. For the scope of this study, this simplification of 
the model is acceptable, since the main interest is to get an overview of the 
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power system reliability and not study all the possible contingencies in detail. 
Getting an overall idea of the consequences of different contingencies requires 
many simulations, even with this degree of accuracy.  
The power system states and their definitions are the following:  
Secure 
Secure was stable in dynamic simulations, no extra generators and HVDC links 
were tripped, no thermal nor voltage violations occurred. The fault tripped in 
100 ms and the rapid autoreclosing succeeded. 
Alert 
Alert was a case that was stable and did not have any voltage or thermal rating 
violations in the dynamic simulations. One or several components could be 
tripped. A selective line trip without an autoreclosing was an alert case. A 
busbar trip and trips of extra generators were alert cases as well, if the voltages 
and thermal ratings were not violated.  
For consequences 23 and 24, where the trip fails at one line end, the case 
was regarded as alert if the requirements of an alert case were fulfilled and if 
the remote back-up protection reach was sufficient to trip the substation. 
Substation consequences 23 and 24 are defined in Table 7. 
An example of an alert state is the tripping of a busbar by the breaker 
failure relay at a double circuit breaker substation. The load flow case does not 
change after the fault is cleared, since all the lines and substations are in use 
after the trip. The only difference compared to the secure state before the fault 
is the fact that the faulted substation would lose all the lines connected to it if a 
busbar fault were to occur before the disconnected busbar is reconnected. 
Emergency 
Emergency was a stable case with several lines tripped. Voltages or thermal 
ratings or both were outside the limits. A trip of the faulted line only cannot 
lead to an emergency state due to the n-1 principle. A busbar trip, a substation 
trip and trips of extra generators could be emergency cases if the voltages or 
thermal ratings were violated.  
For consequences 23 and 24 the case was regarded as emergency if the 
simulation results belonged to the emergency category and if the remote back-
up protection reach was sufficient to trip the substation. 
System breakdown  
The system breakdown can be due to different causes. An unstable case in 
dynamic simulations was one reason of a system breakdown. Another 
possibility for a case to be classified as a system breakdown was such that zone 
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3 of the remote back-up protection did not reach to fault location in 
consequences 23 and 24. In this case, it did not matter if the dynamic 
simulation result was unstable or not. If there was no trip at the faulted line end 
and, additionally, if the remote back-up protection did not reach to the fault, 
nothing else would isolate the fault. 
Partial system breakdown 
An extra class, ‘partial system breakdown’, was calculated. It is a special case 
among the alert cases. The definition of a partial system breakdown is that it is 
either an alert or an emergency state where one or several extra generators or 
HVDC links trip due to the extended fault duration. It is worth noting that if a 
radial line between a generator and the grid is tripped, this is not regarded as an 
extra trip, since the generator acts as planned after such a fault. 
Figures 18, 19 and 20 present the dynamic stability analysis results. 
 
 
Figure 18  Dynamic simulation results of an alert and stable case 
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Figure 19  Dynamic simulation results of partial system breakdown 
 
Figure 20  Dynamic simulation results of a system breakdown 
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9 COMBINATION OF RELIABILITY MODEL AND POWER 
SYSTEM SIMULATIONS 
In this chapter, the combination of substation-model and power system 
simulations is described. Also, the importance measures of basic events for one 
line fault are presented and importance measures for the whole grid are 
proposed. In this chapter the equations for the system breakdown (SB) are 
presented, but a similar approach can be applied to all power system states. 
This chapter also includes a description of indices for the system breakdown.  
9.1 The reliability analysis process  
In this chapter, the process for one line as a part of the whole process is 
presented. The purpose is to illustrate how the modelling and analysis were 
made. Figure 21 presents the block diagram of the combination of the 
reliability model and dynamic simulations of the power system.  
9.1.1 Line data and line analysis  
When calculating the contribution of one line to the power system, the 
initiating event frequency needs to be calculated. All the event tree analyses are 
made in such a way that the initiating event has a certain frequency. The results 
of the event tree analysis are therefore frequencies rather than probabilities. In 
this study, the initiating events are the line faults and it is assumed that the 
annual line fault frequency per line length is constant. The initiating event 
frequency therefore depends on the line fault frequency and on the line section 
length. The average line fault frequency estimate is calculated from the 
statistics of 20 years of Fingrid plc; it includes both earth faults and short 
circuits. The calculation of the line fault estimate is presented in Section 5.2.1. 
Letting the average initiating event frequency be fIE and the length of the line 
section of event tree M be lM in kilometres, the frequency of the initiating event 
of event tree M is thus MIE lf ⋅ .  
The event trees needed for a certain line depend on the busbar structure of 
the substations at the line ends. Different event tree models are presented in 
detail in Section 7.4 and in Appendix A. The fault trees for each line depend on 
the protection system, substation structure and on the components at the 
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substations. The fault tree construction is presented in detail in Section 7.5 and 
in Appendix B.  
After the line event trees are built, they can be analysed. The results of 
these analyses are the frequencies of different substation consequences and the 
local importance measures. 
 
 
Figure 21  The block diagram of the power system reliability analysis after 
line faults 
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9.1.2 Dynamic simulations and the power system post-fault 
states 
Those substation consequences are simulated where the post-fault state is not 
known in advance. The simulations, the grid model and the definition of the 
power system states after the fault are presented in detail in Chapter 8.  
9.1.3 Power system consequences in the event trees 
Figure 11 presents the substation consequences of an event tree 7. Those 
consequences are always the same and not dependent on the load flow or grid 
connection. The frequency of different consequences varies to some extent 
from line to line and is dependent on the components used at the line 
substations. The power system consequences, on the other hand, are dependent 
on the line. The substation failures at different lines lead to different power 
system consequences. The power system consequences are also a function of 
the load flow and grid topology. A substation consequence can in one load flow 
lead to an alert state and in some other load flow it can lead to a system 
breakdown. Therefore dynamic simulations are needed for defining the power 
system consequences at different grid connections and load flows.  
Always when a substation consequence of a certain event tree leads to a 
system breakdown, the power system consequence SB for system breakdown 
and PSB for partial system breakdown are added to corresponding end 
branches of the event trees. 
Figure 22 presents an example of an event tree with added power system 
consequence analysis results. In this case the power system state is a system 
breakdown if the follower or master line end trip is totally missing due to 
protection failure or due to the breaker failure protection failure.  
After the power system consequences received from dynamic simulations 
are added to the end branches of the event trees of all lines, the consequence 
analysis of the system breakdown and partial system breakdown for the whole 
grid can be made.  
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Figure 22  The event tree with power system consequences added to the end 
branches 
9.2 Power system consequence analysis  
The event trees are now analysed again, but the goal this time is to ascertain the 
grid-level frequency of system breakdown and partial system breakdown and 
the importance measures. The probability, minimal cut sets and importance 
measures can be calculated directly for power system consequences instead of 
substation consequences. The consequence analysis results are therefore at the 
grid level.  
Notation 
The frequency of the system breakdown after line shunt faults is denoted by 
f(SB). The constant unavailability is denoted by q. The constant unavailability 
of a component i is denoted by q(i). P(SB|q(i)=1)) represents the conditional 
probability of SB, given that q(i) equals 1.  
9.2.1 The frequency of power system breakdown 
The frequency of the system breakdown after line shunt faults is a result of the 
analysis of all event trees. The frequency of the system breakdown f(SB) is the 
sum of the system breakdowns of each event tree. 
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where the f(SBM) is the system breakdown frequency of an event tree M.  
9.3 Importance measures  
In this chapter the importance measures used in the consequence analysis are 
presented. The importance measures are those used for ranking the importance 
of different substation components. Different measures give different 
information about the components.  
9.3.1 Fussell-Vesely importance 
Fussell-Vesely’s measure of importance FV(i) of a basic event i is the 
approximate conditional probability that at least one minimal cut set that 
contains component i is failed, given that the system is failed. A minimal cut 
set is failed when all the components in the minimal cut set are failed. Thus, the 
FV importance identifies the components that have the largest probability of 
being the cause of the system failure (Høyland and Rausand 2004, p. 194). This 
measure is also called the fractional contribution of basic event to risk 
(Mankamo et al., 1991). It is a positive number between 0 and 1. The equation 
of Fussell-Vesely importance for a system breakdown can be presented 
according to Høyland and Rausand (2004, p. 194) in the following way: 
)(
)()(
CP
DPiFV iSB =  (7) 
where P(Di) is the probability that at least one minimal cut set that contains 
component i is failed, and P(C) is the probability that the system is failed.  
9.3.2 Risk increase factor  
Risk increase factor (RIF) is also called the risk achievement worth (RAW). 
Here we use the concept RIF. RIF is the ratio of the conditional system 
unreliability if component i is not present (or if component i is always failed) 
with the actual system unreliability. It presents a measure of the worth of 
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component i in achieving the present level of system reliability and indicates 
the importance of maintaining the current level of reliability for the component 
(Høyland and Rausand, 2004, p. 191). For coherent systems the risk increase 
factor is always greater than 1. The RIF of a basic event i for a system 
breakdown SB is 
)(
))1)(((
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iqSBP
iRIF SB
==  (8) 
in which q(i) is the unavailability of basic event i (Relcon, 2003, Theory 
manual, p. 48). The risk increase factor can be calculated as a function of 
Fussell-Vesely importance. In this case, RIF is  
)(1
1)(
iFV
iRIF SB
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−=  
(9) 
in which FVSB(i) is the Fussell-Vesely importance of the component i. 
9.3.3 Risk decrease factor  
Risk decrease factor RDF (also called as the risk reduction worth (RRW)) is 
the ratio of the actual system unreliability with the conditional system 
unreliability if component i is replaced by a perfect component (Høyland and 
Rausand, 2004, p. 191). The risk decrease factor identifies the basic event that 
would improve the system most if it were perfectly reliable. For coherent 
systems, the risk decrease factor is always greater than 1. The RDF of a basic 
event i for system breakdown SB is  
))0)(((
)()( == iqSBP
SBPiRDF SB  (10) 
in which q(i) is the constant unavailability of basic event i (Relcon, 2003, 
Theory manual, p. 48).  
9.3.4 Sensitivity of parameters  
Parameters in the event tree model are, for example, the failure rate, test 
interval and constant unavailability. The sensitivity of a parameter indicates the 
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rate of change of the consequence if the parameter changes. The sensitivity Sθ 
of any parameter θ for the system breakdown is calculated in the following 
way.  
)
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⋅==
θ
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(11) 
9.4 Analysis of the system with grid-level importance 
measures  
After grid-level importance measures for all event trees have been calculated, 
they can be arranged so that the most important substation components 
contributing the system breakdown after the line short circuits can be 
recognised. The frequencies of system breakdown and partial system 
breakdown and the corresponding minimal cut sets are calculated. Also 
Fussell-Vesely importance, RDF and RIF measures and sensitivity of 
parameters are calculated. Chapter 10 describes the results of these 
calculations. 
9.5 Summary of reliability indices  
Different indicators can be calculated from the event tree results.  
 
• The frequency of system breakdown after a fault at a line and 
frequency of system breakdown after all line faults. 
• An index for the relative importance of each component in relation to 
system breakdown and partial system breakdown. This can be done by 
ranking the grid-level importance measures. 
• Different probability values of each fault tree can be obtained.  
• Local indices for each initiating event can be calculated from each 
event tree. 
 
The indices, except the last one in the list above were calculated and some of 
them are presented in Chapter 10.  
  94
10 RESULTS  
This chapter describes the results of the analyses made. The system breakdown 
and partial system breakdown frequencies, corresponding minimal cut sets and 
some importance measures for them are presented. The contributing factors to 
partial and total system breakdown are presented and some recommendations 
are made. It is worth noting that these results correspond to the intact grid and 
one grid loading only; it is only for those line shunt faults that can be tripped by 
the distance relays. More summaries of quantitative results are given in 
Appendix E for a system breakdown and in Appendix F for a partial system 
breakdown.  
The estimate of the frequency due to failures at the substation after line 
shunt faults was made for partial and total system breakdown. They were made 
for a lightly loaded grid, which means that the values are, to some extent, too 
optimistic. The estimate is 1.37E-03 / years for the system breakdown and 
1.12E-01 / years for the partial system breakdown. The corresponding time 
intervals between the successive breakdowns are 730 years and 9 years, 
respectively. The annual line shunt fault frequency estimate used in the 
analysis, i.e., 2.9E-03 faults / km, is calculated in Section 5.2.1.  
10.1 System breakdown 
There were two different series of events that led lead to a system breakdown. 
The most common cause was the failure to trip at the substation, after which 
the remote back-up protection reach was not sufficient to isolate the fault. The 
substation consequences that caused this system breakdown were numbered as 
23 or 24 and are presented in Table 7. This kind of series of events caused a 
system breakdown after faults at 26 lines. The system remained dynamically 
stable, but was classified as a system breakdown due to the insufficient reach of 
the remote back-up distance relays.  
The other, and significantly less frequent, cause that resulted in a system 
breakdown was extended fault duration near the generators. The extended fault 
duration was caused by the circuit breakers that failed to trip or by the failure 
of the telecommunication channel that caused the trip signal delay. The 
extended fault duration in these cases was either 250 ms or 450 ms. This was 
the case after faults at 6 lines. If a circuit breaker fails, the fault duration is 250 
ms and several lines are tripped at single circuit breaker substations. If the 
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telecommunication fails, the faulted line is tripped after 450 ms, which also can 
lead to loss of transient stability of the system. 
Seven lines were such that there were no system breakdowns after the 
fault sequences studied. 
Minimal cut sets 
There were 13963 different minimal cut sets that led to a system breakdown. 
Figure 23 presents the components of the 100 most important minimal cut sets 
for the system breakdown. The frequency contributions of the cut sets are 
presented in Figure 24. Those 100 minimal cut sets represent 81.1 % of the 
whole system breakdown frequency. It appears that minimal cut sets consisting 
of two circuit breaker failures represent more than half of the minimal cut sets. 
Both causes of the breakdown are included.  
 
Figure 23  The components of the 100 most important minimal cut sets for a 
system breakdown  
The minimal cut sets for the failure to trip at the substation always have two 
components. These components are either two circuit breakers at the single 
circuit breaker substation, two main protection relays or the telecommunication 
of the main protection 1 and the relay of the main protection 2.  
At a few fault locations the power system went into system breakdown 
due to transient stability. The minimal cut sets that are most important at grid 
level have one basic event only; it is either one circuit breaker or one 
telecommunication channel. These components were the highest in the minimal 
cut set ranking list and are ranked high in all importance measure lists, too. 
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Figure 24  The frequency contributions of the 100 most important minimal 
cut sets for a system breakdown 
Fussell-Vesely and risk decrease factors 
Most important components according to grid-level Fussell-Vesely and RDF 
importance measures are presented in Figure 25. Only components with the 
FV-importance measure larger than 0.01 are presented.  
 
Figure 25  The 32 components that have the highest FV importance ranking 
for system breakdown 
Among the most important components, there are 18 circuit breakers, 11 
distance relays and 3 telecommunication channels. Most, but not all, circuit 
breakers are air-blast circuit breakers. It is worth noting that the remote back-
up protection systems are not included in the importance measures, since they 
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are not modelled in event trees. The most important components in Fussell-
Vesely ranking are four air-blast circuit breakers. The FV measure of them 
varies between 0.11 and 0.13. 
Risk increase factors  
The most significant risk increase factors were different from Fussell-Vesely 
and risk decrease factors. The basic events for substations and bays had the 
highest RIF measure. This is natural, since the basic events for bays and 
substations are in all fault trees of that bay and that substation, respectively. 
Therefore they are in all function events of the event trees and their failure 
causes the system to fail. This is a structural property of the model.  
In addition to this, all the voltage transformer miniature circuit breakers of 
electromechanical distance relays were ranked high in the list of grid-level RIF 
measures. The two electromechanical distance relays protecting the same line 
have a common miniature circuit breaker in the voltage transformer circuit. If 
the miniature circuit breaker trips, both relays are incapable of tripping the line. 
Sensitivity of parameters for system breakdown 
The ranking list of local parameter sensitivity shows that the circuit breaker 
testing interval and the failure rate of air-blast circuit breakers are the 
parameters that have the highest sensitivity values. This list also has ranked 
quite highly some unavailability values of the distance relays. The parameters 
that have a sensitivity value higher than 1.0 are listed in Appendix E. 
10.2 Partial system breakdown 
A delayed line trip takes longer than 100 ms. A delayed trip was the reason for 
a partial system breakdown because of faults at 21 lines. The consequence of 
the delayed line trip was the trip of near-by generators or the permanent 
blocking of near-by HVDC links. One reason for the delayed trip was the 
failure of the telecommunication signal, which caused the distance relays to trip 
at zone 2. This caused the fault duration to be about 450 ms. The most 
important minimal cut sets of this power system state had only one basic event; 
this was the power line carrier telecommunication channel. 
Another cause of a delayed trip is the circuit breaker becoming stuck. A 
breaker failure relay trips the other circuit breakers connected to the same 
busbar as the faulted circuit breaker. In this case, the fault duration was 250 ms. 
This failure caused the partial system breakdown on many lines near the 
generators and HVDC links. 
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Minimal cut sets 
There were 7603 different minimal cut sets that led to a partial system 
breakdown. 62 most frequent minimal cut sets covered 100 % of the partial 
system breakdown frequency. Among those cut sets there are 59 that have only 
one component and 3 that have two components. Figure 26 and Figure 27 
present the contribution of these minimal cut sets to a partial system 
breakdown. 
 
Figure 26  The components of the 62 most important minimal cut sets for a 
partial system breakdown 
 
Figure 27  The frequency contributions of different types of the 62 most 
important minimal cut sets for a partial system breakdown 
The most important minimal cut sets with one component have a 
telecommunication channel or a circuit breaker. The circuit breaker was often, 
but not always, an air-blast circuit breaker. Similarly, the telecommunication 
channel was often, but not always, a power line carrier. Naturally the 
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components of these basic events were located near the generators or HVDC 
links.  
Importance measures  
Fussell-Vesely importance measures and RDF measures were identical to the 
list of minimal cut sets. The same circuit breakers and telecommunication 
channels that were ranked highest in the minimal cut set list were ranked high 
on the Fussell-Vesely and RDF lists, too. The reason is obvious: these 
components already have a high failure rate in the model. Figure 28 presents 
the 35 most important components according to the Fussell-Vesely and RDF 
ranking. Those 35 components have a FV measure value that is bigger than 
0.001. The FV measure values of those four telecommunication channels that 
are ranked highest vary between 0.08 and 0.3.  
 
Figure 28  The 35 components that have the highest FV importance ranking 
When ranking RIF measures, it was the circuit breakers, substations, line bays 
and miniature circuit breakers of the voltage transformers that were ranked 
high. Power line carrier telecommunication channels were not ranked very high 
in the RIF list. 
10.2.1 Sensitivity of parameters  
The ranking list of local parameter sensitivity shows that the power line carrier 
telecommunication constant unavailability has the highest sensitivity for the 
partial system breakdown. The circuit breaker test interval has the second 
Tele (11)
CB (24)
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largest sensitivity. Those parameters the sensitivity of which is larger than 1 are 
presented in Appendix F. 
10.3 Comments and recommendations  
The Fussell-Vesely importance is directly proportional to the unavailability of 
the component. Thus Fussell-Vesely importance measures can be used alone 
for identifying the potential components for safety improvement. Fussell-
Vesely importance is comparable to the RDF measure. The RIF measure, on 
the other hand, is a weak function of the unavailability of the component and 
thus it sees the system from a different point of view. RIF does not represent 
the component itself but the defence of the rest of the installation against a 
failure of a component (Borst and Schoonakker, 2001). 
Circuit breakers  
The Fussell-Vesely grid-level importance measures show that the failure of a 
circuit breaker is in many fault locations the cause of a system breakdown. 
Many, but not all of these circuit breakers were air-blast circuit breakers. Some 
circuit breakers near big generators were ranked high in FV ranking lists, 
because the extended fault duration due to the stuck circuit breaker and the 
weakening of the grid after the breaker failure relay trip was enough to trip the 
generators and lead to system breakdown due to stability problems. Some 
circuit breaker failures near the generators caused partial system breakdowns. 
The parameter, the change of which most changed the system breakdown 
frequency, was in many fault locations the circuit breaker test interval. The test 
interval of the circuit breaker was also ranked high for the partial system 
breakdown. 
Because the circuit breakers were often the main reason for grid problems, 
the circuit breaker test interval should not be lengthened. The test interval in 
this model was 1 year. This does not mean complete maintenance of the circuit 
breakers, but a check that the breaker trips after it has received a trip signal. 
Nowadays the relays are tested once a year and also the circuit breaker is 
checked during the test. If the relay test interval of the microprocessor relays is 
lengthened because of the self-supervision they have, the circuit breakers 
should still be checked once a year.  
The air-blast circuit breakers should always be changed to SF6 circuit 
breakers when the substation is renovated. At the substations near the 
generators, the circuit breakers could be changed even without the substation 
renovation.  
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Some circuit breakers are ranked high in the Fussell-Vesely ranking for both 
system breakdown and partial system breakdown. Table 9 presents the ranking 
of those components. 
Table 9  The ranking of the circuit breakers that have a high Fussell-Vesely 
ranking both for the system breakdown and the partial system breakdown. The 
substation identifications are not real due to confidentiality reasons. 
Component Ranking of FV and 
RDF measures for SB 
Ranking of FV and RDF 
measures for PSB 
25AC09 CB TRIP 8 5 
26AC03 CB TRIP 9 38 
25AC06 CB TRIP 13 15 
20AC03 CB TRIP 22 24 
22AC05 CB TRIP 25 30 
18AC03 CB TRIP 34 8 
 
Protection issues 
The single components the failing of which most increases the risk of system 
breakdown are the miniature circuit breakers of the electromechanical distance 
relays. Always when the old relays are exchanged for new ones, both relays 
have their own miniature circuit breakers. Thus this safety problem will 
disappear in the future.  
Because the power line carrier telecommunication channel fails almost 
always after 3-phase line faults and once in three 2-phase line faults, it would 
be good to duplicate the telecommunication at those lines where the power line 
carrier is the only telecommunication and at those that are located near 
generators. One power line carrier telecommunication channels had a high 
Fussell-Vesely ranking both for the system breakdown (ranking: 17) and for 
the partial system breakdown (ranking: 4). 
The reach of the zone 3 of the distance relays is sufficient only on short 
lines. On many locations, it is not possible to lengthen the reach to all fault 
locations of the adjacent lines. It is worth noting that a lengthening of the reach 
can increase the risk of unwanted trips.  
A good way to improve the reliability of duplicated protection systems 
would be to change the specifications in such a way that the main protection 
relays were obtained from different manufacturers. Then the common cause 
failure possibility due to the same software code in the duplicated relays would 
disappear. 
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High resistance earth faults 
In Section 5.2.2, the line faults with a high resistance were described. Even 
though they are infrequent, they have caused unselective line trips. The 
selectivity of the protection for high resistance earth faults can be improved by 
changing the settings from definite time to inverse time. This requires that the 
old electromechanical earth fault relays are replaced with modern 
microprocessor relays, which have both definite time and inverse time settings. 
The old electromechanical relays have only a definite time setting. This will be 
realised as the remaining electromechanical relays are replaced with modern 
relays within the next few years. The number of high resistance faults can also 
be reduced with other measures, such as tree felling at regular intervals on the 
transmission line right-of-ways. This may not be the case with high current 
faults. 
10.4 Other results  
Slightly different conclusions can be drawn from the results of the substation 
reliability model alone, without a consideration of the power system impacts. 
The relays that cause the failures at the substation more often are the static 
distance relays compared to electromechanical or microprocessor relays. The 
same comparison between the circuit breakers gives the result that air-blast 
circuit breakers fail more often than minimum oil and SF6 circuit breakers. 
Here it is worth remembering that the blocking of SF6 circuit breakers due to 
low gas pressure is not used.  
When the circuit breakers are ignored, and only the different protection 
systems for the line faults near the line ends are compared, different details can 
be seen. The impact of the telecommunication unavailability value and the 
duplication of the telecommunication channels can be compared. In this 
comparison, it is assumed that the line fault distribution along the line is 
uniform. The result of one comparison between three different protection 
systems is presented in Table 10. In this comparison the best solution is two 
distance relays with duplicated telecommunication channels. The second best 
solution is the one distance relay and one differential relay. The system with 
the lowest reliability is the protection system with the two distance relays that 
use a common telecommunication channels. The ranking of the three solutions 
remains the same with two different telecommunication unavailability values. 
The minimal cut set that covers 99 % of the unavailability of solution (3) in 
Table 10 has only one basic event: telecommunication channel. The details of 
the comparison are presented by Pottonen et al. (2004a, 2004b). 
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Table 10  Constant unavailability values for three different protection systems 
with two different unavailability values of the telecommunication channel. Z = 
distance relay, D = differential relay. 
Unavailability q 
of the tele-
communication 
channel 
Unavailability of 
a protection 
system with two 
Z–relays and two 
tele-
communication 
channels 
Unavailability of 
a protection 
system with one 
D-relay and one 
Z-relay, two 
telecommunicatio
n channels 
Unavailability of a 
protection system 
with two Z- relays 
and one tele-
communication 
channel 
q = 1.2E-02 q = 7.5E-05 q = 1.3E-04 q = 2.4E-03 
q = 1.0E-03 q = 1.6E-05 q = 3.9E-05 q = 2.1E-04 
 
In addition some qualitative results were achieved during the modelling 
process. The FMEA process gave an overview of the different ways of keeping 
the component-failure statistics. The failure statistics of the primary 
components, such as circuit breakers, were more detailed than the statistics of 
the secondary components, such as the relays. The relay failure databases had 
quite detailed descriptions of the relay failures, but lacked the information 
about component years. The number of component years had to be estimated 
from other sources. During the modelling, an incorrectly made duplication of 
the telecommunication channel was found and corrected. The 
telecommunication channels A and B were in the same optic cable at one 
substation.  
10.5 Concluding remarks 
The results received with the analysis of the transmission grid give an overview 
of the different series of events that lead to system problems. They also present 
the relative importance of different components as a reason for a system 
breakdown or a partial system breakdown.  
Also the modelling process gave some valuable information about the grid 
that can be used in asset management.  
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11 DISCUSSION 
The aim of the project was to create a modelling method for the transmission 
grid reliability. The model was made for line faults only, since they are the 
most common initiating events. There exist other initiating events, which might 
contribute more to power system breakdown frequency than line shunt faults. 
However, this study deals only with line shunt faults. 
The other aim was to estimate the reliability of the Finnish 400 kV grid. 
The model was made for this grid and the estimates for partial and total system 
breakdown were calculated. Some importance measures and more and less 
likely contributing factors to system breakdown were also received. The fact 
that the model can be applied to a grid of real size, gives results at component 
level and ranks the component importance is a practical achievement. It is 
easier to create accurate and detailed models for reduced grids, but these 
models often have more academic than practical value.  
The calculated estimates after line faults for partial and total system 
breakdown were one in 9 years and one in 730 years, respectively. When 
considering these figures one has to remember that this is only for failures of 
the substation operations after line shunt faults, not for all possible initiating 
events and substation operation failures. It is also important to remember the 
properties of a probabilistic approach. The probability indicates the degree of 
uncertainty and a result like ‘once in 9 years’ needs to be understood as a 
rational belief based on a certain case and certain assumptions instead of a 
scientific fact that can be proved. This probability model connects the evidence 
of the component reliability to the transmission system breakdown probability 
in a rational way. 
The model gives information about the upper-level (the transmission grid) 
reliability by using the reliability of the lower-level components. There is no 
data available on the system breakdown but there is a lot about the failures of 
different components. The grid-level failure is a function of the structural 
function of the system and the reliability of the system components. The 
important results derived from this approach are failure sequences that 
contribute to the system breakdown, the importance values and ranking of 
different components and the indicators for the system breakdown. Thus the 
real result is the knowledge of the system characteristics, not the exact 
numerical values. 
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Methodology  
The scientific contribution of the model is the evaluation of the applicability of 
the probabilistic safety assessment for power system security estimation. The 
power system is a highly non-linear system, in which similar failure sequences 
in different locations and at different grid loading levels can lead to different 
system states. Thus the dynamic simulations of the substation failures are an 
essential part of this study. When combining the PSA-type of approach for 
substation post-fault events with grid simulations one can get the importance 
measures for different power system post-fault states. In this model, the 
substation component importance measures are calculated for total and partial 
system breakdown of the whole grid. 
When the reliability of the meshed grid is under discussion, it is the 
system state that is more important than the unavailability of a single substation 
component, a bay or a line. This is due to the fact that, according to the n-1 
criterion, the transmission system can at any time lose a component without 
any problems to the consumers. In this respect, the study differs from the 
previous studies, where either the power system security is studied without a 
detailed substation model or the substation is studied without considering the 
effects of substation operation failures on the power system. It also differs from 
the security study of Miki (1999), which had a limited substation model where 
the protection, but not the circuit breakers, was included. The results of this 
study show that the circuit breaker operation failures are one of the important 
reasons that lead to system breakdowns.  
The FMEA analysis of the substation components was made. The FMEA 
made in this study was both qualitative and quantitative. It is a necessary part 
of a reliability analysis and also a good way to document device-failure 
statistics and expert judgements. Here the FMEA was conducted by using the 
specific data of the Finnish 400 kV transmission grid. Thus the failure data are 
suitable for the case analysed. Different transmission system operators may 
have different maintenance policies, different substation structures and also 
equipment from different manufacturers. Also the ages of the line and 
substation equipment can be different at different transmission grids. It is 
therefore better to use the specific FMEA data instead of general data.  
In some cases, the component failure statistics are not available and 
therefore the quantitative modelling seems to be impossible. That is not 
necessarily the case, however. It is possible to use the data received with expert 
judgments and get information of structural properties of the system from 
diagrams and pictures. In this way, one can also find important failure 
combinations. There also exist methods for estimating the structural importance 
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of the components. These methods do not need any failure data. Some 
measures are presented by Myötyri (2003).  
This analysis method enables risk-informed grid asset management, since 
it gives the connection between the system breakdown risk and a single 
component at the substation. It brings the quantitative element into reliability 
analysis and helps to rank the substation components at different substations.  
Practical aspects 
The model is detailed enough to give information about the impact of different 
substation components to grid security. The model can be built by using 
different reliability and power system dynamic software.  
The correctness of the results received depends on the structure of the 
model, i.e., how well it represents the reality. It also depends on the quality of 
the fault and failure statistics available. If the component failure statistics are 
made for purposes other than reliability analysis, they need to be interpreted. In 
this research, the failure statistics were made mostly for maintenance purposes. 
It was therefore necessary to read every failure report and conclude from them 
whether the failure reported is a failure in this model. For example, if a circuit 
breaker has a 'major failure' it can be a major failure as far as the maintenance 
engineers are concerned, but it does not necessarily prevent the circuit breaker 
trip. On the other hand, if a trip coil of a circuit breaker is disconnected, it is 
not necessarily reported at all in the circuit breaker failure database, but it 
definitely prevents the circuit breaker trip. 
Despite the uncertainties of the model and the component failure data, the 
method proposed can suggest ways of improving the maintenance and the 
transmission grid. It also can be used during the planning stage of a new 
substation. Different busbar schemes and protection systems can be compared 
from the reliability point of view. As the method lists the relative importance of 
substation components and helps to identify the weaknesses of the system, it 
can help those concerned to focus the maintenance operations and thus it can 
bring risk-informed thinking into the asset management of the power system. 
The method makes it possible to identify beneficial changes that do not 
deteriorate the system reliability.  
The drawback of the model proposed is that building the reliability model 
for substations, and also the use of it for different load flow cases, requires a lot 
of work and therefore is expensive. But after the model has been built, the 
information received with it can be beneficial. Also creating the model gives 
rise to knowledge of the system, so the model is not a black-box model. One 
needs to understand the details of the model in order to interpret the results 
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correctly. In this respect, the model is not different from other power system 
simulation software. 
Other issues  
The model was made for 2-phase short circuits. To some extent the results are 
also valid for 3- and 1-phase line shunt faults. The event tree model is similar 
for 1-, 2- and 3-phase faults in all other aspects, but the power line carrier 
telecommunication unavailability changes drastically with the phases involved 
in the fault. This is due to the fact the PLC system is installed on 2 phases and 
the carrier signal most probably fails to travel on the faulted line.  
The power system simulation results are made for 3-phase faults. The 
results are valid also for 2-phase faults, since the fault currents are about the 
same magnitude. All the cases that were stable for 3-phase faults would be 
stable also during 2- and 1-phase faults. But if the transient stability is lost 
during a 3-phase fault, it might not always be the case with 1-phase faults. 
Therefore, a few faults that were unstable with 3-phase faults were simulated 
with 1-phase faults in order to compare the difference in the power system state 
due to the fault type. The fault locations were near big generators. The transient 
stability was lost in most simulations in a way similar to that with 3-phase 
faults. One can conclude that, even though the model and the results are tuned 
for 2-phase faults, they are to some extent valid also for other line shunt faults.  
When evaluating the system breakdown and partial system breakdown 
results, one has to remember that this dynamic simulation model did not 
include all the possible causes for a generator trip, which in many cases is the 
main contributing factor of a system breakdown. The model trips a generator if 
it loses the synchronous operation. In reality, a generator can trip due to low 
voltages even though it is dynamically stable. This means that it may be 
possible that some generators may trip during a near-by short circuit even 
though they are dynamically stable. Power stations are complicated systems 
and modelling of all possible causes for a trip is simply not possible. Tripping 
of a single contactor can sometimes be enough for a generator trip.  
Future work 
A substation reliability model for busbar faults should also be made. The 
busbar faults are less frequent, but they are more severe. The model for 
ordinary busbar shunt faults can be created in a way similar to that in which the 
substation model for line shunt faults was made. A slightly different approach 
is suitable for explosions of current transformers, since the consequences of the 
current transformer explosions are partly unforeseeable and partly dependent 
on the busbar scheme and the location of the current transformer. The initiating 
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event frequency for substation faults depends more on the devices at the 
substation and so the initiating event analysis should take into account the 
number of devices, not only the faults that have occurred. 
The method can be used for analysing how often the power system ends 
up in different states (secure, alert, emergency, major disturbance) during a 
year. This requires that different load flows are simulated and the duration of 
them is estimated. A comprehensive analysis requires that the different ambient 
temperatures and different initiating event frequencies are taken into account in 
different load flow analysis cases. There are more line shunt faults due to 
lightning strokes in the summer than in the winter. 
The model proposed here is too complicated for multiple faults. A simpler 
method would be more applicable for analysing different combinations of 
several faults. 
By analysing different power system operating conditions, it might be 
possible to define a quantitative value for the acceptable risk level for normal 
and exceptional operating conditions.  
One way to use the model would be to estimate how often the grid ends 
up in different power system states during a certain moment with given load 
flow, grid connection, initiating event frequency and weather forecast (the 
probability of lightning, ambient temperature). This analysis can be useful 
during the planning stage of line or busbar outage, for example. The risk of 
power system breakdown at different load flows can be compared.  
Based on the statistics, an analysis of the high resistance earth faults and 
their effect on the reliability of the power system would be needed. Even 
though the fault current during these faults is smaller than in other line shunt 
faults, the possible unselective line trips can weaken the grid significantly and 
cause stability and thermal problems. However, the sensitive earth fault relays 
will, within the next few years, be changed into inverse time relays, thus 
improving the selectivity of the protection. Because the selectivity will be 
improved in the near future, there is no need to analyse these faults with the 
existing protection system; however, an analysis would be useful after the 
changes are made. 
This study includes basically exceptional fault durations of 250 ms, 450 
ms, 600 ms and 1000 ms. The effect of these fault durations combined with a 
possible weakening of the grid during a load flow case where Finland exports 
power to Sweden would certainly be worth researching. In this case, it is the 
damping of electromechanical oscillations that are critical. Also, the new 
nuclear power station of 1600 MW will change the grid; the effect this will 
have needs to be researched.  
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12 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study deals with transmission system reliability. More precisely, it 
proposes a reliability model for a power system in which the reliability of 
substation operations after line shunt faults and the impact of possible failures 
of the operations on the power system dynamics are both taken into account. 
The reliability evaluation was made for a real 400 kV transmission grid with 
one grid connection and load flow case. 
The main contribution of the study is a probabilistic method for 
transmission grid security analysis after line shunt faults. This method enables 
the estimation of the probability of the system breakdown and other power 
system states. The method developed for substation post-fault operations uses 
event and fault trees and therefore inherently gives rise to the possibility of 
calculating different importance measures for substation components and for 
parameters of the model. Importance measures can be used as tools for 
evaluating the importance of different grid components in several ways. With 
these importance measures, the more and less effective ways for improving 
grid security can be found. 
The method proposed is applicable to real transmission grids. Every line 
and every substation bay with the line protection primary and secondary 
components are included in the model. The basic functions in the substation 
operations after line faults are modelled, yet some simplifications and 
assumptions were made. The predefinitions and assumptions of the model were 
made bearing in mind the applicability of the method for the grids of real size. 
Fundamental to the modelling process was the fact that the basic phenomena 
and reliability problems were of interest, rather than every (local) detail. 
The method developed here takes into account the effect of the following 
issues in the matter of security:  
 
• Frequency of line faults 
• Fault location at the line 
• Different substation structures 
• Failure rates of the substation components  
• Dynamic behaviour of the power system after different contingencies 
• Reach of the remote back-up distance protection  
 
The mechanisms that lead to power system breakdown are different at different 
parts of the grid. This is why quantitative analysis is required in order to 
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correctly estimate the contribution of different fault locations and different grid 
components to the system breakdown.  
The method developed was applied to the Finnish transmission system 
and some quantitative estimates for the grid reliability were received. Several 
importance measures for substation components and model parameters, as well 
as estimates of the total and partial system breakdown frequency due to failures 
at the substation after line shunt faults, were calculated. The factors 
contributing to partial and total system breakdown were found. Based on the 
results, some recommendations for improving the reliability were made.  
When a transmission system operator has a tool that can really estimate 
quantitatively the reliability of the grid after grid faults, it can be used for 
several different purposes. It is possible, for example, to calculate the 
probability of a system breakdown during a planned outage with different grid 
connections and with different grid loadings and then decide the connection 
and maximum grid loading for that outage. It is possible to compare different 
substation structures when planning a new substation. In addition, different 
reliability indices can be calculated for a certain period. The aim was to get a 
practical, rather than a purely theoretical, model and it succeeded. In this way, 
this study differs from many other studies where a method is developed but is 
used only for a reduced grid model. 
For society, the probabilistic approach of grid planning and operation can 
produce benefits, since it enables a more efficient utilization of the grid without 
reducing the reliability.  
This study is a reliability analysis of a transmission grid in which some 
system issues were predefined, after which the system was analysed. In this 
way, an understanding of the system security after line faults was gained. One 
has to bear in mind that this research does not give a comprehensive view of all 
possible transmission system risks, because not all initiating events are 
modelled. Nevertheless, the method used in this research can also be used for 
risk, as well as reliability, analysis. 
  111
REFERENCES 
Aabo, Y., Goin, R., Lundqvist, B. 2001. Risk analysis – a new aspect on 
protection and local control design. In: IEE Conference Publications 479, IEE 
Seventh International Conference on Developments in Power System 
Protection (DPSP) Amsterdam April 2001, Pp. 347-350.  
Aboreshaid, S., Billinton, R. 1999. A framework for incorporating voltage and 
transient stability considerations in well-being evaluation of composite power 
systems. Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, 1999, IEEE, Volume 1, 
18-22, Jul 1999. Pp. 219-224.  
APM Task Force Report on Protection systems reliability. 1994. Allan, R., 
Anderson, P., Bhuiyan, M., Billinton, R., Deep, N., Endrenyi, J., Fong, C., 
Grigg, C., Haddad, S., Hormozi, J., Lauby, M., Schneider, A. Jr., Singh, C., 
Wang, L.: Effect of Protection Systems on Bulk Power Reliability Evaluation. 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Vol. 9, No 1. Pp. 198-205.  
Allan, R., Ochoa, J.R. 1988. Modelling and assessment of station originated 
outages for composite systems reliability evaluation. IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, Vol. 3, No. 1, February 1988. Pp. 158-165. ISBN ISSN: 0885-
8950. 
Anders, G.J. 1990. Probability concepts in electric power systems. New York, 
USA: John Wiley & Sons. 1990. 682 p. ISBN 0-471-50229-4.  
Anderson, P.M. 1999. Power System Protection. New York, USA. IEEE Press 
Power Engineering Series. McGraw-Hill & IEEE Press. 1999. 1307 p. ISBN 0-
7803-3427-2 (IEEE), 0-07-134323-7 (McGraw-Hill). 
Anderson, P.M. Chinaluri, G.M., Magbuhat, S.M., Ghajar, R.F., 1997. An 
Improved Reliability Model for Redundant Protective Systems – Markov 
Models. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 12, No. 2, May 1997, pp. 
573-578. 
APM Bulk Power indices Task Force 1994. Ringlee, R.J., Albrecht, P., Allan, 
R.N., Bhavaraju, M.P., Billington, R., Ludorf, R. LeReverend, B.K., Neudorf, 
  112
E., Lauby, M.G. Kuruganty, P.R.S., McCoy, M.F., Mielnik, T.C., Rau, N.S., 
Silverstein, B. Singh, C., Stratton, J.A., Sub-Task Force on Future needs; IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 9, No. 1, February 1994. Page(s): 181-
190 
Atanackovic, D. McGillis, D.T., Galiana, F.D. 1999. Reliability comparison of 
substation layouts. IEEE Transactions on Power System Delivery, Vol. 14, No. 
3, July 1999. Pp. 903-910.  
Berizzi, A., Bovo, C., Fumagalli, E., Grimaldi, E. A. 2003. Security assessment 
in operation: a comparative study of probabilistic approaches. Power Tech 
Conference Proceedings, 2003 IEEE Bologna, Vol. 1, 6 pp. 23-26 June 2003. 
Beshir, M., J. Farag, A., S., Cheng, T., C. 1999. New comprehensive reliability 
assessment framework for power systems. Energy Conversion and 
Management 40. Pp. 975-1007.  
Billinton, R., Khan, E. 1992. A security based approach to composite power 
system reliability evaluation. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, Feb 1992. Pp. 65-72. 
Billinton, R., Mo, R. 2003. Impact of Equipment Availability on Composite 
System Reliability. IEEE CCECE 2003. Canadian Conference on Electrical 
and Computer Engineering, 4-7 May 2003. Vol. 1, pp. 607-612. 
Borst, van der, M., Schoonakker, H. 2001. An overview of PSA importance 
measures. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Elsevier Science Ltd. Vol. 
72, 2001. p. 241-245. 
Elizondo, D.C., de la Ree, J., Phadke, A.G., Horowitz, S. 2001. Hidden 
Failures in Protection Systems and their Impact on Wide-area Disturbances. 
IEEE Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting, 2001. Vol. 2. Pp. 710-714.  
Ferreira, L.R.C., Crossley, P., Allan, R.N., Downes, J. 2001. The Impact of 
Functional Integration on the Reliability of Substation Protection and Control 
Systems. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 2001. 
Pp. 83-88.  
  113
Ferreira, L.R.C., Pugh, J., Crossley, P.A., Allan, R.N., Goody J. 1996. Design 
and Reliability of Integrated Protection and Control Schemes. In: IEE 
Conference Publication No. 421. Power System and Control Management. Pp. 
87-91.  
Goel, L., Shrestha, G.B. 2002. A versatile tool for electric substation reliability 
assessment. Computers and Electrical Engineering, Vol. 28, No. 6, November 
2002. Pp. 562-576.  
Henley, E.J., Kumamoto, H. 1992. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Reliability 
Engineering, Design and Analysis. IEEE Press January 1992. ISBN 
0879422904, 592 p.  
Hirvonen R., Pottonen L. 1994. Low voltages after a disturbance in the Finnish 
400 kV transmission network. Bulk Power System Voltage Phenomena III. 
Voltage stability, security and control. 22-26 August 1994. Davos, Switzerland. 
Pp. 231-234. 
Huang, G., M., Yishan L. 2002. Power System reliability Indices to Measure 
Impacts Caused by Transient Stability Crises. 2002 IEEE Power Engineering 
Society Winter Meeting, January 2002. Pp. 766-771.  
Høyland, A. Rausand, M. 1994. System Reliability Theory. USA. John Wiley 
& Sons. 1994. 519 p. ISBN 0-471-59397-4 
IEC 60050-191 (1990-12), International Electrotechnical Vocabulary (IEV), 
Chapter 191: Dependability and quality of service, IEC 60050-191-amendment 
1 (1999-03), Amendment 2 (2002-01). The vocabulary available also at 
www.iec.ch. 
IEC 60050-448 1995. International Electrotechnical Vocabulary (IEV), 
Chapter 446: Power system protection. 107 p. The vocabulary available also at 
www.iec.ch. 
IEEE/CIGRE 2004. Joint task force on stability terms and definitions. Kundur, 
P.; Paserba, J.; Ajjarapu, V.; Andersson, G.; Bose, A.; Canizares, C.; 
Hatziargyriou, N.; Hill, D.; Stankovic, A.; Taylor, C.; Van Cutsem, T.; Vittal, 
  114
V. Definition and classification of power system stability. IEEE Transactions 
on Power Systems, Vol. 19, Issue: 3, Aug. 2004, pp. 1387 – 1401 
Johannesson, T., Roos, R., Lindahl S. 2004. Reliability of protection systems – 
operational experience 1976-2002. IEE 8th International Conference on 
Developments in Power System Protection. Amsterdam, The Netherlands 5-8 
April 2004. Pp. 303-306. ISBN 0 86341 385 4, ISSN 0537-9989, 827 p. 
Jourda, P. 1993. Probabilistic assessment of risk and quality in high voltage 
systems. University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology, Ph.D. 
Thesis 1993. 294 p.  
Jourda, P., Allan, R.N. 1996. Evaluating the availability of electrical 
substations: a dynamic methodology. IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, 
Vol. 11, No. 4, October 1996. Pp. 1755-1764.  
Karlsson D., Olovsson H-E, Wallin L, Sölver, C-E. 1997. Reliability and Life 
Cycle Cost Estimates of 400 kV Substation Layouts. IEEE Transactions on 
Power System Delivery, Vol. 12, No. 4, October 1997. Pp. 1486-1492.  
Khan M.E. 1998. Bulk load points reliability evaluation using a security based 
model. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 13, No. 2, May 1998. Pp. 
456-463.  
Koeunyi-Bae, Thorp J.S. 1999. A stochastic study of hidden failures in power 
system protection. Decision Support Systems 24, 1999, pp. 259-268. Elsevier, 
Netherlands. 
Kundur P. 1994. Power System Stability and Control. McGraw-Hill, New York 
1994. ISBN 0 070 35958 X, 1176 pages.  
Lee, P.M. 1997. Bayesian Statistics: An Introduction. Second ed. Arnold, a 
member of the Hodder Headline Group. London, 344 p. ISBN 0 340 67785 6 
(pb) 
Leite da Silva, A.M., Endrenyi, J. Wang, L. 1993. Integrated Treatment of 
Adequacy and Security in Bulk Power System Reliability Evaluations. IEEE 
  115
Transactions on Applied Superconductivity, Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1993. Pp. 
275-285.  
Loparo, K.A., Abdel-Malek, F. 1990. A Probabilistic Approach to Dynamic 
Power System Security. IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems, Vol. 37, 
No. 6, June 1990. Pp. 787-798.  
Machowski, J., Bialek, J.W. Bumby, J.R. 1997. Power System Dynamics and 
Stability. John Wiley and Sons, Chichester 1997. ISBN 0 471 97174X (PPC), 0 
471 95643 0 (PR). 461 p. 
Makarov, Y.V., Hardiman, R.C. 2003. On Risk-based Indices for Transmission 
Systems. IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting 13-17 July 2003. 
Vol. 2, pp. 671-678.  
Mankamo T., Pörn, K., Holmberg, J. 1991. Uses of risk importance measures. 
Technical report, Technical Research Centre of Finland, Research notes 1245. 
ISBN 951-38-3877-3, ISSN 0358-5085. Espoo 1991. 36 p. 
Medicherla, T.K. P., Chau, M., Zigmund, R.E., Chan, K. 1994. Transmission 
station reliability evaluation. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 9, No. 
1, February 1994. Pp. 295-304.  
Meeuwsen, J.J., Kling, W.L. 1997. Substation Reliability Evaluation including 
Switching Actions with Redundant Components. IEEE Transactions on Power 
Delivery, Vol. 12, No. 4, October 1997. Pp. 1472-1479.  
Miki, T., Okitsu, D., Kushida, M., Ogino, T. 1999. Development of a Hybrid 
Type Assessment Method for Power System Dynamic Reliability. In: IEEE 
International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics 1999. IEEE SMC 
'99 Conference Proceedings, Vol. 1. Pp. 968-973.  
Myötyri, E. 2003. Measures for structural properties of systems. Master’s 
thesis. Helsinki University of Technology. Department of Engineering Physics 
and Mathematics. Espoo, Finland. 52+20 p.  
NERC 2004. North American Electric Reliability Council: Technical Analysis 
of the August 14, 2003, Blackout: What Happened, Why, and What Did We 
  116
Learn. Report to the NERC Board of Trustees by the NERC Steering Group. 
July 13, 2003. Retrieved November 11, 2004 from www.nerc.com. 
Nguyen, D. 2001. Failure modes and effects Analysis for Software Reliability. 
Proceedings of the Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium. 2001. 
Pp. 219 –222. 
Nordel 2004. Nordisk Regelsamling 2004. (Nordic Grid Code 2004). Del 1. En 
gemensam nordisk regelsamling. Del 2: regler för planering (Planning Code) 
med bilagor. Del 3. Regler för Drift (Operational Code) (Systemdriftavtal). Del 
4: Regler för anslutning (Connection Code). Del 5: Regler för data (Dataaftale 
mellem de nordiske systemansvarige). 180 p. Retrieved November 11, 2004 
from www.nordel.org. 
Nordel 2002. Report form Nordel ad hoc group. September 19, 2002. 
Reliability Standards and System Operating Practices in Nordel. 16 pages. 
Retrieved November 11, 2004 from www.nordel.org. 
NUREG/CR-2300 1983. PRA Procedures Guide: A Guide to the Performance 
of Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plants. The American 
Nuclear Society and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New 
York.  
Phadke, A.G., Thorp, J.S. 2002. Expose Hidden Failures to prevent Cascading 
Outages. IEEE Computer Applications in Power. Vol. 9, No 3, ed. Pp. 20-23.  
Pottonen, L., Pulkkinen, U., Koskinen, M. 2004. A method for evaluating the 
reliability of protection. IEE 8th International Conference on Developments in 
Power System Protection. Pp. 299-302. Amsterdam, The Netherlands; 5-8 
April 2004. ISBN 0 86341 385 4, ISSN 0537-9989. 827 p. 
Pottonen, L., Pulkkinen, U., Koskinen, M. 2004. The effect of relay protection 
on the substation reliability. PSAM7 – ESREL´04, International Conference on 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management. Pp. 1002-1007. Berlin, 
Germany 14-18 June 2004. Springer Verlag London limited 2004. ISBN 1-
85233-827-X. 3728 p. 
  117
Pugh, J.S., Ferreira, L.R.C., Crossley, P.A., Allan, R.N., Goody, J., Downes, J., 
Burt, M. 1997. The reliability of protection and control systems for 
transmission feeders. In: IEE Conference Publications No. 434. Developments 
of Power System Protection (DPSP), Nottingham, April 1997. Pp. 10-13.  
Pulkkinen, U., Simola, K., Hirvonen, R., Lemström, B., Koskinen, M. 2002. 
Availability Analysis of an Electricity Transmission Network. Pp. 12-16. VTT 
Industrial Systems Review 2002. VTT Industrial Systems, P.O. BOX 1300, 
FIN-33101 Tampere, Finland. ISSN 1459-1804. 79 p.  
Rausand, M., Høyland, A. 2004. System Reliability Theory, Models, Statistical 
Methods, and Applications, Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Hoboken, 
New Jersey, USA. ISBN 0-471-47133-X, 636 p.  
Rei, A.M., Leita da Silva A.M., Jardim, J.L., de Oliveira Mello, J.C. 2000. 
Static and Dynamic Aspects in Bulk Power System Reliability Evaluations. 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 15, No. 1, February 2000. Pp. 189-
195.  
Relcon AB 2003. Risk Spectrum PSA Professional 2.0, published 2003. 
Software developed by Relcon AB, Box 1288, SE-17225 Sundbyberg, Sweden. 
Tel. +46 8 445 2100, www.riskspectrum.com 
Shahidehpour, A., M., Behera. A., K. 1989. Dynamics of Power System in 
Reliability Studies. Circuits and Systems, 1989. Proceedings of the 32nd 
Midwest Symposium on 14-16 Aug 1989. Pp. 268-272, Vol. 1. 
Shaw PTI 2001. PSS/E-28 Program Application Guide (PAG) and PSS/E 
Program Operation Manual (POM). ©2004 Shaw Power Technologies, Inc., 
1482 Erie Boulevard, Schenectady, NY 12305, USA. PAG 1072 p., POM 1736 
p. http://www.shawgrp.com/PTI/index.cfm 
Singh, C., Hiskens A. 2001. Direct Assessment of Protection Operation and 
Non-viable Transients. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
August 2001, Pp. 427-434. 
Svenska Kraftnät 2003. The black-out in southern Sweden and eastern 
Denmark, September 23, 2002. Report from Svenska Kraftnät, the Swedish 
  118
Transmission System Operator (TSO). 5 p. Retrieved December 7, 2004 from 
www.svk.se 
Svensson, B.; Mathiasson, G.; Holst, S., Lindahl, S. 1992. Experience of 
Protection Equipment Maintenance - A Case Story, Report 34-105, CIGRE-
Session, Paris, 30 August - 5 September, 1992, 9 pages. 
Tamronglak, S., Horowitz, A.H., Phadke, A.G., Thorp. J.S., 1996. Anatomy of 
power system blackouts: preventive relaying strategies. IEEE Transactions of 
Power Delivery, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 1996. Pp. 708-715.  
Taylor, C. W. 1994. Power System Voltage Stability. New York, McGraw-
Hill, Inc. 1994. ISBN 0-07-113708-4. 273 pages. 
Thorp, J.S., Phadke, A.G, Horowitz, S.H., Tamronglak, S. 1998. Anatomy of 
power system disturbances: importance sampling. International Journal of 
Electrical Power & Energy Systems. Feb. 1998, 20(2). Elsevier., UK. Pp. 147-
152.  
UCTE 2004. Final report of the Investigation Committee on the 28 September 
2003 Blackout in Italy. 122 pages. Retrieved November 11, 2004 from 
http://www.ucte.org. 
Wang, H., Thorp, J.S. 2001. Optimal locations for Protection System 
Enhancement: A Simulation of Cascading Outages. IEEE Transactions on 
Power Delivery, Vol. 16, No. 4, October 2001, pp. 528-533. 
Wu. F.F., Tsai, Y., Yu, Y. 1988. Probabilistic Steady-State and Dynamic 
Security Assessment. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol., No. 1, 
February 1988. Pp. 1-9.  
Xu, X., Lam, P., Austria, R.R., Ma, Z., Zhu, Z., Zhu, R., Hu, J. 2002. Assessing 
the Impact of Substation-Related Outages on The Network Reliability. 
International Conference on Power System Technology, 2002. PowerCon 
2002, Vol. 2, Pp. 844-848.  
  119
Yu, X., Singh, C. 2003. Integrated Power System Vulnerability Analysis 
Considering Protection Failures. IEEE Power Engineering Society General 
Meeting 13-17 July 2003. Vol. 2, pp. 706-711.  
Yu, X., Singh, C. 2002. Power system reliability analysis considering 
protection failures. IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, 21-25 
July 2002. Vol. 2, pp. 963-968.  
 
  120
APPENDIX A – EVENT TREES FOR SUBSTATION MODEL 
Event trees for lines with a double circuit breaker busbar 
scheme at both ends of the line  
Event tree 1 is for faults in the middle of the line. The fault tree is presented in 
Figure 1 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in Table 
1.  
 
 
Figure 1  Event tree 1 (ET 1) for a line with a double circuit breaker busbar 
scheme at both line ends. The fault location is in the middle of the line. MA 
= master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit breaker, BFR = 
breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z = distance relay. 
Table 1  The substation consequences of event tree 1 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 1-00 Master and follower: line trip, automatic reclosing 
2 1-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails 
3 1-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails 
4 1-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
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6 1-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
7 1-14 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms 
8 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 1-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
11 1-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
12 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 1-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
14 1-32 Master: one busbar trips, follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms) 
15 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
17 1-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
18 1-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
19 1-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
20 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
21 1-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
22 1-32 Master: one busbar trips, follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms) 
23 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
24 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
25 1-13 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
26 1-33 Master: two busbars trip, follower: one busbar trips (BFR 250 ms) 
27 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
28 1-33 Master: two busbars trip, follower: one busbar trips (BFR 250 ms) 
29 1-59 Both substations tripped by BFR after 250 ms 
30 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
31 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
32 1-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
33 1-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
34 1-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
35 1-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
 
Event tree 2 is for faults near the master line end. The fault tree is presented in 
Figure 2 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in Table 
2. 
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Figure 2  Event tree 2 (ET 2) for a line with a double circuit breaker busbar 
scheme at both line ends. The fault location is near the master line end. MA 
= master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit breaker, BFR = 
breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z = distance relay, 
POTT = permissive overreach transfer trip scheme. 
Table 2  The substation consequences of event tree 2 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 2-00 Master and follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 2-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 2-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 2-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 2-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
7 2-14 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms 
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8 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 2-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
11 2-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
12 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 2-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
14 2-32 Master: one busbar trips, follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms) 
15 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
17 2-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
18 2-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
19 2-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
20 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
21 2-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
22 2-32 Master: one busbar trips, follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms) 
23 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
24 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
25 2-13 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
26 2-33 Master: two busbars trip, follower: one busbar trips (BFR 250 ms) 
27 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
28 2-33 Master: two busbars trip, follower: one busbar trips (BFR 250 ms) 
29 2-59 Both substations tripped by BFR after 250 ms 
30 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
31 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
32 2-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
33 2-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
34 2-04 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, line trip 550 ms. Follower: 
line trip 450 ms. 
35 2-05 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: line trip 450 ms. 
36 2-15 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, line trip 600 ms. Follower: 
one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. 
37 2-25 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
38 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
39 2-15 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, line trip 600 ms. Follower: 
one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms 
40 2-25 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
41 2-43 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, trip 600 ms. Follower: two 
busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. 
42 2-44 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. 
43 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
44 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
45 2-21 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 450 ms 
46 2-50 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
47 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
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48 2-50 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
49 2-48 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Master: two busbars trip, 
BFR 600 ms. 
50 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
51 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
52 2-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
53 2-21 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 450 ms. 
54 2-50 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
55 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
56 2-50 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
57 2-48 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Master: two busbars trip, 
BFR 600 ms. 
58 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
59 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
60 2-34 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 450 ms 
61 2-46 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
62 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
63 2-46 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
64 2-60 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, 
BFR 600 ms. 
65 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
66 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
67 2-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
68 2-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
69 2-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
70 2-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
 
Event tree 3 is for faults near the follower line end. This fault tree is presented 
in Figure 3 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in 
Table 3. 
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Figure 3  Event tree 3 (ET 3) for a line with a double circuit breaker busbar 
scheme at both line ends. The fault location is near the follower line end. 
MA = master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit breaker, BFR 
= breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z = distance 
relay, POTT = permissive overreach transfer trip scheme. 
Table 3  The substation consequences of event tree 3 
 The identification number and description of the substation 
consequence of the end branch 
1 3-00 Master and follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 3-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 3-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 3-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 3-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
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7 3-14 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms 
8 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 3-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
11 3-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
12 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 3-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
14 3-32 Master: one busbar trips, follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms) 
15 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
17 3-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
18 2-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
19 3-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
20 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
21 3-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
22 3-32 Master: one busbar trips, follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms) 
23 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
24 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
25 3-13 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
26 3-33 Master: two busbars trip, follower: one busbar trips (BFR 250 ms) 
27 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
28 3-33 Master: two busbars trip, follower: one busbar trips (BFR 250 ms) 
29 3-59 Both substations tripped by BFR after 250 ms 
30 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
31 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
32 3-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
33 3-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
34 3-06 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
35 3-22 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
36 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
37 3-22 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
38 3-35 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. 
39 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
40 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
41 3-17 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
42 3-51 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
43 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
44 3-51 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
45 3-37 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, 
BFR 250 ms. 
46 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
47 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
48 3-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
49 3-17 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
50 3-51 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
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51 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
52 3-51 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
53 3-37 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, 
BFR 250 ms. 
54 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
55 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
56 3-45 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
57 3-39 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
58 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
59 3-39 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
60 3-61 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, 
BFR 250 ms. 
61 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
62 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
63 3-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
64 3-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
65 3-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
66 3-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
Event trees for lines with a double circuit breaker busbar 
scheme at the master line end and a single circuit breaker 
busbar scheme at the follower line end 
Event tree 4a is for faults in the middle of the line. The fault tree is presented in 
Figure 4 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in Table 
4.  
 
Figure 4  Event tree 4a (ET 4a) for a line with a double circuit breaker 
busbar scheme at the master line end and a single busbar scheme at the 
follower line end. The fault location is in the middle of the line. MA = 
master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit breaker, BFR = 
breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z = distance relay 
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Table 4  The substation consequences of event tree 4a 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 4a-00 Master and Follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 4a-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 4a-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 4a-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 4a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 4a-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
7 4a-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms. 
8 4a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 4a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 4a-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
11 4a-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms. 
12 4a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 4a-13 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
14 4a-33 Master: two busbars trip, follower: one busbar trips (BFR 250 ms). 
15 4a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 4a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
17 4a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
18 4a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
19 4a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
 
Event tree 5a is for faults near the master line end. This fault tree is presented 
in Figure 5 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in 
Table 5. 
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Figure 5  Event tree 5a (ET 5a) for a line with a double circuit breaker 
busbar scheme at the master line end and a single busbar scheme at the 
follower line end. The fault location is near the master line end. MA = 
master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit breaker, BFR = 
breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z = distance relay, 
POTT = permissive overreach transfer trip scheme. 
Table 5  The substation consequences of event tree 5a 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 5a-00 Master and Follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 5a-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 5a-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 5a-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
5 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 5a-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
7 5a-13 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
8 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 5a-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
11 5a-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
12 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 5a-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
14 5a-33 Master: two busbars trip, follower: one busbar trips (BFR 250 ms) 
15 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
17 5a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
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18 5a-04 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, trip 600 ms. Follower: line 
trip 450 ms. 
19 5a-05 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: line trip 450 ms. 
20 5a-21 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 450 ms. 
21 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
22 5a-21 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 450 ms. 
23 5a-35 Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Master: line trip 450 ms. 
24 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
25 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
26 5a-15 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, line trip 600 ms. Follower: 
one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. 
27 5a-25 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
28 5a-50 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
29 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
30 5a-50 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
31 5a-46 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
32 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
33 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
34 5a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
35 5a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
36 5a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
 
Event tree 6a is for faults near the follower line end. This fault tree is presented 
in Figure 6 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in 
Table 6. 
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Figure 6  Event tree 6a (ET 6a) for a line with a double circuit breaker 
busbar scheme at the master line end and a single busbar scheme at the 
follower line end. The fault location is near the follower line end. MA = 
master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit breaker, BFR = 
breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z = distance relay, 
POTT = permissive overreach transfer trip scheme. 
Table 6  The substation consequences of event tree 6a 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 6a-00 Master and Follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 6a-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 6a-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 6a-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
5 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 6a-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
7 6a-13 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
8 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 6a-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
11 6a-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
12 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 6a-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
14 6a-33 Master: two busbars trip, follower: one busbar trips (BFR 250 ms). 
15 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
17 6a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
18 6a-06 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
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19 6a-17 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
20 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
21 6a-17 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
22 6a-45 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
23 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
24 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
25 6a-22 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
26 6a-51 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
27 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
28 6a-51 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
29 6a-39 Master: two busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
30 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
31 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
32 6a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
33 6a-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
34 6a-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
Event trees for lines with a single circuit breaker busbar 
scheme at the master line end and a double circuit breaker 
busbar scheme at the follower line end 
Event tree 4b is for faults in the middle of the line. This fault tree is presented 
in Figure 7 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in 
Table 7. 
 
 
Figure 7  Event tree 4b (ET 4b) for a line with a single circuit breaker 
busbar scheme at the master line end and a double circuit breaker busbar 
scheme at the follower line end. The fault location is in the middle of the 
line. MA = master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit breaker, 
BFR = breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z = 
distance relay. 
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Table 7  The substation consequences of event tree 4b 
 The identification number and description of the substation 
consequence of the end branch 
1 4b-00 Master and Follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 4b-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 4b-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 4b-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 4b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 4b-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
7 4b-14 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. 
8 4b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 4b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 4b-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
11 4b-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
12 4b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 4b-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
14 4b-32 Master: one busbar trips, follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms) 
15 4b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 4b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
17 4b-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
18 4b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
19 4b-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
 
Event tree 5b is for faults near the master line end. The fault tree is presented in 
Figure 8 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in Table 
8. 
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Figure 8  Event tree 5b (ET 5b) for a line with a single circuit breaker 
busbar scheme at the master line end and a double circuit breaker busbar 
scheme at the follower line end. The fault location is near the master line 
end. MA = master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit breaker, 
BFR = breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z = 
distance relay, POTT = permissive overreach transfer trip scheme. 
Table 8  The substation consequences of event tree 2 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 5b-00 Master and Follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 5b-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 5b-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 5b-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 5b-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
7 5b-14 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. 
8 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 5b-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
11 5b-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
12 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 5b-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
14 5b-32 Master: one busbar trips, follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms) 
15 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
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17 5b-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
18 5b-04 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, trip 600 ms. Follower: line 
trip 450 ms. 
19 5b-05 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: line trip 450 ms. 
20 5b-15 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, trip 600 ms. Follower: one 
busbar trips (BFR 600 ms). 
21 5b-25 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 
600 ms. 
22 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
23 5b-15 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, trip 600 ms. Follower: one 
busbar trips (BFR 600 ms). 
24 5b-25 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 
600 ms. 
25 5b-43 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, trip 600 ms. Follower: two 
busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. 
26 5b-44 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 600 ms. 
27 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
28 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
29 5b-21 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 450 ms. 
30 5b-50 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
31 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
32 5b-50 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
33 5b-48 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Master: two busbars trip, BFR 
600 ms. 
34 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
35 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
36 5b-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
37 5b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
38 5b-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
 
Event tree 6b is for faults near the follower line end. This fault tree is 
presented in Figure 9 and the corresponding substation consequences are 
presented in Table 9. 
 
  136
 
Figure 9  Event tree 6b (ET 6b) for a line a single circuit breaker busbar 
scheme at the master line end and a double circuit breaker busbar scheme 
at the follower line end. The fault location is near the follower line end. MA 
= master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit breaker, BFR = 
breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z = distance relay, 
POTT = permissive overreach transfer trip scheme. 
Table 9  The substation consequences of event tree 6b 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 6b-00 Master and follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 6b-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 6b-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 6b-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 6b-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
7 6b-14 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, BFR 250 ms. 
8 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 6b-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
11 6b-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms. 
12 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 6b-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms. 
14 6b-32 Master: one busbar trips, follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms) 
15 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
17 6b-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
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18 6b-06 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
19 6b-22 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
20 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
21 6b-22 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
22 6b-35 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: two busbars trip (BFR 250 ms). 
23 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
24 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
25 6b-17 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
26 6b-51 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
27 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
28 6b-51 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
29 6b-37 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: two busbars trip, 
BFR 250 ms. 
30 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
31 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
32 6b-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
33 6b-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
34 6b-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
Event trees for lines with single circuit breaker busbar 
schemes at both ends of the line  
Event tree 7 is for faults in the middle of the line. This fault tree is presented in 
Figure 10 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in 
Table 10. 
 
 
 
Figure 10  Event tree 7 (ET 7) for a line with a single circuit breaker 
busbar scheme at both ends of the line. The fault location is in the middle of 
the line. MA = master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = circuit 
breaker, BFR = breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic reclosing, Z 
= distance relay. 
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Table 10  The substation consequences of event tree 7 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 7-00 Master and follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 7-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 7-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 7-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 7-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 7-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
7 7-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
8 7-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 7-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 7-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
11 7-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
 
Event tree 8 is for faults near the master line end. The fault tree is presented in 
Figure 11 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in 
Table 11. 
 
 
 
Figure 11  Event tree 8 (ET 8) for a line with a single circuit breaker 
busbar schemes at both ends of the line. The fault location is near the 
master line end. MA = master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = 
circuit breaker, BFR = breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic 
reclosing, Z = distance relay, POTT = permissive overreach transfer trip 
scheme. 
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Table 11  The substation consequences of event tree 8 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 8-00 Master and follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 8-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 8-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 8-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 8-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 8-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
7 8-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
8 8-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 8-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 8-04 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, trip 600 ms. Follower: line 
trip 450 ms. 
11 8-05 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: line trip 450 ms. 
12 8-15 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR 500 ms, line trip 600 ms. Follower: 
one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. 
13 8-25 Master: line trip 100 ms, RAR fails. Follower: one busbar trips BFR 
600 ms. 
14 8-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
15 8-21 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 450 ms. 
16 8-50 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 600 ms. 
17 8-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
18 8-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
19 8-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
20 8-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
 
Event tree 9 is for faults near the follower line end. This fault tree is presented 
in Figure 12 and the corresponding substation consequences are presented in 
Table 12. 
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Figure 12  Event tree 9 (ET 9) for a line with a single circuit breaker 
busbar scheme at both ends of the line. The fault location is near the 
follower line end. MA = master line end, FO = follower line end, CB = 
circuit breaker, BFR = breaker failure relay, RAR = rapid automatic 
reclosing, Z = distance relay, POTT = permissive overreach transfer trip 
scheme. 
Table 12  The substation consequences of event tree 6b 
 The identification number and description of the substation consequence of the end branch 
1 9-00 Master and follower: line trip, automatic reclosing. 
2 9-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
3 9-01 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. RAR fails. 
4 9-11 Master: line trip 100 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
5 9-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
6 9-10 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms 
7 9-12 One busbar tripped at both substations by BFR after 250 ms 
8 9-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
9 9-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
10 9-06 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
11 9-22 Master: line trip 450 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, BFR 250 ms. 
12 9-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
13 9-17 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: line trip 100 ms. 
14 9-51 Master: one busbar trips, BFR 600 ms. Follower: one busbar trips, 
BFR 250 ms. 
15 9-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
16 9-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
17 9-23 Master: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
18 9-24 Follower: no trip signal or no CB trip at the substation 
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APPENDIX B – MINIMAL CUT SETS OF THE FAULT TREES  
The fault trees are presented as a list of minimal cut sets. If the minimal cut set 
list is brief, it is presented completely. If there are more than 20 minimal cut 
sets, only the most important cut sets are presented. In all cases at least 99 % of 
the cut sets are presented. 
In the tables, ID is the identification at the substation where the protection 
is located, ID2 is the identification for the substation at the remote line end, id 
is the identification for the bay at the substation where the protection is located 
and id2 and id3 are the identification for the other bays. 
Fault trees for the main protection when the fault is located 
within zone 1 of the distance relay  
These fault trees are inputs in the event tree branches labelled MA Z ZONE 1, 
FO Z ZONE 1, MA Z ZONE 2 and FO Z ZONE 2.  
 
Table 1  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two microprocessor 
distance relays for each line end. Top event probability q = 1.093E-05.  
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.09E-05 99.62 IDACid Z1 PRO IDACid Z2 PRO        
2 1.13E-08 0.1 IDACid DC1 MCB 1 IDACid Z2 PRO        
3 1.13E-08 0.1 IDACid DC2 MCB 1 IDACid Z1 PRO        
4 6.53E-09 0.06 IDACid Z1 VT MCB IDACid Z2 PRO        
5 6.53E-09 0.06 IDACid Z1 PRO IDACid Z2 VT MCB  
6 1.90E-09 0.02 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 PRO        
7 1.90E-09 0.02 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid Z2 PRO        
8 1.83E-09 0.02 ID SUBSTATION         
9 7.25E-10 0.01 IDACid BAY            
10 1.17E-11 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     IDACid DC2 MCB 1   
11 6.77E-12 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     IDACid Z2 VT MCB  
12 6.77E-12 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     IDACid Z1 VT MCB  
13 3.92E-12 0 IDACid Z1 VT MCB     IDACid Z2 VT MCB  
14 1.97E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid DC1 MCB 1   
15 1.97E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid DC2 MCB 1   
16 1.14E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 VT MCB  
17 1.14E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid Z2 VT MCB  
18 3.32E-13 0 ID DC1 220 1         ID DC2 220 1         
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Table 2  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with one microprocessor 
distance relay and one electromechanical distance relay for each line end. 
Top event probability q = 1.10E-05.  
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.09E-05 99.62 IDACid Z1 MEC        IDACid Z2 PRO        
2 1.13E-08 0.1 IDACid DC2 MCB 1    IDACid Z1 MEC        
3 1.13E-08 0.1 IDACid DC1 MCB 1    IDACid Z2 PRO        
4 6.55E-09 0.06 IDACid Z1 MEC        IDACid Z2 VT MCB     
5 6.53E-09 0.06 IDACid Z1 VT MCB    IDACid Z2 PRO        
6 1.91E-09 0.02 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 MEC        
7 1.90E-09 0.02 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid Z2 PRO        
8 1.83E-09 0.02 ID SUBSTATION         
9 7.25E-10 0.01 IDACid BAY            
10 1.17E-11 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1    IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
11 6.77E-12 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1    IDACid Z1 VT MCB     
12 6.77E-12 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1    IDACid Z2 VT MCB     
13 3.92E-12 0 IDACid Z1 VT MCB    IDACid Z2 VT MCB     
14 1.97E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
15 1.97E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid DC1 MCB 1     
16 1.14E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid Z2 VT MCB     
17 1.14E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 VT MCB     
18 3.32E-13 0 ID DC1 220 1         ID DC2 220 1         
 
Table 3  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two electromechanical 
distance relays per line end. Top event probability q = 1.30E-05.. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.10E-05 84.51 IDACid Z1 MEC        IDACid Z2 MEC        
2 1.98E-06 15.27 IDACid Z VT MCB      
3 1.13E-08 0.09 IDACid DC2 MCB 1    IDACid Z1 MEC        
4 1.13E-08 0.09 IDACid DC1 MCB 1    IDACid Z2 MEC        
5 1.91E-09 0.01 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 MEC        
6 1.91E-09 0.01 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid Z2 MEC        
7 1.83E-09 0.01 ID SUBSTATION         
8 7.25E-10 0.01 IDACid BAY  
9 1.17E-11 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1    IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
10 1.97E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     
11 1.97E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
12 3.32E-13 0 ID DC1 220 1 ID DC2 220 1         
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Table 4  Minimal cut sets of the fault trees with one microprocessor 
distance relay and one static distance relay per line end. Top event 
probability q = 2.36E-05.  
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 2.35E-05 99.73 IDACid Z1 PRO        IDACid Z2 STA        
2 2.44E-08 0.1 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     IDACid Z2 STA        
3 1.41E-08 0.06 IDACid Z1 VT MCB     IDACid Z2 STA        
4 1.13E-08 0.05 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     IDACid Z1 PRO        
5 6.53E-09 0.03 IDACid Z1 PRO        IDACid Z2 VT MCB    
6 4.11E-09 0.02 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid Z2 STA        
7 1.90E-09 0.01 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 PRO        
8 1.83E-09 0.01 ID SUBSTATION         
9 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
10 1.17E-11 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     IDACid DC2 MCB 1    
11 6.77E-12 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     IDACid Z2 VT MCB    
12 6.77E-12 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     IDACid Z1 VT MCB    
13 3.92E-12 0 IDACid Z1 VT MCB     IDACid Z2 VT MCB    
14 1.97E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid DC2 MCB 1    
15 1.97E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid DC1 MCB 1    
16 1.14E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid Z2 VT MCB    
17 1.14E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 VT MCB    
18 3.32E-13 0 ID DC1 220 1         ID DC2 220 1         
 
Table 5  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with a microprocessor 
differential relay and microprocessor distance relay per line end. The line 
is a 3-branch line where the third branch is a 400/110 kV transformer. In 
this protection system it is enough if two of the three telecommunication 
channels between the three differential relays are functioning. All the 
telecommunication channels between the differential relays use fibre optics. 
Top event probability q = 3.69E-05. Here we exclude all transformer 
branch operations except the line differential relay, since all three 
differential relays at all line ends are needed for tripping operations at the 
two normal line ends. The transformer branch tripping operations can be 
neglected due to the reasons given in Section 7.4.1. 
No Prob. % Event Event Event 
1 1.19E-05 32.08 IDACid D PRO    IDACid Z2 PRO      
2 1.19E-05 32.08 IDACid Z2 PRO  ID2id2 D PRO       
3 1.19E-05 32.08 IDACid Z2 PRO  ID3ACid3 D PRO    
4 4.75E-07 1.29 IDACid Z2 PRO  TELE 1A TELE 2A 
5 4.75E-07 1.29 IDACid Z2 PRO  TELE 3A TELE 1A 
6 4.75E-07 1.29 IDACid Z2 PRO  TELE 3A TELE 2A 
7 1.23E-08 0.03 IDACid D PRO    IDACid DC2 
MCB 1 
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Minimal cut sets numbered from 8 to 82 are not listed 
 
Table 6  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with one microprocessor 
differential and one microprocessor distance relay per line end. Top event 
probability q = 4.01E-05. The telecommunication channel of the differential 
relays is a combination of a radio link and optical fibre. 
No. Prob.  % Event Event 
1 1.65E-05 41.11 IDACid Z2 PRO        TELE B 
2 1.19E-05 29.51 IDACid Z2 PRO        IDAC06 D PRO         
3 1.19E-05 29.51 IDACid Z2 PRO        ID2ACid2 D PRO         
4 1.71E-08 0.04 IDACid DC2 MCB 1   TELE B 
5 1.23E-08 0.03 IDACid DC2 MCB 1   IDAC06 D PRO         
6 1.23E-08 0.03 IDACid DC2 MCB 1   ID2ACid2 D PRO         
7 1.13E-08 0.03 IDACid Z2 PRO        ID2ACid2 DC1 MCB 1     
8 1.13E-08 0.03 IDACid DC1 MCB 1   IDACid Z2 PRO        
9 9.90E-09 0.02 IDACid Z2 VT MCB   TELE B 
10 7.11E-09 0.02 IDACid Z2 VT MCB   IDAC06 D PRO         
11 7.11E-09 0.02 IDACid Z2 VT MCB   ID2ACid2 D PRO         
12 2.88E-09 0.01 ID DC2 220 1         TELE B 
13 2.41E-09 0.01 ID DC 48 V 1         IDACid Z2 PRO        
14 2.41E-09 0.01 IDACid Z2 PRO        ID2 DC 48 V 1         
15 2.07E-09 0.01 ID DC2 220 1         IDAC06 D PRO         
16 2.07E-09 0.01 ID DC2 220 1         ID2ACid2 D PRO         
Minimal cut sets numbered from 17 to 50 are not listed 
 
Table 7  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two static distance relays 
per line end. Top event probability q = 5.09E-05.  
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 5.08E-05 99.83 IDid Z1 STA     IDid Z2 STA     
2 2.44E-08 0.05 IDid DC2 MCB 1  IDid Z1 STA     
3 2.44E-08 0.05 IDid DC1 MCB 1  IDid Z2 STA     
4 1.41E-08 0.03 IDid Z1 MCB VT  IDid Z2 STA     
5 1.41E-08 0.03 IDid Z1 STA     IDid Z2 MCB VT  
6 4.11E-09 0.01 ID DC1 220 1         IDid Z2 STA     
7 4.11E-09 0.01 ID DC2 220 1         IDid Z1 STA     
8 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION        
9 7.25E-10 0 IDid BAY            
10 7.25E-10 0 IDid BAY            
11 1.17E-11 0 IDid DC1 MCB 1  IDid DC2 MCB 1  
12 6.77E-12 0 IDid DC1 MCB 1  IDid Z2 MCB VT  
13 6.77E-12 0 IDid DC2 MCB 1  IDid Z1 MCB VT  
14 3.92E-12 0 IDid Z1 MCB VT  IDid Z2 MCB VT  
15 1.97E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDid DC1 MCB 1  
16 1.97E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDid DC2 MCB 1  
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17 1.14E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDid Z1 MCB VT  
18 1.14E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDid Z2 MCB VT  
19 3.32E-13 0 ID DC1 220 1         ID DC2 220 1         
 
Table 8  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with one microprocessor 
differential relay and one microprocessor distance relay per line end. Top 
event probability q = 6.31E-05. The telecommunication channel of the 
differential relays consists of an optical fibre. 
No Prob. % Event Event 
1 3,96E-05 62,74 TELE B IDACid Z2 PRO        
2 1,19E-05 18,77 ID2ACid2 D PRO      IDACid Z2 PRO        
3 1,19E-05 18,77 IDACid D PRO         IDACid Z2 PRO        
4 4,10E-08 0,07 TELE B IDACid DC2 MCB 1   
5 2,38E-08 0,04 TELE B IDACid Z2 VT MCB   
6 1,23E-08 0,02 ID2ACid2 D PRO      IDACid DC2 MCB 1   
7 1,23E-08 0,02 IDACid D PRO         IDACid DC2 MCB 1   
8 1,13E-08 0,02 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     IDACid Z2 PRO        
9 1,13E-08 0,02 ID2ACid2 DC1 MCB 1  IDACid Z2 PRO        
10 7,11E-09 0,01 ID2ACid2 D PRO      IDACid Z2 VT MCB   
11 7,11E-09 0,01 IDACid D PRO         IDACid Z2 VT MCB   
12 6,91E-09 0,01 TELE B ID DC2 220 1         
Minimal cut sets numbered from 13 to 55 are not listed 
 
Table 9  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with one microprocessor 
differential relay and one static distance relay per line end. Top event Prob. 
q = 1.17E-04. The telecommunication channel of the differential relays 
consists of a radio link. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 6.63E-05 56.63 IDACid Z2 STA        TELE A 
2 2.56E-05 21.86 IDACid Z2 STA        ID2ACid2 D PRO      
3 2.56E-05 21.86 IDACid D PRO         IDACid Z2 STA        
4 3.18E-08 0.03 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     TELE A 
5 2.44E-08 0.02 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     IDACid Z2 STA        
6 2.44E-08 0.02 IDACid Z2 STA        ID2ACid2 DC1 MCB 1  
7 1.84E-08 0.02 IDACid Z2 VT MCB     TELE A 
8 1.23E-08 0.01 IDACid D PRO IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
9 1.23E-08 0.01 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     ID2ACid2 D PRO      
10 7.11E-09 0.01 IDACid Z2 VT MCB     ID2ACid2 D PRO      
11 7.11E-09 0.01 IDACid D PRO         IDACid Z2 VT MCB     
Minimal cut sets numbered from 12 to 54 are not listed 
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Fault trees for the main protection when the fault is located in the 
permissive overreach zone 
These fault trees are inputs in the event tree branches labelled MA Z POTT and 
FO Z POTT.  
 
Table 10  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two microprocessor 
distance relays per line end and two telecommunication channels. Top event 
probability q= 1.35E-04. The telecommunication channels A and B each 
consist of a combination of a radio link and optical fibre . 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 2.50E-05 18.48 TELE A TELE B 
2 1.65E-05 12.2 IDACid Z1 PRO TELE B 
3 1.65E-05 12.2 TELE A ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO 
4 1.65E-05 12.2 TELE B ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO     
5 1.65E-05 12.2 IDACid Z2 PRO       TELE A 
6 1.09E-05 8.05 IDACid Z1 PRO       IDACid Z2 PRO        
7 1.09E-05 8.05 IDACid Z2 PRO       ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO     
8 1.09E-05 8.05 IDACid Z1 PRO       ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO     
9 1.09E-05 8.05 ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO    ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO     
Minimal cut sets numbered from 10 to 88 are not listed 
 
Table 11  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with one microprocessor 
differential relay and one microprocessor distance relay for each line end. 
The telecommunication channels A and B each consist of a combination of a 
radio link and optical fibre. Top event probability q= 1.42E-04.  
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 2.50E-05 17.62 TELE A TELE B 
2 1.80E-05 12.65 TELE A ID2ACid2 D PRO         
3 1.80E-05 12.65 TELE A IDAC06 D PRO         
4 1.65E-05 11.63 TELE B ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO        
5 1.65E-05 11.63 IDACid Z2 PRO        TELE B 
6 1.19E-05 8.35 IDACid Z2 PRO        ID2ACid2 D PRO         
7 1.19E-05 8.35 IDAC06 D PRO         ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO        
8 1.19E-05 8.35 ID2ACid2 D PRO        ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO        
9 1.19E-05 8.35 IDACid Z2 PRO        IDAC06 D PRO         
Minimal cut sets numbered from 10 to 78 are not listed 
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Table 12  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with one microprocessor 
differential relay and one microprocessor distance relay for each line end. 
The telecommunication channel of the differential relay consists of an 
optical fibre and the telecommunication channel of the distance relays is a 
combination of optical fibre and a radio link. Top event probability q= 
2.22E-04. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 6.00E-05 26.99 TELE A TELE B 
2 3.96E-05 17.81 TELE B IDACid Z2 PRO     
3 3.96E-05 17.81 TELE B ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO     
4 1.80E-05 8.08 TELE A IDACid D PRO      
5 1.80E-05 8.08 TELE A ID2ACid2 D PRO      
6 1.19E-05 5.33 IDACid Z2 PRO     ID2ACid2 D PRO      
7 1.19E-05 5.33 IDACid D PRO      IDACid Z2 PRO     
8 1.19E-05 5.33 IDACid D PRO      ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO     
9 1.19E-05 5.33 ID2ACid2 D PRO     ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO     
Minimal cut sets numbered from 10 to 80 are not listed 
 
Table 13  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with a microprocessor 
differential relay and microprocessor distance relay for each line end. The 
line is a 3-branch line, where the third branch is a 400/110 kV transformer. 
In this protection system it is enough if two of the three telecommunication 
channels between the three differential relays are functioning. All the 
telecommunication channels between the differential relays consist of 
optical fibre. The telecommunication channel of the distance relays consists 
of the series connection of an optical fibre and the combination of an 
optical fibre and radio link. Top event probability q= 2.63E-04. Here we 
exclude all transformer branch operations except the line differential relay, 
since all three differential relays at all line ends are needed for tripping 
operations at the two normal line ends. The transformer branch tripping 
operations can be neglected due to the reasons given in Section 7.4.1. 
No. Prob. % Event Event Event 
1 4.31E-05 16.33 TELE 1B ID3ACid3 D PRO     
2 4.31E-05 16.33 IDACid D PRO        TELE 1B  
3 4.31E-05 16.33 TELE 1B ID2ACid2 D PRO     
4 1.80E-05 6.8 TELE 2B ID2ACid2 D PRO     
5 1.80E-05 6.8 IDACid D PRO        TELE 2B  
6 1.80E-05 6.8 TELE 2B ID3ACid3 D PRO     
7 1.19E-05 4.49 IDACid D PRO        IDACid Z2 PRO        
8 1.19E-05 4.49 IDACid D PRO        ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO    
9 1.19E-05 4.49 IDACid Z2 PRO       ID2ACid2 D PRO     
10 1.19E-05 4.49 ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO    ID3ACid3 D PRO     
11 1.19E-05 4.49 IDACid Z2 PRO       ID3ACid3 D PRO     
12 1.19E-05 4.49 ID2ACid2 D PRO     ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO    
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13 1.73E-06 0.65 TELE 3A TELE 1B TELE 1A 
14 1.73E-06 0.65 TELE 3A TELE 2A TELE 1B 
15 1.73E-06 0.65 TELE 1A TELE 1B TELE 2A 
16 7.29E-07 0.28 ID DC 48 V 1   
17 7.29E-07 0.28 ID2 DC 48 V 1   
18 7.29E-07 0.28 ID3 DC 48 V 1     
Minimal cut sets numbered from 19 to 158 are not listed 
 
Table 14  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with one microprocessor 
differential relay and one static distance relay for each line end. The 
telecommunication channel of the differential relay consists of a radio link 
and the telecommunication channel of the distance relays is a radio link. 
Top event probability q= 3.85E-04.  
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 8.65E-05 22.45 TELE A TELE B 
2 6.63E-05 17.21 TELE A ID2ACid2 Z2 STA  
3 6.63E-05 17.21 IDACid Z2 STA        TELE A 
4 3.34E-05 8.67 TELE B ID2ACid2 D PRO 
5 3.34E-05 8.67 IDACid D PRO         TELE B 
6 2.56E-05 6.64 IDACid Z2 STA        ID2ACid2 D PRO 
7 2.56E-05 6.64 IDACid D PRO         IDACid Z2 STA        
8 2.56E-05 6.64 ID2Acid2 D PRO ID2ACid2 Z2 STA 
9 2.56E-05 6.64 IDACid D PRO         ID2ACid2 Z2 STA 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 10 to 34 are not listed 
 
Table 15  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with a microprocessor 
distance relay and an electomechanical distance relay for each line end. 
The line is a 3-branch line, where the third branch is a 400/110 kV 
transformer. There are telecommunication channels A and B between the 
line ends and the transformer substation. This makes two parallel 
telecommunication  channels (A and B). Both of these channels consist of 
two (1 and 2) telecommunication channels in series. The telecommunication 
channel A1 is an optical fibre, A2 is a radio link,B1 and B2 are both 
combinations of an optical fibre and a radio link. Top event probability q= 
4.60E-04.  
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 6.00E-05 13.04 TELE 1B TELE 2A 
2 6.00E-05 13.04 TELE 2A TELE 2B 
3 4.65E-05 10.1 TELE 1A TELE 2B 
4 4.65E-05 10.1 TELE 1A TELE 1B 
5 3.97E-05 8.63 ID2ACid2 Z2 MEC       TELE 2A 
6 3.96E-05 8.6 IDACid Z2 PRO        TELE 2A 
7 3.08E-05 6.69 TELE 1A ID2ACid2 Z2 MEC   
8 3.07E-05 6.67 IDACid Z2 PRO        TELE 1A 
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9 1.66E-05 3.6 TELE 1B ID2ACid2 Z1 MEC   
10 1.66E-05 3.6 ID2ACid2 Z1 MEC       TELE 2B 
11 1.65E-05 3.58 IDACid Z1 PRO        TELE 1B 
12 1.65E-05 3.58 IDACid Z1 PRO        TELE 2B 
13 1.10E-05 2.38 ID2ACid2 Z1 MEC       ID2ACid2 Z2 MEC   
14 1.09E-05 2.37 IDACid Z2 PRO        ID2ACid2 Z1 MEC   
15 1.09E-05 2.37 IDACid Z1 PRO        ID2ACid2 Z2 MEC   
16 1.09E-05 2.37 IDACid Z1 PRO        IDACid Z2 PRO        
Minimal cut sets numbered from 17 to 88 are not listed 
 
Table 16  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with a microprocessor 
distance relay and a static distance relay for each line end. The line is a 3-
branch line, where the third branch is a 400/110 kV transformer. There are 
telecommunication channels A and B between the line ends and the 
transformer substation. This makes two parallel telecommunication 
channels (A and B). Both of these channels consist of two (1 and 2) 
telecommunication channels in series. Telecommunication channel A1 is a 
combination of optical fibre and a radio link, A2 is a radio link, B1 and B2 
are both combinations of an optical fibre and a radio link. Top event 
probability q= 4.99E-04. 
No Prob. % Event Event 
1 6.63E-05 13.29 ID2ACid2 Z2 STA   TELE 2A 
2 5.08E-05 10.19 IDACid Z1 STA     ID2ACid2 Z2 STA        
3 4.65E-05 9.32 TELE 2A TELE 2B 
4 4.65E-05 9.32 TELE 1B TELE 2A 
5 3.57E-05 7.14 TELE 1A ID2ACid2 Z2 STA        
6 3.57E-05 7.14 IDACid Z1 STA     TELE 2B 
7 3.57E-05 7.14 TELE 1B IDACid Z1 STA     
8 3.07E-05 6.15 IDACid Z2 PRO     TELE 2A 
9 2.50E-05 5.01 TELE 1A TELE 2B 
10 2.50E-05 5.01 TELE 1A TELE 1B 
11 2.35E-05 4.71 ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO   ID2ACid2 Z2 STA        
12 2.35E-05 4.71 IDACid Z1 STA     IDACid Z2 PRO     
13 1.65E-05 3.31 TELE 1A IDACid Z2 PRO     
14 1.65E-05 3.31 TELE 1B ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO        
15 1.65E-05 3.31 ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO   TELE 2B 
16 1.09E-05 2.18 IDACid Z2 PRO     ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO        
Minimal cut sets numbered from 17 to 107 are not listed 
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Table 17  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two electromechanical 
distance relays for each line end. The line is a 3-branch line, where the 
third branch is a 400/110 kV transformer. There are telecommunication 
channels A and B between the line ends and the transformer substation. 
This makes two parallel telecommunication channels (A and B). Both of 
these channels consist of two (1 and 2) telecommunication channels in 
series. Telecommunication channel A1 is an optical fibre, A2 is a 
combination of an optic fibre and a radio link, B1 is an optical fibre and B2 
is a combination of an optical fibre and a radio link. Top event probability 
q= 5.55E-04. 
No Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.44E-04 25.94 TELE 1A TELE 1B 
2 6.00E-05 10.81 TELE 2A TELE 1B 
3 6.00E-05 10.81 TELE 2B TELE 1A 
4 3.97E-05 7.16 ID2ACid2 Z1 MEC       TELE 1B 
5 3.97E-05 7.16 IDACid Z1 MEC        TELE 1B 
6 3.97E-05 7.16 IDACid Z2 MEC        TELE 1A 
7 3.97E-05 7.16 ID2ACid2 Z2 MEC       TELE 1A 
8 2.50E-05 4.5 TELE 2A TELE 2B 
9 1.66E-05 2.98 IDACid Z2 MEC        TELE 2A 
10 1.66E-05 2.98 TELE 2B ID2ACid2 Z1 MEC    
11 1.66E-05 2.98 TELE 2A ID2ACid2 Z2 MEC    
12 1.66E-05 2.98 IDACid Z1 MEC        TELE 2B 
13 1.10E-05 1.97 ID2ACid2 Z1 MEC       ID2ACid2 Z2 MEC    
14 1.10E-05 1.97 IDACid Z1 MEC        ID2ACid2 Z2 MEC    
15 1.10E-05 1.97 IDACid Z2 MEC        ID2ACid2 Z1 MEC    
16 1.10E-05 1.97 IDACid Z1 MEC        IDACid Z2 MEC       
Minimal cut sets numbered from 17 to 72 are not listed 
 
Table 18  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two microprocessor 
distance relays for each line end. The line is a 3-branch line, where the 
third branch is a 400/110 kV transformer. There are telecommunication 
channels A and B between the line ends and the transformer substation. 
This makes two parallel telecommunication channels (A and B). Both of 
these channels consist of two (1 and 2) telecommunication channels in 
series. The telecommunication channel A1 is an optical fibre, A2 is an 
optical fibre, B1 is an optical fibre and B2 is a radio link. Top event 
probability q= 8.39E-04. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.44E-04 17.16 TELE 2A TELE 2B 
2 1.44E-04 17.16 TELE 1A TELE 2B 
3 1.12E-04 13.3 TELE 1B TELE 2A 
4 1.12E-04 13.3 TELE 1A TELE 1B 
5 3.96E-05 4.72 IDACid Z1 PRO    TELE 2B 
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6 3.96E-05 4.72 TELE 1A IDACid Z2 PRO     
7 3.96E-05 4.72 IDACid Z2 PRO    TELE 2A 
8 3.96E-05 4.72 TELE 2B ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO    
9 3.96E-05 4.72 TELE 1A ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO    
10 3.96E-05 4.72 TELE 2A ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO    
11 3.07E-05 3.66 TELE 1B ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO    
12 3.07E-05 3.66 TELE 1B IDACid Z1 PRO     
13 1.09E-05 1.3 ID2ACid2 Z1 
PRO     
ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO    
14 1.09E-05 1.3 IDACid Z1 PRO    ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO    
15 1.09E-05 1.3 IDACid Z2 PRO    ID2ACid2 Z1 PRO    
16 1.09E-05 1.3 IDACid Z1 PRO    IDACid Z2 PRO     
Minimal cut sets numbered from 17 to 108 are not listed 
 
Table 19  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two static distance relays 
for one line end and one microprocessor and one electromechanical 
distance relay at the other line end. The line is a 3-branch line, where the 
third branch is a 400/110 kV transformer. There are telecommunication 
channels A and B between the line ends and the transformer substation. 
This makes two parallel telecommunication channels (A and B). Both of 
these channels consist of two (1 and 2) telecommunication channels in 
series. The telecommunication channel A1 is an optical fibre, A2 is an 
optical fibre, B1 is an optical fibre and B2 is a combination of an optical 
fibre and a radio link. Top event probability q= 9.27E-04. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.44E-04 15.54 TELE 1A TELE 2B 
2 1.44E-04 15.54 TELE 2A TELE 2B 
3 8.56E-05 9.23 TELE 2A ID2ACid2 Z2 STA     
4 8.56E-05 9.23 TELE 2B ID2ACid2 Z1 STA     
5 8.56E-05 9.23 TELE 1A ID2ACid2 Z2 STA     
6 6.00E-05 6.48 TELE 1A TELE 1B 
7 6.00E-05 6.48 TELE 1B TELE 2A 
8 5.08E-05 5.49 ID2ACid2 Z1 
STA     
ID2ACid2 Z2 STA     
9 3.97E-05 4.29 IDACid Z1 MEC     TELE 2B 
10 3.96E-05 4.27 IDACid Z2 PRO      TELE 1A 
11 3.96E-05 4.27 IDACid Z2 PRO      TELE 2A 
12 3.57E-05 3.85 TELE 1B ID2ACid2 Z1 STA     
13 2.36E-05 2.55 IDACid Z1 MEC     ID2ACid2 Z2 STA     
14 2.35E-05 2.54 IDACid Z2 PRO      ID2ACid2 Z1 STA     
15 1.66E-05 1.79 IDACid Z1 MEC     TELE 1B 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 16 to 107 are not listed 
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Table 20  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two electromechanical 
distance relays for each line end and one telecommunication channel. Top 
event probability q= 5.03E-03. The telecommunication channel is a 
combination of a radio link and an optical fibre . 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 5.00E-03 99.5 TELE 
   
 
2 1.10E-05 0.22 ID2Acid2 Z1 MEC      ID2ACid2 Z2 MEC        
3 1.09E-05 0.22 IDACid Z1 PRO        IDACid Z2 PRO        
4 1.98E-06 0.04 ID2ACid2 Z VT 
MCB      
 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5 to 27 are not listed 
 
Table 21  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with twomicroprocessor 
distance relays for each line end and two telecommunication channels. Top 
event probability q= 6.66E-03. The telecommunication channel A is a 
power line carrier, the telecommunication channel B is a combination of a 
power line carrier and an optical fibre. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 4.38E-03 65.77 TELE A TELE B 
2 1.11E-03 16.69 TELE A IDACid Z2 PRO 
3 1.11E-03 16.69 TELE A ID2ACid2 Z2 PRO 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 4 to 41 are not listed 
 
Table 22  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with twomicroprocessor 
distance relays for each line end and one telecommunication channel. Top 
event probability q= 9.32E-03. The telecommunication channel is a radio 
link. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 9.30E-03 99.75 TELE    
Minimal cut sets numbered from 2 to 40 are not listed 
 
Table 23  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two microprocessor 
distance relays for one line end, two electromechanical distance relays at 
the other line end and one telecommunication channel. Top event 
probability q= 9.32E-03. The telecommunication channel is a radio link. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 9.30E-03 99.73 TELE    
Minimal cut sets numbered from 2 to 34 are not listed 
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Table 24  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two distance relays(any 
type) for each line end and one telecommunication channel. Top event 
probability q= 1.20E-02. The telecommunication channel is an optical 
fibre. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.20E-02 99.79 TELE    
 
Table 25  Minimal cut sets for the fault trees with two distance relays(any 
type) for each line end and one telecommunication channel. Top event 
probability q= 3.37E-01. The telecommunication channel is a power line 
carrier. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 3.37E-01 99.99 TELE    
 
Fault trees for the tripping of circuit breakers  
These fault trees are inputs in the event tree branches labelled as MA CB and 
and FO CB.  
 
Table 26  Minimal cut sets for a fault tree using SF6 circuit breakers for 
tripping. Top event probability q = 1.40E-03. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.40E-03 99.99 IDACid CB TRIP       
2 8.70E-08 0.01 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL1 
IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL2 
3 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION        
4 1.01E-09 0 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL2 
IDACid DC1 MCB 1  
5 1.01E-09 0 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL1 
IDACid DC2 MCB 1  
6 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY  
7 1.70E-10 0 ID DC1 220 1 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL2 
8 1.70E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL1 
9 1.17E-11 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1 IDACid DC2 MCB 1  
10 1.97E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid DC1 MCB 1  
11 1.97E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid DC2 MCB 1  
12 3.32E-13 0 ID DC1 220 1         ID DC2 220 1         
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Table 27  The minimal cut sets of a fault tree with minimum oil circuit 
breakers for tripping. Top event probability q = 2.45E-03. 
No Prob. % Event Event 
1 2.45E-03 100 IDACid CB TRIP        
2 8.70E-08 0 IDACid CB TRIP COIL1 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL2 
3 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION         
4 1.01E-09 0 IDACid CB TRIP COIL2 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     
5 1.01E-09 0 IDACid CB TRIP COIL1 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
6 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
7 1.70E-10 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL2 
8 1.70E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL1 
9 1.17E-11 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
10 1.97E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid DC1 MCB 1     
11 1.97E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1         IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
12 3.32E-13 0 ID DC1 220 1         ID DC2 220 1         
 
Table 28  Minimal cut sets for a fault tree using air-blast circuit breakers 
for tripping. Top event probability q = 8.45E-03. 
No Prob. % Event Event 
1 8.45E-03 100 IDACid CB TRIP        
2 8.70E-08 0 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL1 
IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL2 
3 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION         
4 1.01E-09 0 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL1 
IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
5 1.01E-09 0 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL2 
IDACid DC1 MCB 1     
6 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY  
7 1.70E-10 0 ID DC1 220 1 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL2 
8 1.70E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1 IDACid CB TRIP 
COIL1 
9 1.17E-11 0 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
10 1.97E-12 0 ID DC2 220 1 IDACid DC1 MCB 1     
11 1.97E-12 0 ID DC1 220 1 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
12 3.32E-13 0 ID DC1 220 1 ID DC2 220 1         
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Fault trees for the breaker failure protection  
These fault trees are inputs in the event tree branches labelled MA BFR and FO 
BFR.  
 
Table 29  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip one SF6 circuit breaker. Top event 
probability q = 1.98E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 1.40E-03 70.54 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 5.13E-04 25.87 IDACid BFR STA 
3 6.63E-05 3.34 IDACid BFR TS REC 1  
Minimal cut sets numbered from 4 to 15 are not listed 
 
Table 30  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip one minimum oil circuit breaker. Top 
event probability q = 3.03E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 2.45E-03 80.74 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 5.13E-04 16.93 IDACid BFR STA 
3 6.63E-05 2.19 IDACid BFR TS REC 1 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 4 to 15 are not listed 
 
Table 31  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip two SF6 circuit breakers. Top event 
probability q = 3.38E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 1.40E-03 41.4 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 1.40E-03 41.4 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 5.13E-04 15.18 IDACid BFR STA 
4 6.63E-05 1.96 IDACid BFR TS REC 1 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5-23 are not listed 
 
Table 32  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip one SF6 circuit breaker and one 
minimum oil circuit breaker. Top event probability q = 4.42E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 2.45E-03 55.29 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 1.40E-03 31.62 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 5.13E-04 11.6 IDACid BFR STA 
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4 6.63E-05 1.5 IDACid BFR TS REC 1 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5-23 are not listed 
 
Table 33  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip three SF6 circuit breakers. Top event 
probability q = 4.77E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 1.40E-03 29.31 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 1.40E-03 29.31 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 1.40E-03 29.31 IDACid4 CB TRIP 
4 5.13E-04 10.75 IDACid BFR STA 
5 6.63E-05 1.39 IDACid BFR TS REC 1 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 6-31 are not listed 
 
Table 34  Minimal cut sets for a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip two minimum oil circuit breakers. Top 
event probability q = 5.47E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 1 2.45E-03 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 2 2.45E-03 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 3 5.13E-04 IDACid BFR STA 
4 4 6.63E-05 IDACid BFR TS REC 1 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5-23 are not listed 
 
Table 35  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip four SF6 circuit breakers. Top event 
probability q = 6.17E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 1.40E-03 22.69 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 1.40E-03 22.69 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 1.40E-03 22.69 IDACid4 CB TRIP 
4 1.40E-03 22.69 IDACid5 CB TRIP 
5 5.13E-04 8.32 IDACid BFR STA 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 6-39 are not listed 
 
Table 36  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip one SF6 circuit breaker and two 
minimum oil circuit breakers. Top event probability q = 6.86E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 2.45E-03 35.66 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 2.45E-03 35.66 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
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3 1.40E-03 20.39 IDACid4 CB TRIP 
4 5.13E-04 7.48 IDACid BFR STA 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5-31 are not listed 
 
Table 37  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip three minimum oil circuit breakers. 
Top event probability q = 7.90E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 2.45E-03 30.96 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 2.45E-03 30.96 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 2.45E-03 30.96 IDACid4 CB TRIP 
4 5.13E-04 6.49 IDACid BFR STA 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5-31 are not listed 
 
Table 38  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip four SF6 circuit breakers and one 
minimum oil circuit breaker. Top event probability q = 8.60E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 2.45E-03 28.46 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 1.40E-03 16.27 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 1.40E-03 16.27 IDACid4 CB TRIP 
4 1.40E-03 16.27 IDACid5 CB TRIP 
5 1.40E-03 16.27 IDACid BFR STA 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 7-47 are not listed 
 
Table 39  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip one air-blast circuit breaker. Top 
event probability q = 9.03E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 8.45E-03 93.58 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 5.13E-04 5.68 IDACid BFR STA 
3 6.63E-05 0.73 IDACid BFR TS REC 1  
MCS numbered from 4 to 15 are not listed 
 
Table 40  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip three SF6 circuit breakers and two air-
blast circuit breakers. Top event probability q = 9.64E-03.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 2.45E-03 25.38 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 2.45E-03 25.38 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 1.40E-03 14.52 IDACid4 CB TRIP 
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4 1.40E-03 14.52 IDACid5 CB TRIP 
5 1.40E-03 14.52 IDACid6 CB TRIP 
6 5.13E-04 5.32 IDACid BFR STA 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 7-47 are not listed 
 
Table 41  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip one SF6 circuit breaker and one air-
blast circuit breaker. Top event probability q = 1.04E-02.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 8.45E-03 81.13 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 1.40E-03 13.43 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 5.13E-04 4.92 IDACid BFR STA 
4 6.63E-05 0.64 IDACid BFR TS REC 1 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5-23 are not listed 
 
Table 42  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip two air-blast circuit breakers. Top 
event probability q = 1.74E-02.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 8.45E-03 48.55 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 8.45E-03 48.55 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 5.13E-04 2.95 IDACid BFR STA 
4 6.63E-05 0.38 IDACid BFR TS REC 1 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5-23 are not listed 
 
Table 43  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip two air-blast circuit breakers and one 
SF6 circuit breaker. Top event probability q = 1.88E-02.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 8.45E-03 45 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 8.45E-03 45 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
3 1.40E-03 7.45 IDACid4 CB TRIP 
4 5.13E-04 2.73 IDACid BFR STA 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5-31 are not listed 
 
Table 44  Minimal cut sets of a fault tree for breaker failure protection. In 
this case the protection needs to trip three air-blast circuit breakers. Top 
event probability q = 2.57E-02.  
No. Prob. % Event 
1 8.45E-03 32.87 IDACid2 CB TRIP 
2 8.45E-03 32.87 IDACid3 CB TRIP 
  159
3 8.45E-03 32.87 IDACid4 CB TRIP 
4 5.13E-04 2 IDACid BFR STA 
Minimal cut sets numbered from 5-31 are not listed 
Fault trees for the autoreclosing  
These fault trees are inputs in the event tree branches MA RAR and FO RAR.  
 
Table 45  The minimal cut sets for a fault tree covering the autoreclosing 
system of a master line end. The autoreclosing relay and synchronism check 
device are integrated microprocessor relays and the circuit breaker is the 
minimum oil type. Top event probability q = 1.03E-02 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 7.46E-03 72.31 IDACid CB CLOSE       
2 1.14E-03 11.05 IDACid SC STA         
3 1.02E-03 9.88 IDACid AR MEC 2       
4 6.50E-04 6.3 IDACid AR OFF         
5 6.50E-05 0.63 IDACid AR1 SIGN       
6 3.42E-06 0.03 IDACid DC1 MCB 1      
7 2.11E-06 0.02 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    IDACid Z2 AR1 SIG    
8 1.98E-06 0.02 IDACid BUS U MEASURE  
9 5.76E-07 0.01 ID DC1 220 1          
10 4.96E-09 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
11 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION         
12 8.36E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
13 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
 
Table 46  The minimal cut sets for a fault tree covering the autoreclosing 
system of a master line end. The autoreclosing relay and synchronism check 
device are electromechanical and the circuit breaker is the minimum oil 
type. Top event probability q = 1.11E-02. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 7.46E-03 67.49 IDACid CB CLOSE     
2 1.89E-03 17.04 IDACid SC MEC 2      
3 1.02E-03 9.22 IDACid AR MEC 2      
4 6.50E-04 5.88 IDACid AR OFF        
5 6.50E-05 0.59 IDACid AR1 SIGN      
6 3.42E-06 0.03 IDACid DC1 MCB 1    
7 2.11E-06 0.02 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG   IDACid Z2 AR1 SIG    
8 1.98E-06 0.02 
IDACid BUS U 
MEASURE  
9 5.76E-07 0.01 IDACid DC1 220 1       
10 4.96E-09 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1   IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
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11 1.83E-09 0 
IDACid 
SUBSTATION         
12 8.36E-10 0 IDACid DC2 220 1      IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
13 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
 
Table 47  The minimal cut sets for a fault tree covering the autoreclosing 
system of a master line end. The autoreclosing relay and synchronism check 
device are electromechanical and the circuit breaker is of the air-blast type. 
Top event probability q = 1.35E-02. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 9.93E-03 73.44 IDACid CB CLOSE     
2 1.89E-03 13.93 IDACid SC MEC 2      
3 1.02E-03 7.54 IDACid AR MEC 2      
4 6.50E-04 4.8 IDACid AR OFF        
5 6.50E-05 0.48 IDACid AR1 SIGN      
6 6.60E-06 0.05 
ID AIR PRESSURE 
AR    
7 3.42E-06 0.03 IDACid DC1 MCB 1    
8 2.11E-06 0.02 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG   IDACid Z2 AR1 SIG    
9 1.98E-06 0.01 
IDACid BUS U 
MEASURE  
10 5.76E-07 0 ID DC1 220 1          
11 4.96E-09 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1   IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
12 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION        
13 8.36E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
14 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
 
Table 48  The minimal cut sets for a fault tree dealing with the 
autoreclosing system of a master line end. The autoreclosing relay and 
synchronism check device are integrated microprocessor relays and the 
circuit breaker is of the SF6 type. Top event probability q = 1.90E-02. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.29E-02 67.82 IDACid AR / SC PRO    
2 5.48E-03 28.81 IDACid CB CLOSE       
3 6.50E-04 3.42 IDACid AR OFF       
4 6.50E-05 0.34 IDACid AR1 SIGN    
5 3.42E-06 0.02 IDACid DC1 MCB 1   
6 2.11E-06 0.01 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG IDACid Z2 AR1 SIG 
7 1.98E-06 0.01 IDACid BUS U MEASURE  
8 1.98E-06 0.01 IDACid LIN U MEAS FO  
9 5.76E-07 0 ID DC1 220 1          
10 4.96E-09 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1  IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG 
11 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION         
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12 8.36E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG 
13 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
 
Table 49  The minimal cut sets of a fault tree for the autoreclosing system of 
a master line end. The autoreclosing system consists of an 
electromechanical autoreclcosing relay and a microprocessor synchronism 
check device. The circuit breaker is of the air-blast type. Top event 
probability q = 2.04E-02. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 9.93E-03 48.65 IDACid CB CLOSE     
2 8.86E-03 43.39 IDACid SC PRO         
3 1.02E-03 4.99 IDACid AR MEC 2      
4 6.50E-04 3.18 IDACid AR OFF        
5 6.50E-05 0.32 IDACid AR1 SIGN      
6 6.60E-06 0.03 
ID AIR PRESSURE 
AR    
7 3.42E-06 0.02 IDACid DC1 MCB 1    
8 2.11E-06 0.01 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG   IDACid Z2 AR1 SIG    
9 1.98E-06 0.01 
IDACid BUS U 
MEASURE  
10 5.76E-07 0 ID DC1 220 1          
11 4.96E-09 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1   IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
12 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION        
13 8.36E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
14 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
 
Table 50  The minimal cut sets for a fault tree covering the autoreclosing 
system of a master line end. The autoreclosing relay and synchronism check 
device are integrated microprocessor relays and the circuit breaker is of 
the air-blast type. Top event probability q = 2.34E-02 
No Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.29E-02 55.08 IDACid AR & SC PRO    
2 9.93E-03 42.42 IDACid CB CLOSE       
3 6.50E-04 2.77 IDACid AR OFF         
4 6.50E-05 0.28 IDACid AR1 SIGN       
5 6.60E-06 0.03 ID AIR PRESSURE AR    
6 3.42E-06 0.01 IDACid DC1 MCB 1      
7 2.11E-06 0.01 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
IDACid Z2 AR1 
SIG    
8 1.98E-06 0.01 IDACid BUS U MEASURE  
9 5.76E-07 0 ID DC1 220 1          
10 4.96E-09 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
IDACid Z1 AR1 
SIG    
11 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION         
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12 8.36E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         
IDACid Z1 AR1 
SIG    
13 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
 
Table 51  The minimal cut sets of a fault tree for the autoreclosing system of 
a master line end. The autoreclosing system consists of a static 
autoreclcosing relay and a static synchronism check device. The circuit 
breaker is of the SF6 type. Top event probability q = 2.57E-02. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.85E-02 71.99 IDACid AR STA      
2 5.48E-03 21.33 IDACid CB CLOSE     
3 1.14E-03 4.44 IDACid SC STA         
4 6.50E-04 2.53 IDACid AR OFF       
5 6.50E-05 0.25 IDACid AR1 SIGN    
6 3.42E-06 0.01 IDACid DC1 MCB 1  
7 2.11E-06 0.01 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG IDACid Z2 AR1 SIG 
8 1.98E-06 0.01 
IDACid BUS U 
MEASURE  
9 5.76E-07 0 ID DC1 220 1          
10 4.96E-09 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG 
11 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION        
12 8.36E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG 
13 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
 
Table 52  The minimal cut sets of a fault tree for the autoreclosing system of 
a master line end. The autoreclosing system consists of a static 
autoreclcosing relay and a static synchronism check device. The circuit 
breaker is of minimum oil type. Top event probability q = 2.76E-02. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.85E-02 66.93 IDACid AR STA         
2 7.46E-03 27 IDACid CB CLOSE       
3 1.14E-03 4.12 IDACid SC STA         
4 6.50E-04 2.35 IDACid AR OFF      
5 6.50E-05 0.24 IDACid AR1 SIGN    
6 3.42E-06 0.01 IDACid DC1 MCB 1   
7 2.11E-06 0.01 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG 
IDACid Z2 AR1 
SIG 
8 1.98E-06 0.01 
IDACid BUS U 
MEASURE  
9 5.76E-07 0 ID DC1 220 1          
10 4.96E-09 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1  
IDACid Z1 AR1 
SIG 
11 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION         
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12 8.36E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         
IDACid Z1 AR1 
SIG 
13 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
 
Table 53  The minimal cut sets of a fault tree for the autoreclosing system of 
a follower line end. The autoreclosing system consists of a static 
autoreclcosing relay and a static synchronism check device. The circuit 
breaker is of the air-blast type. Top event probability q = 3.01E-02. 
No. Prob. % Event Event 
1 1.85E-02 61.53 IDACid AR STA         
2 9.93E-03 33.04 IDACid CB CIDSE       
3 1.14E-03 3.79 IDACid SC STA         
4 6.50E-04 2.16 IDACid AR OFF         
5 6.50E-05 0.22 IDACid AR1 SIGN       
6 6.60E-06 0.02 ID AIR PRESSURE AR   
7 3.42E-06 0.01 IDACid DC1 MCB 1      
8 2.11E-06 0.01 IDACid Z1 AR1 SIG    
IDACid Z2 AR1 
SIG    
9 1.98E-06 0.01 
IDACid BUS U 
MEASURE  
10 1.98E-06 0.01 
IDACid LIN U MEAS 
FO  
11 5.76E-07 0 ID DC1 220 1          
12 4.96E-09 0 IDACid DC2 MCB 1     
IDACid Z1 AR1 
SIG    
13 1.83E-09 0 ID SUBSTATION         
14 8.36E-10 0 ID DC2 220 1         
IDACid Z1 AR1 
SIG    
15 7.25E-10 0 IDACid BAY            
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APPENDIX C – FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS  
Table 1  Substation, a basic event for a common cause failure. Identification of the basic event: ID SUBSTATION, where ID is the 
identification of the substation. 
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Fire due to 
overload of a 
device 
The protection 
systems of the 
substation do not 
function 
A failure of 
control, 
protection and 
alarm systems  
Fire alarm.  
Manufacturing or 
installation failure 
of cables 
Cable failure -> 
earth fault, short 
circuit -> signal 
transfer is 
prevented 
A failure of 
control, 
protection and 
alarm systems 
DC earth fault 
alarm 
λˆ = 6.3E-05  
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
The whole 
substation: 
control 
building, 
common 
cables.  
All the control 
commands, 
measurements 
and alarms of 
the substation 
A truck drives to 
the control 
building. A 
meteorite or an air 
plane falls. 
Mechanical 
failure of devices 
prevents 
substation 
operations 
A failure of 
control, 
protection and 
alarm systems 
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Table 2  Bay, a basic event for a common cause failure. Identification of the basic event: IDACid BAY, where ID is the 
identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay. This basic event shall be included in all fault trees, which 
includes at least one component of that bay. 
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Frost Frost damages the cables 
or causes the insulation to 
fray due to cable move-
ment. -> earth fault, short 
circuit 
Water in the 
cable ditch 
Mechanical failures due 
to water  freezing and 
melting -> a cable suf-fers 
an earth fault or short 
circuit 
Fire A fire caused by overload 
or an external reason -> a 
cable faces an earth fault 
or a short circuit 
Cables of 
one bay, 
which 
connects the 
circuit 
breakers, 
instrument 
transformers 
etc to 
substation 
control and 
protection. 
Controls, 
measurement
s and other 
information 
between the 
building 
devices 
(relays) and 
the 
switchyard 
devices 
(circuit 
breakers, 
instrument 
transformers)  Manufactur-
ing or in-
stallation 
failure  
Manufacturing defect or a 
careless installation 
causes an earth fault or a 
short circuit 
Controls 
commands and 
alarms fail. 
Circuit breaker 
does not trip or 
close, current 
and voltage 
measurements 
fail. 
Alarm after a cable 
failure.  
 
DC earth fault 
alarm or DC MCB 
trips or Z MCB 
trips or busbar 
protection 
differential relay 
sends an alarm or 
the main 
transformer 
(400/110/20 kV) 
trips. 
λˆ = 2.5E-05 
MTTR: 2.9E-05 
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Table 3  220 V DC voltage supply. IDENTIFICATION: ID DC1 220 V 1 or ID DC2 220 V 1, where ID is the identification of the 
substation. ID DC1 220 V 1 is used for distance relay 1, breaker failure relay, circuit breaker trip coil 1, circuit breaker closing 
coil and rapid automatic reclosing relays. ID DC2 220 V 1 is used for distance relay 2, differential relay, and circuit breaker trip 
coil 2. 
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure 
mode 
Effects of failure Detection of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Substation 220 V DC 
voltage batteries. 
This includes the 
batteries, miniature 
circuit breakers and 
direct current 
conductors. 
Direct voltage 
that feeds the 
relays and circuit 
breaker trip coils 
and tele-
communication 
48 V DC supply. 
Manufactur
ing , 
installation 
failure or 
ageing 
DC short 
circuit  
Relays do not 
function, circuit 
breaker trip coil 
does not receive a 
trip command 
An alarm for a 
DC fuse or an 
alarm for battery 
low voltage. 
Monitored 
component. 
λˆ = 6.4E-04  
MTTR = 9.0E-04 
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Table 4  Miniature circuit breaker (MCB) for the 220 V DC voltage supply for the bay. IDENTIFICATION: IDACid DC1 MCB 1 
or IDACid DC2 MVB 1, where ID is the identification of the substation, id is the identification of the bay. Usually IDACid DC1 
MCB 1 is used in the fault trees that contain the basic event ID DC1 220 V 1 and the basic event IDACid DC2 MCB 1 is used in the 
fault trees that contain the basic event ID DC2 220 V 1. The only exception to this rule are the fault trees for the breaker failure 
relays, which do not use the miniature circuit breakers for the bays but the miniature circuit breakers for the busbar protection 
relays. At the substations with two circuit breakers and two bays for a line end, there is only one MCB for DC batteries 1 and 2. 
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure 
mode 
Effects of failure Detection of failure  λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Mechanical 
failure, 
ageing 
Short circuit 
leads to a 
MCB trip 
Relay does not 
function, CB does not 
receive a trip signal to 
trip coil 1, and CB 
does not close. 
Alarm: MCB tripped λˆ = 5.7E-03 
MTTR = 6.0E-04 
220 V DC 
miniature 
circuit 
breaker 
protecting 
the DC 1 
or DC 2 
supply 
circuits of 
a bay 
Short 
circuit 
protection 
for the 
DC 
supply 
circuits 
Human 
error 
The DC 
circuit is 
disconnected 
Relay does not 
function, CB does not 
receive a trip signal to 
trip coil 1, and CB 
does not close. 
If the DC circuit is open, the 
failure is detected by a test if 
there are only electro-
mechanical relays in the bay: 
Static and microprocessor 
relays send an alarm during a 
DC supply failure. 
Not included in 
the model. 
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Table 5  Miniature circuit breaker for the 220 V DC voltage supply for the breaker failure relay. IDENTIFICATION: ID DC1 BPR 
MCB 1, where ID is the identification of the substation. This basic event is used in the fault trees for the breaker failure relays.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure 
mode 
Effects of 
failure 
Detection 
of failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Miniature circuit breakers 
for the busbar protection 
relay, which is supplied 
from the 220 V DC 
batteries. This is used 
when the initiating event 
is not an explosion of a 
current transformer. 
MCB of the 
busbar 
protection and 
breaker failure 
protection. It 
detects faults in 
the DC supply 
of those relays. 
Human error 
during 
installation, 
ageing, 
manufacturing 
failure. 
DC short 
circuit, MCB 
trips without 
a fault 
Breaker failure 
relay does not 
function 
Alarm λˆ = 4.2E-03 
MTTR = 6.0E-04 
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Table 6  48 V DC voltage supply for the telecommunication devices. IDENTIFICATION: ID DC 48 V 1, where ID is the 
identification of the substation. This basic event is used in the fault trees for the protection that uses the telecommunication. 
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Manufacturing 
failure, installation 
failure, ageing 
Mechanical 
failures in the 
devices 
Alarm. Either a 
part of the 48 V 
system fails and 
sends an alarm or 
the entire 48 V 
system fails and 
the substation 
remote terminal 
unit sends an 
alarm. 
Human error, 
ageing, 
The DC circuit is 
disconnected 
Alarm (terminal 
devices send an 
alarm) 
Overload  Voltage is too low  Alarm indicating 
a low DC voltage 
The 48 V DC 
supply for the 
protection 
telecommuni-
cation system 
components. This 
includes the 48 V 
DC system and its 
parts: 220/48 V 
DC/DC-
converters, MCB, 
and the 48 V DC 
circuitry (the 48 
V cables between 
the terminal 
devices and 
DC/DC 
converters). The 
cables are usually 
not doubled. 
Distance 
relays 
permissive 
overreach and 
underreach 
transfer trip 
and 
differential 
relays need 
protection tele-
communicatio
n terminal 
devices. These 
devices are 
supplied by 48 
V DC battery.  Telecommunicati
on device cubicle 
that includes 
DC/DC 
converters and 
terminal devices  
Fire, shock 
Those 
protection 
systems that 
need tele-
communicatio
n channel 
between 
stations do not 
function. 
Alarm  
 λˆ = 8.1E-04 
 
MTTR =  
9.0E-04 
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Table 7  Substation pneumatic system at the substation for the air-blast circuit breakers. IDENTIFICATION: ID AIR PRESSURE 
AR, where ID is the identification of the substation. This basic event is used in the fault trees, where the air-blast circuit breakers 
need to reclose after a trip. 
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure 
mode 
Effects of failure Detection of failure  λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Pneumatic 
system of 
the 
substation 
for the CB 
trip 
function 
The 
system 
creates the 
compresse
d air for 
the circuit 
breakers. 
CB trip 
function.  
Ageing, 
manufactu
ring 
failure 
Valves of 
the circuit 
breaker leak 
and the 
pneumatic 
system of 
the 
substation 
fails. 
The pneumatic system 
cannot give CBs the 
pneumatic they need. Since 
the CBs have individual PI 
tanks, they can trip once but 
then the pneumatic tank 
would be empty. After one 
trip a CB cannot reclose if 
the air is not replenished. 
Alarm. The following 
actions in this order after 
the valves start to leak:  
1) Alarm, 2) CB closing is 
blocked 3) CB tripping is 
blocked. After there is not 
any compressed air left, 
the CBs remain closed or 
close.  
This is not used in 
the fault trees 
since the CBs can 
trip once even if 
the substation 
pneumatic system 
has failed.   
Pneumatic 
system of 
the 
substation 
for the CB 
reclosing 
function 
The 
system 
creates the 
compresse
d air for 
the circuit 
breakers. 
CB trip 
function.  
Ageing, 
manufactu
ring 
failure 
Valves of 
the 
pneumatic 
system leak, 
mechanical 
damage in 
the 
pneumatic 
system.  
Not a single CB at the 
substation can reclose after 
tripping.  
An assumption: tripping has 
emptied the compressed air 
tank of the CB and since the 
substation pneumatic system 
tank has failed, the CB 
cannot close any more. 
Alarm. The following 
actions in this order after 
the valves start to leak:  
1) Alarm, 2) CB closing is 
blocked 3) CB tripping is 
blocked. After there is not 
any compressed air left, 
the CBs remain closed or 
close. 
λˆ = 1.1E-02 
MTTR = 6.0E-04 
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Table 8  The trip function of the air-blast circuit breakers. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid CB TRIP, where ID is the identification of 
the substation and id is the identification of the bay.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection of failure  λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Air-blast 
circuit 
breaker 
Trip after 
it has 
received a 
trip signal 
during a 
fault 
Ageing A valve failure, 
where the 
compressed air 
leaks from the 
circuit breaker  
CB does not 
trip on 
command 
Alarm This is not taken into 
account. The faults detected 
by the tests dominate the 
unavailability of the air-
blast circuit breakers. 
Therefore this fault does 
not have significance. The 
same constant 
unavailability is received 
with and without this basic 
event. 
Air-blast 
circuit 
breaker 
Trip 
during a 
fault 
Ageing, 
manufacturi
ng failure 
A mechanical 
failure in the 
circuit breaker  
CB does not 
trip on 
command 
Test. An additional 
manual trip 
command, which is 
not taken into 
account in the 
model. 
λˆ = 1.7E-02 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
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Table 9  The trip function of the minimum oil and SF6-circuit breakers. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid CB TRIP, where ID is the 
identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection of failure  λˆ  (1/year) 
 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Minimum oil 
circuit 
breaker 
Trip 
during a 
fault 
Ageing, 
manufacturi
ng failure 
A mechanical 
failure in the CB.  
Circuit 
breaker does 
not trip on 
command 
Test (also manual 
command, which is 
not taken into 
account in the 
model). 
λˆ = 4.9E-03 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
SF6 circuit 
breaker 
Trip 
during a 
fault 
Ageing, 
manufacturi
ng failure 
A mechanical 
failure in the CB.  
CB does not 
trip on 
command 
Test (also manual 
command, which is 
not taken into 
account in the 
model). 
λˆ = 2.8E-03 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
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Table 10  Trip coils in all types of circuit breakers. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid CB TRIP COIL 1 or IDACid CB TRIP COIL 2, 
where ID is the identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay. This basic event is used in the fault trees, 
where the circuit breakers trip.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection of failure  λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Circuit 
breaker 
Trip 
during a 
fault 
Terminal strip 
of the trip coil 
1 is 
disconnected  
Human error Circuit 
breaker does 
not receive a 
trip signal to 
trip coil 1 
Test. An additional 
manual command, 
which is not taken 
into account in the 
model. 
λˆ = 5.9 E-04 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
Circuit 
breaker 
Trip 
during a 
fault 
Terminal strip 
of the trip coil 
1 is 
disconnected 
Human error Circuit 
breaker does 
not receive a 
trip signal to 
trip coil 2 
Test λˆ = 5.9 E-04 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
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Table 11  The reclosing function of the air-blast circuit breakers. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid CB CLOSE, where ID is the 
identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Air-blast 
circuit 
breakers 
Close at 
automatic 
reclosing 
action 
Manufacturin
g failure, 
ageing 
A valve failure in which 
the compressed air leaks 
from the circuit breaker. 
CB does not 
close on 
command 
Alarm This is not taken into 
account. It is detected 
by an alarm and the 
faults detected by tests 
dominate the 
unavailability of the 
circuit breakers 
Air-blast 
circuit 
breakers 
Close at 
automatic 
reclosing 
action 
Human error, 
ageing, 
manufacturin
g failure 
CB mechanical failure, 
terminal strips 
disconnected.  
CB does not 
close on 
command. CB 
does not 
receive a 
signal to the 
coil for closing 
the CB. 
Test. An 
additional 
manual 
command. 
 λˆ   = 2.0E-02 
 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
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Table 12  The reclosing function of the minimum oil and SF6-circuit breakers. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid CB CLOSE, where ID 
is the identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay. This basic event is used in the fault trees, where the 
minimum oil circuit breaker recloses.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of failure Detection 
of failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Minimum oil 
circuit 
breakers 
Close at 
automatic 
reclosing 
action 
Manufacturing 
failure, ageing 
Failure of the spring 
charger. 
CB does not close on 
command 
Alarm This is not taken into 
account. These faults do 
not have significance 
compared to faults 
detected by tests. 
Minimum oil 
circuit 
breakers 
Close at 
automatic 
reclosing 
action 
Human error, 
ageing, 
manufacturing 
failure 
Circuit breaker 
mechanical failure, 
terminal strips 
disconnected. 
CB does not close on 
command. CB does 
not receive a signal 
to the coil for closing 
the CB. 
Test. An 
additional 
manual 
command. 
λˆ   = 1.5E-02 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1  
SF6 circuit 
breakers, 
reclosing 
after the trip 
Close at 
automatic 
reclosing 
action 
Manufacturing 
failure, ageing 
Failure of the spring 
charger 
Circuit breaker does 
not close on 
command 
Alarm This is not taken into 
account. These faults do 
not have significance 
compared to faults 
detected by tests. 
SF6 circuit 
breakers 
Close at 
automatic 
reclosing 
action 
Human error, 
ageing, 
manufacturing 
failure 
CB mechanical 
failure, terminal 
strips of the close 
coil are not 
connected  
CB does not close on 
command. CB does 
not receive a signal 
to the coil for closing 
the CB. 
Test. An 
additional 
manual 
command.  
λˆ   = 1.1E-02 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
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Table 13  Electromechanical distance relays. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid Z1 MEC 2 and IDACid Z2 MEC 2, where ID is the 
identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection 
of failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Voltage 
measuremen
t circuits  
The 
voltage 
value to the 
relay. 
Human error, 
ageing 
Measuring circuit 
disconnected, loose junction  
The relay trips if 
the load current 
exceeds the 
threshold value 
(e.g. 0.2*IN) 
Unwanted 
trip.  
It is no relevant in 
this study, since 
the relay trips 
correctly during 
faults. 
Dirt, ageing Trip signal delayed due to dirt 
Dirt, ageing Zone 1 reach decreases  
Human error Current measurement circuit of 
the relay is disconnected 
Human error Terminal strips of the relay or 
of the relay cubicle are 
disconnected 
Human error Erroneous setting or 
configuration  
Electromech
anical 
distance 
relays  
Send an 
instantaneo
us trip 
signal 
during 
faults on 
the 
protected 
line 
Ageing, 
manufacturing 
error,  
Internal contact of the relay is 
loose and prevents the signal 
transfer  
No 
instantaneous 
trip signal 
Test  λˆ   = 6.5E-03 
 
MTTR =  
1.0E-02 
 
Ti = 1 
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Table 14  Static distance relays. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid Z1 STA and IDACid Z2 STA, where ID is the identification of the 
substation and id is the identification of the bay.  
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects of fail-
ure 
Detec-
tion of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Ageing of the relay 
components. 
Zone 1 reach is reduced 
Human error Current measurement circuit of the 
relay is disconnected 
Human error Terminal strips of the relay or of 
the relay cubicle are disconnected 
Human error Erroneous setting or configuration 
Ageing The spring of the card joints 
becomes loose and the signal 
transfer is prevented. 
The relay does 
not send an 
instantaneous 
trip signal 
Test   λˆ   = 1.4E-02 
 
MTTR =  
1.0E-02 
 
Ti = 1 
Static 
distance 
relay  
Send an 
instantaneous 
trip signal 
during faults 
on the 
protected line 
(zone 1 and 
POTT trips) 
Ageing of the com-
ponents in the relay 
power supply 
The relay loses the power supply it 
needs. 
The relay does 
not send a trip 
signal. 
Voltage 
measure
ment 
circuit 
Voltage 
measurement 
to the relay 
Human error Voltage measurement circuit 
disconnected. The trip signal 
transfer to the CB is prevented by 
the voltage transformer supervision 
No trip signal 
to the circuit 
breaker 
Alarm   λˆ   = 2.7E-03 
 
MTTR = 
1.0E-02 
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Table 15  Microprocessor distance relay. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid Z1 PRO and IDACid Z2 PRO, where ID is the 
identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay.  
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detectio
n of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
A software error  No trip signal. 
Human error Current measurement circuit of 
the relay is disconnected 
Human error Terminal strips of the relay or of 
the relay cubicle are 
disconnected 
Human error Erroneous setting or 
configuration 
Ageing The spring of the card joints is 
loose, the signal transfer is 
prevented. 
No trip 
signal. 
Test  λˆ   = 5.2E-03 
 
MTTR =  
2.0E-02 
 
Ti = 1 
 
Processor 
distance 
relay 
Send an in-
stantaneous 
trip signal 
during 
faults on 
the pro-
tected line 
(zone 1 and 
POTT 
trips) 
Ageing of the 
components in the 
relay power supply. 
Relay loses the power supply 
Voltage 
measurement 
circuit 
Voltage 
value to the 
relay. 
Human error: voltage 
measurement circuit 
disconnected 
No trip signal (voltage trans-
former supervision) 
No trip 
signal 
Alarm  λˆ   = 3.0E-02 
 
MTTR =  
1.0E-02 
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Table 16  Instrument transformers 
Item Function Cause 
of 
failure 
Failure 
mode 
Effects 
of 
failure 
Detection of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Voltage trans-
former (VT) 
for the electro-
mechanical 
distance relays 
Voltage 
measure-
ment for 
the distance 
relay. 
Manufa
cturing 
error, 
ageing 
Voltage 
transformer 
fails (e.g. 
an 
explosion) 
No trip 
signal. 
Alarm. If the 
VT explodes, 
the alarm is 
too late.  
VT failure is a separate initiating event (an 
extra busbar or line fault), which means that 
the grid has to withstand two simultaneous 
faults. In this case it is not sensible to analyse 
in detail the sequence of events after one fault 
only. Besides, a VT failure alone does not 
necessarily prevent the trip after line faults. 
The case is different if the VT fails and the 
MCBs for the VT trip or if the VT fails and the 
voltage transformer supervision of the relays 
operates. In these cases the distance relays can 
not trip the line. These are not included in the 
model, nor are simultaneous grid faults..  
Current trans-
former 
Current 
measure-
ment for 
the relays 
Manufa
cturing 
error 
Current 
transformer 
explodes 
Substati
on or 
line 
shunt 
fault 
Alarm. If the 
VT explodes, 
the alarm is 
too late. 
Not included in the model, since this is a 
separate initiating event, the consequences of 
which are unforeseeable, as can be seen in 
5.3.2. 
  180
Table 17  Miniature circuit breakers (MCB) for the voltage measurement. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid Z MCB VT for 
electromechanical distance relays, IDACid Z1 MCB VT and IDACid Z2 MCB VT for static and microprocessor distance relays. ID 
is the identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay. This basic event is used in the fault trees, where a 
distance relays sends a trip signal.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of failure Detection 
of failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ageing 
(materials 
deteriorate 
over time)  
Isolation failures in the 
relay -> internal short 
circuits of the relay -> 
MCB VT trips  
MCB for 
an electro-
mechanical 
distance 
relay 
Prevent a trip 
during the short 
circuits of the 
voltage 
measurement 
circuit  
Human error, 
mechanical 
failure  
MCB VT trips due to a 
short circuit (both relays 
usually have a common 
MCB) 
MCB of a 
static dis-
tance relay 
Inform about the 
short circuits at 
the voltage meas-
urement circuit 
Human error: 
short circuit 
MCB VT trips due to a 
short circuit (each relay 
usually has a MCB) 
MCB of a 
Processor 
distance 
relay 
Inform about the 
short circuits at 
the voltage meas-
urement circuit 
Human error: -
> short circuit 
MCB VT trips due to a 
short circuit (each relay 
usually has an MCB) 
No trip signal to 
circuit breakers. 
(Busbar VT & old 
installation: both 
relays use the 
same MCB, line 
VT and/or new 
installation: one 
MCB per relay. 
Alarm λˆ   = 3.3E-03 
 
MTTR =  
6.0E-04 
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Table 18  Microprocessor differential relay for a line. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid D, where ID is the identification of the 
substation and id is the identification of the bay.  
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ageing of the 
components in the relay 
power supply. 
The relay loses the 
power supply it needs. 
The relay 
does not 
send a trip 
signal. 
Alarm  λˆ   = 2.9E-02 
 
MTTR =  
2.0E-02 
 
A software error  No trip signal. 
Ageing of the relay 
components. 
Settings are altered.  
Human error Terminal strips of the 
relay or the relay cubicle 
are disconnected 
Human error Wrong setting or 
configuration 
Processor 
differential 
relay for a 
line 
Send a trip 
signal during 
faults on the 
protected line.  
Ageing, the spring of the 
card joints becomes 
loose 
The signal transfer is 
prevented. 
No trip 
signal.  
Test  λˆ   = 5.8E-03 
 
MTTR =  
2.0E-02 
 
Ti = 1 
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Table 19  Static breaker failure relay (BFR). IDENTIFICATION: IDACid BFR STA where ID is the identification of the substation 
and id is the identification of the bay.  
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects 
of fail-
ure 
Detection of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Ageing of the com-
ponents of the relay 
power supply. 
The relay loses the power supply it 
needs. 
No trip 
signal 
Alarm by 
self 
supervision 
of the relay 
Human error Current measurement circuit of the 
relay is disconnected 
No trip 
signal 
The busbar 
protection 
relay sends 
an alarm 
 λˆ   = 2.9E-03 
 
MTTR = 
1.0E-02 
Ageing of the relay 
components. 
Settings are changed 
Ageing. The spring 
of the card joint be-
comes loose. 
The signal transfer is prevented 
Static 
breaker 
failure 
relay 
Sends a trip 
signal to other 
circuit 
breakers 
connected to 
the same bus-
bar as the 
faulted circuit 
breaker. Also 
sends a trip 
signal to the 
remote end 
distance relays 
if the fault 
current has not 
stopped in the 
predefined 
time (200 ms). 
Human error Erroneous settings or configuration.  
No trip 
signal 
Test  λˆ   = 9.5E-04 
 
MTTR =  
1.0E-02 
 
Ti = 1 
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Table 20  Terminal strips of the breaker failure relay are disconnected. IDENTIFICATION: IDACid BFR TS REC 1, where ID is 
the identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of fail-
ure 
Detection of 
failure  
λˆ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Terminal 
strips of the 
breaker 
failure 
relay 
To transmit a 
trip signal from 
the distance or 
differential 
relays to the 
breaker failure 
relay. After 
receiving this 
signal the 
breaker failure 
relay starts to 
measure the 
current of the 
circuit breaker 
that needs to 
trip.  
Human error The signal transfer is 
prevented, therefore the start 
signal from the distance relay 
to the BFR is not transferred. 
 
 
No trip signal 
to the relevant 
circuit 
breakears  
Test  λˆ   = 1.3E-03 
 
MTTR = 
1.0E-02 
 
Ti = 1 
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Table 21  Telecommunication channels for the distance and differential relays. IDENTIFICATION: IDid&IDid TELE A or 
IDid&IDid TELE B, where the IDid-parts are the identifications of the substation and the bay at different line ends. This basic 
event is used in the fault trees, where relays need a telecommunication channel. This basic event also includes also the terminal 
devices between the relays and the telecommunication system. 
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection 
of failure 
Unavailability 
q 
Optical fibre (OF) Manufacturing, 
installation or me-
chanical failure, or a 
human error 
A failure of the optical fibre, 
a joint or terminal device. A 
human error in the software 
of the grid of the network 
provider 
q = 1.2E-02 
 
Radio link (RL)  Fog, manufacturing 
or installing failure 
or a human error 
Fog or mechanical failure. A 
human error in the software 
of the grid of the network 
provider 
q = 9.3E-03 
 
Analogue power 
line carrier (PLC) 
Frost, manufacturing 
or installing failures 
Corona caused by the frost  q = 6.1E-03 
 
OF and RL in 
series  
As See OF and RL  See optical fibre and micro-
wave 
q = 5.0E-03 
 
OF and PLC in 
series  
Signal 
transfer  
 
As OF and PLC  See optical fibre and PLC  
The 
signal 
transfer is 
prevented
. No 
instan-
taneous 
trip signal 
from the 
distance 
relays. No 
trip signal 
by the dif-
ferential 
relays.  
 
An 
immediat
e signal. 
An alarm 
after 20 
seconds. 
q = 1.3E-02 
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Table 22  The test switch of the telecommunication channel. IDENTIFICATION: IDid&IDid TELE A TEST or IDid&IDid TELE B 
TEST, where the first IDid identifies the substation and the bay at one line end and the second IDid identifies the substation and the 
bay at the other line end. This basic event is used in fault trees, where a distance relay or a differential relay needs a 
telecommunication channel.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure 
mode 
Effects of 
failure 
Detection of failure  λ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Telecommu-
nication link 
test switch is 
at TEST posi-
tion during 
normal opera-
tion 
To prevent 
trips during 
testing and 
mainte-
nance. 
Human 
error  
Test switch 
is at ON 
position after 
the test. 
The sig-
nal trans-
fer is pre-
vented 
There is an alarm when the testing or 
maintenance of the telecommunication 
channel starts. This alarm will be on 
until the test switch is set to the normal 
position. However, there will not be 
any more alarms and it is possible that 
the test engineer forgets to switch the 
test switch to its normal position after 
the work and nobody pays attention to 
the old alarm any more. In this study 
this switch is treated as a tested 
component  
 λˆ   = 7.4E-04 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
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Table 23  Electromechanical relays for the automatic reclosing system. IDENTIFICATION: IDACid AR MEC 2 and IDACid SC 
MEC 2, where ID is the identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay. AR is for automatic reclosing and SC 
is for the synchronism check function.  
Item Function Cause of 
failure 
Failure mode Effects of failure Detection of 
failure  
λ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Electro-
mechanical 
autoreclosing 
relay 
To send a close 
signal to circuit 
breakers after a 
fault  
Ageing, dirt Automatic 
reclosing is delayed 
due to dirt and fails. 
Automatic 
reclosing fails.  
Test  λˆ   = 2.0E-03 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Ti = 1 
Electro-
mechanical 
synchronism 
check relay  
To check the 
voltage 
conditions 
before the 
Automatic 
reclosing. 
Ageing, dirt Setting values are 
changed due to dirt. 
Automatic 
reclosing fails.  
Test  λˆ   = 3.7E-03 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Ti = 1 
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Table 24  Static automatic reclosing relay and synchronism check relay. IDENTIFICATION: IDACid AR STA and IDACid SC STA, 
where ID is the identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay. AR is for automatic reclosing and SC is for the 
synchronism check function.  
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection 
of failure  
λ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Ageing of the components 
of the relay power supply. 
Relay loses the power 
supply it needs. 
Automatic 
reclosing 
fails.  
Alarm  λˆ   = 3.6E-02 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Ageing of the relay 
components. 
Settings are changed. 
Ageing. The spring of the 
card joint becomes loose. 
The signal transfer is 
prevented 
Static 
automatic 
reclosing relay 
AR 
To send a 
close signal 
to circuit 
breakers 
after a fault 
Human error Erroneous settings  or 
configuration. 
Automatic 
reclosing 
fails.  
Test  λˆ   = 3.6E-02 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Ti = 1 
Ageing of the components 
of the relay power supply. 
The relay loses the 
power supply it needs. 
Automatic 
reclosing 
fails.  
Alarm,   λˆ   = 2.2E-03 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Ageing of the relay 
components. 
Settings are changed 
Ageing. The spring of the 
card joint becomes loose. 
Signal transfer is 
prevented 
Static 
synchronism 
check relay 
To check 
the voltage 
conditions 
before the 
Automatic 
reclosing  . 
Human error Erroneous settings or 
configuration. 
Automatic 
reclosing 
fails.  
Test  λˆ   = 2.2E-03 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Ti = 1 
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Table 25  Microprocessor relays for the synchronism check (SC) alone and for the automatic reclosing with the synchronism check 
function (AR&SC). IDENTIFICATION: IDACid AR&SC and IDACid SC PRO, where ID is the identification of the substation and 
id is the identification of the bay. AR&SC is for the combined automatic reclosing and synchronism check relay and SC is for 
synchronism check only.  
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection 
of failure  
λ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Ageing of the components 
of the relay power supply. 
The relay loses the 
power supply it 
needs. 
Automatic 
reclosing 
fails 
Alarm  λˆ   = 3.4E-03 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Micro-
processor 
synchronism 
check relay.  
To check the 
voltage 
conditions 
before 
automatic 
reclosing. 
Human error Erroneous settings 
or configuration  
 
Automatic 
reclosing 
fails 
Test λˆ   = 1.7E-02 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Ti = 1 
Ageing of the components 
of the relay power supply. 
The relay loses the 
power supply it 
needs. 
Automatic 
reclosing 
fails 
Alarm λˆ   = 2.4E-02 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Human error Erroneous settings 
or configuration  
 
Human error A software error  
Ageing of the components  Settings are changed 
Microproc-
essor relays, 
combined 
automatic 
reclosing and 
synchronism 
check relay.  
To send a 
close signal 
to circuit 
breakers 
after a fault 
if the 
voltages are 
correct. 
Ageing. The spring of the 
card joint becomes loose. 
The signal transfer is 
prevented 
Automatic 
reclosing 
fails 
Test  λˆ   = 2.4E-02 
MTTR = 1.0E-02 
Ti = 1 
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Table 26  Automatic reclosing (AR) system, the components that send an alarm. IDENTIFICATION: ID W1 U MEASURE, IDACid 
LIN U MEAS FO, where ID is the identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay. ID W1 U MEASURE is for 
busbar voltage measurement and is used in all autoreclosing fault trees. IDACid LIN U MEAS FO is for line voltage measurement 
and is used in the autoreclosing fault trees for the follower line end only.  
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects of 
failure 
Detection of 
failure  
λ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Busbar voltage 
measurement for 
the automatic re-
closing system. 
This is used in 
both the master 
and follower line 
ends. 
To send a close 
signal to circuit 
breakers after a 
fault if the busbar 
voltage is correct 
and the line is dead. 
Busbar voltage 
measurement 
circuit has an earth 
fault or miniature 
circuit breakers of 
the VT trip 
SC relay blocks 
the AR-relay. 
AR fails Alarm  λˆ   = 3.3E-03 
 
MTTR =  
6.0E-04 
Line voltage 
measurement for 
the automatic re-
closing system of 
the follower line 
end 
To send a close 
signal to circuit 
breakers after a 
fault if the busbar 
and line voltages 
are correct 
Line voltage 
measurement 
circuit has an earth 
fault or miniature 
circuit breakers of 
the VT trip 
SC relay blocks 
the AR-relay. 
The bay that is a 
‘follower’ cannot 
make an 
automatic 
reclosing action.  
AR fails Alarm  λˆ   = 3.3E-03 
 
MTTR =  
6.0E-04 
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Table 27  Automatic reclosing (AR) system, the tested components. IDENTIFICATION: IDACid Z1 AR SIG, IDACid AR1 SIGN and 
IDACid AR OFF. ID is the identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay. : IDACid Z1 AR SIG is for a start 
signal from the trip relay, IDACid AR1 SIGN is for signal transfers between the circuit breaker and autoreclosing relays and 
between the synchronism check relays and autoreclosing relays. IDACid AR OFF is for the switch which turns AR off when needed.  
Item Function Cause of failure Failure mode Effects 
of fail-
ure 
Detec-
tion of 
failure  
λ  (1/year) 
MTTR (year) 
Ti (year) 
Distance or 
differential 
relay 
Send a start 
signal to 
AR-relays 
A setting or configuration 
error 
Automatic reclosing relay 
does not receive a start 
signal from the trip relays  
AR fails Test λˆ   = 2.9E-03 
MTTR = 9.0E-04 
Ti = 1 
Circuit Signal 
transfer 
Human error: terminal strips 
disconnected in the circuit 
between the CB and AR-relay. 
AR-relay does not receive 
the signal: ‘CB tripped‘. 
For air-blast CBs: AR-
relays do not get the signal 
‘CB ready to close’ 
Circuit Signal 
transfer 
Human error: terminal strips 
disconnected in the circuit 
between the AR- and SC-relay. 
SC-relay blocks the AR-
relay.  
DC infeed 
circuit 
AR relay 
DC power 
supply 
Minimum oil or SF6 CBs: DC 
voltage plus is not connected 
to the AR-relay  
AR-relay does not act due 
to lack of positive voltage. 
AR fails Test  λˆ   = 1.3E-04 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
 
Note: it is 
assumed that one 
basic event 
includes all these 
circuits.  
AR switch 
OFF 
Prevent AR 
when 
needed 
Human error: AR off switch is 
at OFF position. 
AR-relay does not function  AR fails Test  λˆ   = 1.3E-03 
MTTR = 2.9E-05 
Ti = 1 
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APPENDIX D – SOURCE OF INFORMATION FOR THE FMEA 
Device and function Total number 
of equipment-
years / years 
studied 
Data source Faults de-
tected by an 
alarm / by 
tests 
Failure rate 
estimate λˆ for 
faults detected 
by an alarm / by 
tests 
Substation (a common cause 
failure basic event) 
7880 /  
10 ... 55 Yrs 
Norway, Sweden Denmark: 110-400 kV 
substations 1993-2002 from Nordel annual 
statistics, Finland: 220- 400 kV substations 
calculated since 1957, 110 kV estimated 
since 1982 
0 / not relevant 6.3E-05 / -  
Bay (a common cause failure 
basic event) 
20247 /  
20 ... 55 Yrs 
Finland 220- 400 kV substations, calculated 
since 1957, 110 kV estimated since 1982 
0 / not relevant 2.5E-05 / - 
220 V DC voltage supply in a 
case where there is at least 
one modern relay at the 
substation (all DC faults send 
an alarm) 
5457 /  
10 Yrs 
Fingrid’s fault statistics, years 1993-2002, 
DC battery, DC/DC converter faults. 
Rectifier faults are ignored since they send 
an alarm and the fault can be repaired 
before the battery loses its voltage.  
3 / not relevant 6.4E-04 / - 
 
220 V DC voltage supply in a 
case where there is not a 
single modern relay at the 
substation (some DC faults 
send an alarm) 
5457 / 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics, years 1993-2002, 
DC battery,  DC/DC converter faults. 
Rectifier faults are ignored since they send 
an alarm and the fault can be repaired 
before the battery loses its voltage.  
1 / 2 2.7E-04 /  
4.6E-04 
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Device and function Total number of 
equipment-years / 
years studied 
Data source Faults de-
tected by an 
alarm / by 
tests 
Failure rate 
estimate λˆ for 
faults detected 
by an alarm / 
by tests 
220 V DC MCBs at each bay 
for DC1 or DC2 battery 
88 / 1 Yrs Expert judgment. Interview with 
Fingrid’s operation personnel 
0 / not 
relevant 
5.7E-03 / - 
Miniature circuit breaker for 
the busbar protection relay 
(BPR) supplied from 220 V DC 
battery 1 or 2. Initiating event is 
not a current transformer 
explosion. 
330 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault statistics  0 / not 
relevant 
1.5E-03 / - 
 
Miniature circuit breaker of the 
breaker failure relay (BFR) 
supplied from 220 V DC 
battery 1 or 2. Initiating event is 
not a current transformer 
explosion. 
330 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault statistics  0 / not 
relevant 
1.5E-03 / - 
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Device and function Total number of 
equipment-years 
/ years studied 
Data source Faults de-
tected by an 
alarm / by 
tests 
Un-availa-
bility 
Miniature circuit breaker for the 
busbar protection relay (BPR) supplied 
from 220 V DC battery 1 or 2. This 
data is for cases where the initiating 
event is an explosion of a current 
transformer. 
Not relevant / 20 
Yrs 
Fingrid’s grid fault statistics. 8 
busbar faults due to CT explosion, 
the MCB has tripped only once 
during an explosion. 
1 / not 
relevant 
1.3E-01 
Miniature circuit breaker of the 
breaker failure relay (BFR) supplied 
from 220 V DC battery 1 or 2 This 
data is for cases where the initiating 
event is the explosion of a current 
transformer. 
Not relevant / 20 
Yrs 
Fingrid’s grid fault statistics. 8 
busbar faults due to CT explosion, 
once the MCB tripped during a fault.  
1 / not 
relevant 
1.3E-01 
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Device and function Total number of 
equipment-years 
/ years studied 
Data source Faults de-
tected by an 
alarm / by 
tests 
Failure rate 
estimate λˆ for 
faults detected 
by an alarm / 
by tests 
48 V DC supply for protection 
telecommunication system devices 
620 / -  No statistics available. 
Estimate: 620 device years for 
400 kV substations during 20 
years. No faults. 
0 / not 
relevant 
8.1E-04 / - 
Pressurised air system of the substation 
for a circuit breaker trip 
231.3 / 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics 0 / not 
relevant 
2.2E-03 / - 
Pressurised air system of the substation 
for a circuit breaker automatic reclosing 
231.3 / 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics 2 / not 
relevant 
1.1E-02 / - 
Air-blast circuit breaker for tripping 377 / 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics 0 / 6 - / 1.7E-02 
Minimum oil circuit breaker for tripping 507.9 / 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics 0 / 2 - / 4.9E-03 
SF6-circuit breaker for tripping 527.2/ 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics 0 / 1 - / 2.8E-03 
Air-blast circuit breaker for reclosing 377 / 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics 2 / 7 6.9E-02 / 
2.0E-02 
Minimum oil circuit breaker for reclosing 507.9 / 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics 0 / 7 - / 1.5E-02 
SF6-circuit breaker for reclosing 527.2 / 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics 0 / 5 - / 1.1E-02 
Terminal strip of a trip coil or a close coil 
of a circuit breaker is disconnected.  
4236 / 10 Yrs Fingrid’s fault statistics 0 / 2 - / 5.9E-04 
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Device and function  Total number of 
equipment-years 
/ years studied 
Data source Faults de-
tected by an 
alarm / by 
tests 
Failure rate 
estimate λˆ for 
faults detected by 
an alarm / by tests 
Unavailability (q), 
calculated with λ  for 
both tested and 
monitored failures, test 
interval Ti and mean 
time to repair MTTR 
Electromechanical distance 
relays 
386 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
- / 2 - / 6.5E-03 3.3E-03  
Static distance relays 184 / Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
0 / 2 2.7E-03 / 
1.4E-02 
7.1E-03 
Processor distance relays 288 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
8 / 1 3.0E-02 / 5.2E-03 3.3E-03 
MCB for a voltage 
measurement circuit of 
distance relay 
755 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
2 / not 
relevant 
3.3E-03 / - not used 
Electromechanical or static 
differential relays for line 
protection 
Model is not needed. There are no such 
relays in the Finnish transmission grid. 
- - - 
Processor differential relay 
for line protection 
86 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
2 / 0 2.9E-02 / 
5.8E-03 
3.6E-03 
Electromechanical and 
processor breaker failure 
relay 
0 / -  Model is not needed as 
there are no such relays 
on Fingrid’s grid. 
- / - - / - - 
Static breaker failure relay 527 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
1 / 0 2.9E-03 / 9.5E-04 5.1E-04 
Terminal strip of a relay 3856 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
- / 0 - / 1.3E-04 - 
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Device and 
function  
Total number 
of equipment-
years / years 
studied 
Data source Calculation of the unavailability (which is 
constant) 
Unavaila-
bility (q)  
Optical fibre 20 / 1 Yrs The Energy manage-
ment and SCADA 
system of Fingrid 
The unavailability q is the average of the 
unavailabilities of the separate optical fibre 
telecommunication channels. 
1.2E-02 
Radio link 7 / 1 Yrs The Energy manage-
ment and SCADA 
system of Fingrid 
The unavailability q is the average of the 
unavailabilities of the separate radio link channels.  
9.3E-03 
Analogue power 
line carrier 
10 / 1 Yrs The Energy manage-
ment and SCADA 
system of Fingrid 
The unavailability q is the average of the 
unavailabilities of the separate power line carrier 
telecommunication channels.  
6.1E-03 
A combination of 
optical fibre and 
radio link  
20 / 1 Yrs The Energy manage-
ment and SCADA 
system of Fingrid 
The unavailability q is the average of the 
unavailabilities of the separate telecommunication 
channels that consist of optic fibre and radio link. 
5.0E-03 
A combination of 
optical fibre and 
power line carrier 
2 / 1 Yrs The Energy manage-
ment and SCADA 
system of Fingrid 
The unavailability q is the average of the 
unavailabilities of the separate telecommunication 
channels that consist of optic fibre and power line 
carrier. 
1.3E-02 
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Device and function  Total num-
ber of 
equipment-
years / years 
studied 
Data source Faults de-
tected by an 
alarm / by 
tests 
Failure rate estimate λˆ for faults detected 
by an alarm / by tests 
Unavailability (q), 
calculated with λ  
for both tested 
and monitored 
failures, test 
interval Ti and 
mean time to 
repair MTTR 
The tests switch of the 
telecommunication channel is 
at TEST position 
680 / 10 Yrs Expert judgment  not relevant / 
0 
- / 7.4E-04 -  
Electromechanical 
synchronism check relay  
135 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
not relevant / 
0 
- / 3.7E-03 -  
Static autoreclosing relay 152 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
5 / 5 3.6E-02 / 3.6E-02 1.9E-02 
Static synchronism check 
relay  
225 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
0 / 0 2.2E-03 / 2.2 E-03 1.1E-03 
Processor synchronism check 
relay 
147 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
0 / 2 3.4E-03 / 1.7E-02 8.9E-03 
Processor automatic reclosing 
and synchronism check relay 
148 / 5 Yrs Fingrid’s relay fault 
statistics 
3 / 3 2.4E-02 / 2.4E-02 1.2E-02 
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Device and function  Total number 
of equipment-
years / years 
studied 
Data source Faults de-
tected by an 
alarm / by 
tests 
Failure rate 
estimate λˆ for 
faults detected by 
an alarm / by 
tests 
Automatic reclosing system: the trip relays fail 
to send AR start signal. 
955 / 5 Yrs Fingrids relay fault statistics not relevant / 
0 
- / 2.7E-03 
Automatic reclosing system: terminal strips of 
one relay are disconnected  
3536 / 5 Yrs Fingrids relay fault statistics not relevant / 
0 
- / 1.4E-04 
Automatic reclosing system: Autoreclosing 
ON/OFF switch is at OFF position 
397 / 5 Yrs Fingrids relay fault statistics not relevant / 
0 
- / 1.3E-03 
Automatic reclosing system: busbar voltage 
measurement circuit has an earth fault or VT 
MCB trips. 
755 / 5 Yrs Fingrids relay fault statistics 2 /not rele-
vant 
3.3E-03 / -  
Automatic reclosing system: line voltage 
measurement circuit has an earth fault or VT 
MCB trips. 
 Assumption: line VT MCB 
has the same failure rate as the 
busbar MCB. 
 3.3E-03 / - 
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APPENDIX E – RESULTS FOR A SYSTEM BREAKDOWN  
Appendix E uses code names for substation bay and line identifications due to 
confidentiality reasons. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid, where ID is the 
identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay. CB = 
circuit breaker, Z = distance relay, D = line differential relay. 
 
Table 1  100 most important minimal cut sets for the system breakdown. These 
cut sets cover 81.1 % of the system breakdown frequency (1.37E-03).  
No % Fault location 
on the line 
Event 1 Event 2 
1 7.96 Line end Line 33 tele  
2 6.68 In the middle 25AC02 CB TRIP  
3 2.23 Line end 25AC02 CB TRIP  
4 2.06 In the middle 11AC07 CB TRIP 11AC08 CB TRIP 
5 2.06 In the middle 11AC02 CB TRIP 11AC05 CB TRIP 
6 2.06 In the middle 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC08 CB TRIP 
7 2.06 In the middle 11AC05 CB TRIP 11AC07 CB TRIP 
8 2.06 In the middle 11AC08 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
9 2.02 In the middle 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
10 2.02 In the middle 11AC08 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
11 2.02 In the middle 11AC07 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
12 1.67 Line end 20AC03 CB TRIP Line 34 tele 
13 1.58 In the middle 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
14 1.58 In the middle 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC07 CB TRIP 
15 1.58 In the middle 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC08 CB TRIP 
16 1.41 In the middle 25AC06 CB TRIP 25AC09 CB TRIP 
17 1.41 In the middle 25AC09 CB TRIP 25AC01 CB TRIP 
18 1.39 In the middle 26AC03 CB TRIP 26AC10 CB TRIP 
19 1.39 In the middle 26AC03 CB TRIP 26AC09 CB TRIP 
20 1.13 In the middle 32AC01 Z1  32AC01 Z2  
21 1.06 In the middle 32AC09 Z1  32AC09 Z2  
22 0.95 Line end Line 34 tele 25AC03 CB TRIP 
23 0.86 In the middle Line 29 tele 22AC05 Z2 
24 0.86 In the middle Line 29 tele 38AC09 Z2  
25 0.85 In the middle 32AC03 Z1  32AC03 Z2  
26 0.79 In the middle 26AC04 CB TRIP 26AC08 CB TRIP 
27 0.79 In the middle 26AC04 CB TRIP 26AC09 CB TRIP 
28 0.73 In the middle 11AC02 CB TRIP 11AC05 CB TRIP 
29 0.73 In the middle 11AC02 CB TRIP 11AC07 CB TRIP 
30 0.69 Line end 11AC02 CB TRIP 11AC05 CB TRIP 
31 0.69 Line end 11AC07 CB TRIP 11AC08 CB TRIP 
32 0.69 Line end 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC08 CB TRIP 
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33 0.69 Line end 11AC05 CB TRIP 11AC07 CB TRIP 
34 0.69 Line end 11AC08 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
35 0.68 In the middle 42AC09 Z1  42AC09 Z2  
36 0.68 In the middle 25AC07 Z1 25AC07 Z2 
37 0.67 Line end 11AC08 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
38 0.67 Line end 11AC07 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
39 0.67 Line end 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
40 0.63 Line end 12AC04 CB TRIP 12AC05 CB TRIP 
41 0.61 In the middle 26AC03 CB TRIP 26AC10 CB TRIP 
42 0.61 In the middle 26AC09 CB TRIP 26AC10 CB TRIP 
43 0.61 In the middle 26AC08 CB TRIP 26AC09 CB TRIP 
44 0.61 In the middle 26AC04 CB TRIP 26AC08 CB TRIP 
45 0.53 Line end 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC07 CB TRIP 
46 0.53 Line end 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC01 CB TRIP 
47 0.53 Line end 11AC03 CB TRIP 11AC08 CB TRIP 
48 0.47 Line end 25AC06 CB TRIP 25AC09 CB TRIP 
49 0.47 Line end 25AC09 CB TRIP 25AC01 CB TRIP 
50 0.46 Line end 26AC03 CB TRIP 26AC10 CB TRIP 
51 0.46 Line end 26AC03 CB TRIP 26AC09 CB TRIP 
52 0.39 In the middle 25AC06 CB TRIP 25AC01 CB TRIP 
53 0.39 In the middle 25AC06 CB TRIP 25AC09 CB TRIP 
54 0.37 Line end 32AC01 Z1  32AC01 Z2  
55 0.36 In the middle 21AC06 Z2 Line 25 tele 
56 0.36 In the middle 21AC04 Z2 Line 28 tele 
57 0.35 Line end 32AC09 Z1  32AC09 Z2  
58 0.34 In the middle 25AC01 CB TRIP 25AC07 CB TRIP 
59 0.32 In the middle 35AC01 Z1  35AC01 Z2  
60 0.32 In the middle 22AC06 Z1 22AC06 Z2 
61 0.32 In the middle 12AC05 D  38AC08 Z2  
62 0.32 In the middle 38AC08 Z2  27AC01 D  
63 0.32 In the middle 38AC08 D   38AC08 Z2  
64 0.31 In the middle 11AC05 Z1 11AC05 Z2 
65 0.31 In the middle 11AC08 Z1 11AC08 Z2 
66 0.31 In the middle 37AC09 Z1  37AC09 Z2  
67 0.31 In the middle 37AC07 Z1  37AC07 Z2  
68 0.31 Line end 18AC02 CB TRIP 18AC03 CB TRIP 
69 0.31 Line end 18AC03 CB TRIP 18AC05 CB TRIP 
70 0.31 Line end 18AC03 CB TRIP 18AC07 CB TRIP 
71 0.31 In the middle 13AC08 Z1  13AC08 Z2  
72 0.31 In the middle 11AC01 Z1 11AC01 Z2 
73 0.29 Line end Line 29 tele B 22AC05 Z2 
74 0.29 Line end Line 29 tele B 38AC09 Z2  
75 0.28 Line end 32AC03 Z1  32AC03 Z2  
76 0.26 Line end 26AC04 CB TRIP 26AC09 CB TRIP 
77 0.26 Line end 26AC04 CB TRIP 26AC08 CB TRIP 
78 0.26 In the middle 21AC06 D  21AC06 Z2 
79 0.26 In the middle 21AC04 Z2 22AC04 D  
80 0.26 In the middle 21AC06 Z2 37AC00 D   
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81 0.26 In the middle 21AC04 Z2 21AC06 D  
82 0.26 In the middle 38AC09 Z2  22AC05 D  
83 0.26 In the middle 38AC09 D   22AC05 Z2 
84 0.26 In the middle 38AC09 D   38AC09 Z2  
85 0.26 In the middle 22AC05 D  22AC05 Z2 
86 0.25 In the middle 32AC05 Z1  32AC05 Z2  
87 0.24 In the middle 11AC03 Z1 11AC03 Z2 
88 0.24 Line end Line 13 tele B 33AC09 Z2  
89 0.23 In the middle 25AC02 CB TRIP 25AC09 CB TRIP 
90 0.23 Line end 42AC09 Z1  42AC09 Z2  
91 0.23 Line end 25AC07 Z1 25AC07 Z2 
92 0.22 In the middle 25AC09 Z1  25AC09 Z2  
93 0.21 In the middle 26AC03 Z1  26AC03 Z2  
94 0.21 In the middle 13AC01 Z1  13AC01 Z2  
95 0.2 Line end 26AC09 CB TRIP 26AC10 CB TRIP 
96 0.2 Line end 26AC03 CB TRIP 26AC10 CB TRIP 
97 0.2 Line end 26AC04 CB TRIP 26AC08 CB TRIP 
98 0.2 Line end 26AC08 CB TRIP 26AC09 CB TRIP 
99 0.18 In the middle 34AC07 Z1  34AC07 Z2  
100 0.18 In the middle 22AC05 CB TRIP 22AC06 CB TRIP 
Table 2  Most important components for a system breakdown according to 
Fussell-Vesely (FV) and risk decrease factor (RDF) measures.  
No IDENTIFICATION FV measure 
1 11AC08 CB TRIP 1.32E-01 
2 11AC01 CB TRIP 1.31E-01 
3 11AC03 CB TRIP 1.19E-01 
4 11AC07 CB TRIP 1.10E-01 
5 25AC02 CB TRIP 9.30E-02 
6 Line 33 tele 7.96E-02 
7 11AC05 CB TRIP 6.41E-02 
8 25AC09 CB TRIP 4.72E-02 
9 26AC03 CB TRIP 4.64E-02 
10 26AC09 CB TRIP 4.54E-02 
11 11AC02 CB TRIP 4.25E-02 
12 26AC10 CB TRIP 3.54E-02 
13 25AC06 CB TRIP 3.19E-02 
14 26AC04 CB TRIP 3.01E-02 
15 25AC01 CB TRIP 2.95E-02 
16 26AC08 CB TRIP 2.75E-02 
17 Line 34 tele 2.62E-02 
18 Line 29 tele B 2.29E-02 
19 38AC09 Z2  1.82E-02 
20 22AC05 Z2 1.82E-02 
21 21AC04 Z2  1.75E-02 
22 20AC03 CB TRIP 1.71E-02 
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23 32AC01 Z2  1.50E-02 
24 32AC01 Z1  1.50E-02 
25 22AC05 CB TRIP 1.45E-02 
26 32AC09 Z1  1.42E-02 
27 32AC09 Z2  1.42E-02 
28 38AC08 Z2  1.31E-02 
29 21AC06 Z2  1.18E-02 
30 25AC03 CB TRIP 1.15E-02 
31 32AC03 Z1  1.14E-02 
32 32AC03 Z2  1.14E-02 
Table 3  Most important components in a system breakdown according to risk 
increase factor (RIF) measure 
No ID RIF 
1 11 SUBSTATION        6.72E+02 
2 37 SUBSTATION        6.43E+02 
3 32 SUBSTATION        5.59E+02 
4 25 SUBSTATION        5.42E+02 
5 13 SUBSTATION        5.36E+02 
6 22 SUBSTATION        5.04E+02 
7 22AC05 BAY           4.92E+02 
8 38 SUBSTATION        4.72E+02 
9 42 SUBSTATION        4.52E+02 
10 26 SUBSTATION        4.48E+02 
11 21AC04 BAY           3.58E+02 
12 22AC06 BAY           3.56E+02 
13 34 SUBSTATION        3.56E+02 
14 11AC08 BAY           3.50E+02 
15 37AC7A BAY            3.47E+02 
16 37AC7B BAY            3.47E+02 
17 11AC05 BAY           3.47E+02 
18 37AC9A BAY            3.47E+02 
19 37AC9B BAY            3.47E+02 
20 25AC13 BAY           3.46E+02 
21 42AC10 BAY           3.46E+02 
22 42AC09 BAY           3.46E+02 
23 A11AC01 BAY           3.44E+02 
24 13AC08 BAY           3.41E+02 
25 13AC08 Z VT MCB      3.41E+02 
26 38AC8B BAY           3.23E+02 
27 38AC8A BAY           3.23E+02 
28 21 SUBSTATION        3.16E+02 
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Table 4  The parameters, the sensitivity of which is highest for a system 
breakdown.  
No Component Parameter Sensitivity 
1 Circuit breaker Test interval 1.48E+02 
2 Circuit breaker, air-blast Failure rate 7.72E+01 
3 Z-relay, microprocessor Unavailability 7.53E+00 
4 Circuit breaker, SF6 Failure rate 6.53E+00 
5 Z-relay, static Unavailability 5.75E+00 
6 Circuit breaker, minimum oil  Failure rate 5.62E+00 
7 Z-relay electromechanical Unavailability 3.07E+00 
8 Telecommunication channel: a 
combination of an optical fibre and a 
radio link  
Unavailability 1.99E+00 
9 Relay Test interval 1.66E+00 
10 D-relay, microprocessor Unavailability 1.50E+00 
11 Telecommunication channel: optical 
fibre 
Unavailability 1.32E+00 
12 BFF, static Unavailability 1.22E+00 
13 Telecommunication channel: power line 
carrier, 2-phase faults  
Unavailability 1.08E+00 
14 Miniature circuit breaker of voltage 
transformers  
Failure rate 1.04E+00 
15 Miniature circuit breaker of voltage 
transformers  
Time to repair 1.04E+00 
16 Terminal strip of the relays  Failure rate 1.03E+00 
17 Telecommunication channel: radio link Unavailability 1.01E+00 
18 Telecommunication channel: a 
combination of optical fibre and power 
line carrier 
Unavailability 1.01E+00 
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APPENDIX F –PARTIAL SYSTEM BREAKDOWN RESULTS 
Appendix F uses code names for substation bay and line identifications due to 
confidentiality reasons. IDENTIFICATIONS: IDACid, where ID is the 
identification of the substation and id is the identification of the bay.  
Table 1  100 most important minimal cut sets for the partial system breakdown. 
These cut sets cover the entire partial system breakdown frequency (1.12E-01). 
No % Fault location  Event 1 Event 2 
1 28.69 Line end Line 11 tele  
2 24.07 In the middle Line 4 tele  
3 18.09 Line end Line 19 tele  
4 8.32 Line end Line 34 tele  
5 2.03 In the middle 25AC09 CB TRIP  
6 1.75 In the middle 44AC1A CB TRIP  
7 1.75 In the middle 44AC1B CB TRIP  
8 1.35 In the middle 18AC03 CB TRIP  
9 0.89 In the middle 44AC2B CB TRIP  
10 0.89 In the middle 44AC2A CB TRIP  
11 0.89 In the middle 22AC05 CB TRIP  
12 0.83 Line end Line 16 tele  
13 0.76 In the middle 18AC08 CB TRIP  
14 0.68 Line end 25AC09 CB TRIP  
15 0.62 In the middle 20AC05 CB TRIP  
16 0.58 Line end 44AC01 CB TRIP  
17 0.58 Line end 44AC02 CB TRIP  
18 0.57 In the middle 25AC06 CB TRIP  
19 0.45 Line end 18AC03 CB TRIP  
20 0.42 Line end Line 38 tele  
21 0.39 In the middle 15AC05 CB TRIP  
22 0.38 In the middle 21AC06 CB TRIP  
23 0.3 Line end 44AC2B CB TRIP  
24 0.3 Line end 44AC2A CB TRIP  
25 0.29 Line end 22AC05 CB TRIP  
26 0.25 Line end 18AC08 CB TRIP  
27 0.23 Line end Line 20 tele  
28 0.22 In the middle 16AC08 CB TRIP  
29 0.22 Line end Line 17 tele  
30 0.22 Line end 22AC05 CB TRIP  
31 0.21 Line end 20AC05 CB TRIP  
32 0.21 Line end Line 35 tele  
33 0.2 In the middle 39AC09 CB TRIP  
34 0.2 In the middle 39AC10 CB TRIP  
35 0.19 Line end 25AC06 CB TRIP  
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36 0.18 In the middle 22AC04 CB TRIP  
37 0.18 In the middle 21AC04 CB TRIP  
38 0.18 In the middle 20AC03 CB TRIP  
39 0.17 In the middle 15AC06 CB TRIP  
40 0.15 Line end Line 18 tele  
41 0.13 Line end 15AC05 CB TRIP  
42 0.13 Line end Line 37 tele 26AC04 CB TRIP 
43 0.13 Line end 21AC06 CB TRIP  
44 0.1 In the middle 25AC03 CB TRIP  
45 0.1 Line end 34AC7B CB TRIP  
46 0.09 In the middle 39AC03 CB TRIP  
47 0.09 In the middle 39AC04 CB TRIP  
48 0.07 Line end 16AC08 CB TRIP  
49 0.07 Line end 39AC09 CB TRIP  
50 0.07 Line end 39AC10 CB TRIP  
51 0.06 Line end 21AC04 CB TRIP  
52 0.06 Line end 22AC04 CB TRIP  
53 0.06 Line end 20AC03 CB TRIP  
54 0.03 Line end 25AC03 CB TRIP  
55 0.03 Line end 39AC04 CB TRIP  
56 0.03 Line end 39AC03 CB TRIP  
57 0.03 In the middle 39AC01 CB TRIP  
58 0.03 In the middle 39AC02 CB TRIP  
59 0.01 Line end 39AC02 CB TRIP  
60 0.01 Line end 39AC01 CB TRIP  
61 0.01 Line end 26AC03 CB TRIP 26AC09 CB TRIP 
62 0.01 Line end 26AC03 CB TRIP 26AC10 CB TRIP 
63 0 Line end 32AC09 Z1 32AC09 Z2 
64 0 In the middle 31AC05 Z1 31AC05 Z2 
65 0 Line end Line 29 tele B 22AC05 Z2   
66 0 In the middle 39AC09 Z1 39AC09 Z2 
67 0 Line end 26AC04 CB TRIP 26AC09 CB TRIP 
68 0 Line end 26AC04 CB TRIP 26AC08 CB TRIP 
69 0 In the middle 20AC05 Z1 20AC05 Z2   
70 0 Line end 26AC09 CB TRIP 26AC10 CB TRIP 
71 0 Line end 26AC03 CB TRIP 26AC10 CB TRIP 
72 0 In the middle 44AC01 Z1   44AC1A Z2   
73 0 In the middle Line 28 tele B 22AC04 Z2   
74 0 In the middle 15AC05 Z1 15AC05 Z2   
75 0 In the middle 18AC03 Z1 18AC03 Z2   
76 0 In the middle 22AC04 D  22AC04 Z2   
77 0 In the middle 21AC06 D  22AC04 Z2   
78 0 In the middle 17AC03 Z1 17AC03 Z2   
79 0 Line end 21AC04 Z2   Line 28 tele B 
80 0 In the middle Line 30 tele A 39AC01 Z2 
81 0 Line end 22AC06 Z1   22AC06 Z2   
82 0 Line end 39AC09 Z1 39AC09 Z2 
83 0 Line end 21AC04 Z2 22AC04 D  
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84 0 Line end 21AC04 Z2 21AC06 D  
85 0 Line end 22AC05 D  22AC05 Z2   
86 0 Line end 38AC09 D  22AC05 Z2   
87 0 In the middle 16AC08 Z1 16AC08 Z2   
88 0 In the middle 18AC08 Z1 18AC08 Z2   
89 0 Line end 20AC05 Z1 20AC05 Z2   
90 0 Line end 26AC03 Z1 26AC03 Z2   
91 0 In the middle 17AC03 CB TRIP 17AC04 CB TRIP 
92 0 In the middle 20AC03 Z1 20AC03 Z2   
93 0 In the middle 15AC06 Z1 15AC06 Z2   
94 0 Line end 44AC01 Z1   44AC1A Z2   
95 0 In the middle 39AC03 Z1 39AC03 Z2 
96 0 Line end Line 28 tele B 22AC04 Z2   
97 0 Line end 21AC04 Z2   Line 28 tele B 
98 0 Line end 34AC04 Z1 34AC04 Z2 
99 0 Line end Line 30 tele A Line 30 tele B 
100 0 Line end 15AC05 Z1 15AC05 Z2   
Table 2  The most important components in a partial system breakdown 
according to Fussell-Vesely (FV) and risk decrease factor (RDF) measures.  
No ID FV 
1 Line 11 tele 3.00E-01 
2 Line 4 tele 2.51E-01 
3 Line 19 tele 1.89E-01 
4 Line 34 tele 8.69E-02 
5 25AC09 CB TRIP       2.83E-02 
6 44AC1A CB TRIP       2.43E-02 
7 44AC1B CB TRIP       2.43E-02 
8 18AC03 CB TRIP       1.87E-02 
9 22AC05 CB TRIP       1.46E-02 
10 44AC2B CB TRIP       1.23E-02 
11 44AC2A CB TRIP       1.23E-02 
12 18AC08 CB TRIP       1.06E-02 
13 20AC05 CB TRIP       8.70E-03 
14 Line 16 tele 8.64E-03 
15 25AC06 CB TRIP       7.88E-03 
16 15AC05 CB TRIP       5.48E-03 
17 21AC06 CB TRIP       5.24E-03 
18 Line 38 tele 4.38E-03 
19 16AC08 CB TRIP       3.06E-03 
20 39AC10 CB TRIP       2.72E-03 
21 39AC09 CB TRIP       2.72E-03 
22 22AC04 CB TRIP       2.53E-03 
23 21AC04 CB TRIP 2.53E-03 
24 20AC03 CB TRIP 2.52E-03 
25 Line 20 tele 2.43E-03 
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26 Line 17 tele 2.28E-03 
27 Line 35 tele 2.17E-03 
28 15AC06 CB TRIP 1.82E-03 
29 Line 18 tele 1.57E-03 
30 25AC03 CB TRIP 1.44E-03 
31 26AC04 CB TRIP 1.42E-03 
32 Line 37 tele 1.35E-03 
33 39AC03 CB TRIP 1.30E-03 
34 39AC04 CB TRIP 1.30E-03 
35 34AC07 CB TRIP 1.01E-03 
Table 3  Most important components in a partial system breakdown according 
to risk increase factor (RIF) measure. 
No ID RIF 
1 22AC05 CB TRIP       5.46E+00 
2 20 SUBSTATION        4.53E+00 
3 21AC06 CB TRIP       4.09E+00 
4 22 SUBSTATION        4.05E+00 
5 20AC05 Z VT MCB      3.95E+00 
6 20AC05 BAY           3.95E+00 
7 20AC05 CB TRIP       3.94E+00 
8 25AC09 CB TRIP       3.77E+00 
9 18 SUBSTATION        3.73E+00 
10 39 SUBSTATION        3.52E+00 
11 15 SUBSTATION        3.42E+00 
12 44AC1A CB TRIP       3.40E+00 
13 44AC1B CB TRIP       3.40E+00 
Table 4  The parameters, the sensitivity of which is highest for a partial system 
breakdown.  
No Component Parameter Sensitivity 
1 PLC telecommunication channel, 2-ph. faults Unavalability 8.07E+00 
2 Circuit breaker Test interval 2.82E+00 
3 Circuit breaker, air-blast Failure rate 2.28E+00 
4 Circuit breaker, minimum oil Failure rate 1.32E+00 
5 Circuit breaker, SF6 Failure rate 1.19E+00 
6 Telecommunication channel: optical fibre Unavalability 1.14E+00 
7 Relay Test interval 1.05E+00 
8 Telecommunication channel: OF & RL  Unavalability 1.04E+00 
9 Telecommunication channel: radio link Unavalability 1.02E+00 
10 Z-relay, electromechanical Unavalability 1.02E+00 
11 Z-relay, microprocessor Unavalability 1.01E+00 
12 Z-relay, static Unavalability 1.01E+00 
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